

File #:

602-116395

Serial Scope:

51 Three 100

Released under the John
F. Kennedy Assassination
Records Collection Act
of 1992 (44 USC 2107
Note). Case#:NW 55118
Date: 11-12-2011

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

April 30, 1975

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. SUBJECT: Organization
2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI
3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum
4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA
6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

LHM refers to request of the SSC for a list of names and titles of certain FBI Intelligence Division (INTD) personnel at FBIHQ and numbers only of certain other INTD personnel; and relates agreement reached between FBI officials and Mr. William Miller, Staff Director of the SSC, that the original request be modified as follows. The FBI will prepare the necessary list and make it available for review at FBIHQ by appropriately cleared personnel of the SSC Staff.

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75.
8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI REC-106 62-116395-100
9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/8/75 16 MAY 7 1975
10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395-53

11. NONE. #MOB/6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/9/01 BY SP-2 ALM/zwg

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. (4)
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-88 BY SP5 ci/jah

intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 4/25/75

You were previously advised that Douglas Durham, former MP 4115-E, who has furnished high-level information regarding activities of the American Indian Movement (AIM), after being confronted by AIM leaders, admitted being a confidential informant for the FBI. This information has been made public.

Attached teletype from Omaha advises that Assistant U. S. Attorney Keith E. Uhl, Office of Special Prosecutor, stated he received a telephone call 4/24/75 from Durham and that Durham told him he had been contacted by representatives of the Office of Senator Frank Church, Washington, D. C., requesting Durham's presence in Washington during the week of April 28, 1975, for purpose of attending staff meetings to determine his potential as a witness before committee investigating operations of the FBI. Durham indicated he intended to comply and would have no further contact with the FBI. We are following this matter closely and you will be kept advised.

- 1 - General Investigative Division
- 1 - Legal Counsel Division
- 1 - External Affairs Division
- 1 - William O. Cregar

WDN:lij WDN

JGD/wm
JGD/wm
JGD/wm

WRW
Curt
Gra

DOJ/FBI

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

APR 24 1975

TELETYPE

INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

12-19-88 BY SP5 clahm

NR 005 OM PLAIN

4:39PM NTEL 4/24/75 RRH

TO: DIRECTOR (137-33264)
MINNEAPOLIS (157-1458)

FROM: OMAHA (170-231) (P)

FORMER MP 4115-E. *Conf. Draft*

SENSTudy-75

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
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Telephone	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

ON APRIL 24, 1975, AUSA KEITH E. UHL, ADVISED HE RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALL FROM SUBJECT RELATING SUBJECT HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OFFICE OF SENATOR FRANK CHURCH, WASHINGTON, D.C., REQUESTING HIS PRESENCE IN WASHINGTON DURING WEEK OF APRIL 28, 1975, FOR PURPOSE OF STAFF MEETINGS TO DETERMINE SUBJECT'S POTENTIAL AS WITNESS BEFORE CHURCH COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING OPERATIONS OF THE FBI.

SUBJECT INDICATED HE INTENDED TO COMPLY WITH REQUEST AND HAD DECIDED THAT IN VIEW OF THIS DEVELOPMENT, HE WOULD DECLINE AND NOT SOLICIT ANY FURTHER CONTACT WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FBI.

END.

RSP FBIHQ

18 MAY 2 1975

ROUTED IN ENVELOPE

DOMESTIC 30-1975

62-116375-11

NOT RECORDED

JUN 11 1975

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

DATE April 22, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. L. Lacey

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/19/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JLG

The purpose of this memorandum is to record that on 4/18/75 Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, Executive Office Building, stated he had reviewed a final copy of the Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction including Exhibit L, pages 36 and 37. Mr. Wilderotter advised Bureau Supervisor Alonzo L. Lacey that The White House interposed no objection to the Jurisdiction paper being furnished to the Senate Select Committee.

With reference to the study entitled Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction, Mr. Wilderotter requested that he be furnished a copy and this was done. In addition, Wilderotter had previously on 4/4/75 reviewed the paper for approval of the use of items concerning Presidential or National Security Council interest.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

ALL:ekw
(5)

62-116395

WCB
P.M.

REC-106

62-116395-99

JMB

ENR

GML

84 MAY 7 1975

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir. _____
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
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Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. A. Mintz

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION POSITION PAPER
ON AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT NATIONAL SECURITY
INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

DATE: 4/7/75

1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton

1 - Mr. A. L. Lacey, Jr.

SENSTUDY 75

~~Security Jurisdiction~~

The purpose of this memorandum is to summarize investigative efforts to authenticate Hoover memoranda dated 8/24-25/36.

Document Section, FBI Laboratory, determined the type appearing on Hoover memorandum dated 8/25/36 was prepared on a Remington typewriter with an elite type used since October, 1935. Hoover memorandum to Tamm dated 9/10/36, was prepared on an IBM typewriter with pica-style type used since 1930.

The letterhead used on both Hoover memoranda of 8/24-25/36 was authorized FBI stationery effective August 14, 1936.

On 3/10/75, Mr. Donald B. Schewe, Assistant Librarian, Reference Archives, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, advised that The White House Ushers Appointment Book contained entries showing that on Thursday, August 24, 1936, from 9:20 a.m. to 10:12 a.m., President Roosevelt met with Mr. Hoover in his residence at The White House prior to leaving for his office. Schewe pointed out that this meeting was significant since President Roosevelt met Mr. Hoover immediately after returning from an extended trip, a departure from his usual practice. There was no entry on 8/25/36, other than the President's departure for the Dakotas at 10:40 p.m.

On 4/2/75, review of Cordell Hull Papers, Library of Congress, reflected that a Desk Diary (container #68, folder #295, microfilm #38) of Secretary Hull contained an entry on 8/25/36 that the Secretary had luncheon with the President between 1:00 p.m. to 3:15 p.m.

Detailed memorandum attached.

ACTION:

For information.

5 ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

ALL: vb

50 APR 25 1975

MAY 2

1975

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir. _____
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
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Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

Original Filed In C 35-1242

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-7-00 BY 39063 E2022/CC/mmw

Mr. White

February 27, 1975

J. H. Mortimer

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TAMM
FROM JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DATED SEPTEMBER 10, 1936;
CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM BY
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER DATED AUGUST 25, 1936.

On this date, SA Alonzo L. Lacey of the Intelligence Division delivered the above-captioned memoranda to the Laboratory with a request to determine the make of typewriter employed in the preparation of the memoranda and the date of introduction of the type styles employed. The purpose of this investigation was to ascertain whether or not the type styles on the typewriters used to write the memoranda were in use on the dates appearing on the memoranda.

It was determined that the "Memorandum For Mr. Tamm from John Edgar Hoover dated September 10, 1936" was prepared on an IBM typewriter equipped with a pica style of type which has been in use since 1930. The typewriting comprising the "Confidential Memorandum by John Edgar Hoover dated August 25, 1936" was determined to have been prepared on a Remington typewriter equipped with an elite style of type that has been in use since October, 1935.

The memoranda were returned to SA Lacey.

RECOMMENDATION:

The result of this examination be forwarded to the Intelligence Division.

- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Lacey
- 1 - Mr. White
- 1 - Mr. Mortimer
- 1 - Mr. Oberg

WSO:mrg
(6)

ENCLOSURE

62-716395-
66-174-1849

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

August 14, 1936.

New letterheads.

st

Mr. Quinn
Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. T. Ladd
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Hawley
Mr. Edwards
Mr. Egan
Mr. Fairhurst
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Hatch
Mr. Joseph
Mr. Lester
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Quinn
Mr. Schaffer
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy
John Quinn
Aug 14
R.R.

RECORDED

&
INDEXED

AUG 20 1936

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

AUG 18 1936 P. M.

SEARCHED INDEXED SERIALIZED FILED
John Quinn, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice

ENCLOSURE 62-66727 11842

62-116395-

REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR

DIRECTOR

EDGAR HOOVER

Federal Bureau of Investigation

United States Department of Justice

Washington, D. C.

Mr. Coffey
John Dowd
John Edwards
Mr. Egan
Mr. Felt
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Lester
Mr. Nichols
Joe Quinn
Miss Schlesinger
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Tracy
Miss Gandy

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

62-66727-18412

Mar 13, 1975

RESEARCH CONDUCTED AT FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT LIBRARY, HYDE PARK, NY
ON 3/10-12/75

On 3/10/74, Mr. DONALD B. SCHEWE, Assistant Librarian in the Reference Archives, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY, was advised of our interest in locating any communications bearing upon a conversation between former President FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT and former Secretary of State CORDELL HULL in the latter part of August, 1936. Mr. SCHEWE was advised that this conversation was concerned with the security of the US and that Mr. J. EDGAR HOOVER of the FBI may have participated in this conversation. Mr. SCHEWE was also advised that Mr. ROOSEVELT allegedly reduced the subject matter of above conversation to a memorandum and that we were interested in locating this memorandum or some information bearing upon above conversation. Arrangements were made to meet with Mr. SCHEWE at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, NY, on 3/12/75. Mr. SCHEWE indicated that in the meantime he would conduct some research in this matter.

On 3/12/75, Mr. SCHEWE advised that he had conducted some research relative to our telephone call on 3/10/75, and inquired if we could be more specific with regard to the dates of the information desired. SCHEWE was advised that to the best of our knowledge the conversation we were interested in involving FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (FDR), HULL and Mr. HOOVER, occurred on approximately 8/24-26/36 and that the conversation concerned the internal security of the US.

Mr. SCHEWE, at this point, furnished a Xerox copy of a "buck slip" dated 8/24/36, (copy of which is attached) on White House stationery, classified "Confidential" and addressed to the Secretary of State from FDR". Mr. SCHEWE stated that "buck slips" are nothing more than a cover memorandum utilized to transmit communications which are attached thereto. It is to be noted that this "buck slip" indicates that attached to it was a memorandum for the Secretary of State, unsigned, undated and recommending coordination of activities of all agents of the Government in foreign countries. SCHEWE advised

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

that the synopsis of this memorandum which appears on the "buck slip" was the usual practice at that time to identify the documents attached to it. SCHEWE added that this was the only document he was able to locate which may have some bearing on the desired information. SCHEWE stated that the possibility exists that the referred to memorandum may be located among the collection of papers of CORDELL HULL which are now stored at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Mr. SCHEWE then exhibited to interviewing personnel the White House Ushers Appointment Book which was hand-written and kept on a daily basis. This appointment book contained the following pertinent information:

Thursday, August 13, 1936, at 9:50 AM
FDR departed the White House for a visit
to the flood areas in NY, Ohio and Pennsyl-
vania.

Thursday, August 24, 1936, FDR returned
to White House at 8:45 AM.

9:20 AM FDR met with Mr. HOOVER from
9:20 AM to 10:12 AM.

(Note * - There is no entry in this book for Aug. 24, 1936, indicating that Mr. HULL was there. Mr. SCHEWE advised that it is interesting to note that FDR met Mr. HOOVER in his residence in the White House on 8/24/36, prior to leaving for his office in the White House. SCHEWE also pointed out that this meeting was significant since FDR met with Mr. HOOVER on 8/24/36, immediately after returning from an extended trip. This, according to SCHEWE was a departure from FDR's usual practice.

There was no record in the White House Usher's Appointment Book for 8/25/36, which would indicate that FDR met with either Mr. HULL or Mr. HOOVER on that date. This book indicates that FDR departed the White House on Tuesday, 8/25/75, at 10:40 PM for a trip to the draught areas, in upper Maine, South Dakota and North

Dakota, as well as a visit to Mt. Rushmore. FDR did not return to the White House until Sunday, Sept. 6, 1936, at 10:02 AM.

The White House Usher's Appointment Book further reflects that FDR, during the period July 10, 1936, to Aug. 10, 1936, was away from the White House campaigning. FDR returned to the White House on 8/10/36, and remained there until 8/13/36, when he again departed on a trip and returned on 8/24/36. FDR also departed from the White House on 8/25/36, and returned on 9/6/36.

Mr. SCHEWE also produced to interviewing personnel the appointment book of FDR's private secretary, GRACE TULLY for the pertinent period. This appointment book reflects all of FDR's office appointments. A review of this appointment book fails to reflect that FDR met or had an appointment with Mr. HOOVER in his office during the period 8/13/36 to 9/6/36. However, this appointment book does reflect that during this period FDR did have a meeting with CORDELL HULL on 8/25/36, at 1:00 PM.

Mr. SCHEWE further advised that he personally reviewed the following and was unable to locate any documents or references which could possibly shed some light on the matter of interest to us:

- 1.) Papers kept in FDR's safe.
- 2.) Papers kept by his secretary in a separate White House safe.
- 3.) Papers kept in FDR's official presidential file.
- 4.) Papers kept in FDR's alphabetical file maintained by his secretary.
- 5.) Individual agencies files.
- 6.) J. EDGAR HOOVER's file.

- 7.) Attorney General's file.
- 8.) Assistant Attorney General's file.
- 9.) National Security file.
- 10.) Internal Security file.
- 11.) FBI file.

In conclusion, Mr. SCHEWE stated that after reviewing all of the above data, he concluded that the pertinent document of interest to us is not at the FDR Library at Hyde Park, NY. SCHEWE added that if any such document is at the Library, it is misfiled and as there are approximately 21 million pages of manuscripts and documents at the Library, it would be impossible to locate same.

It is to be noted that on the enclosed "buck slip" there are four penciled notations, i.e. 285-C, X20, X285 and X67. SCHEWE stated that these notations are part of the FDR Library cross-reference system. SCHEWE added that he checked these references and could locate nothing further regarding the matter of interest to us. SCHEWE stated that these references pertained to the enclosed "buck slip".

285-6
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

August 24, 1936.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE ~~20~~

I find this in my file,
dating back two months. As I
~~x 255~~
understand it everybody is
agreed on it. What is the next
step?

F. D. R.

Memo. from State, unsigned and undated, recommending coordination of activities of all agents of the govt. in foreign countries: each agency as it is related to the others, and all in their relation to the State Department; makes 9 recommendations of coordination.
62-116395

ENCLOSURE

NR 003 AX CODE

11:43PM NITEL MAY 3, 1975 WMM

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)
FROM ALEXANDRIA (62-NEW) (P)

O
SENSTUDY 75

RE BUTEL MAY 2, 1975. *fwg93*

FORMER BUREAU AGENT WILLIAM P. GEORGE, 6302 GOLF COURSE SQUARE,
ALEXANDRIA, VA., CONTACTED MAY 2, 1975 AND STATED THAT IN EVENT HE IS
CONTACTED BY STAFF OF SENATE OR HOUSE COMMITTEES, HE MAY REFUSE TO BE
INTERVIEWED, BUT IF HE CONSENTS TO BE INTERVIEWED HE WILL REQUEST
PRESENCE OF FBI AGENT, IF QUESTIONS ARE ASKED RELATIVE TO SENSITIVE
TO BUREAU OPERATIONS.

INQUIRY AT RESIDENCE OF HAROLD P. LEINBAUGH, 1160 WIMBLEDON
DRIVE, MC LEAN, VA., ON MAY 2, 1975, REVEALS THAT HE IS PRESENTLY AT
MEDITERRANEAN, HOTEL CARAVELLE, ST. ANNE, GUADALUPE, FRENCH
INDIES. HE IS EXPECTED TO RETURN TO HIS RESIDENCE ON MAY 18, 1975.

BUREAU IS REQUESTED TO ADVISE IF ALEXANDRIA SHOULD CONTACT
LEINBAUGH UPON HIS RETURN.

TJT FBI WASH DC CLR

cc 67-585330 (George)
cc 67-47621 (Leinbaugh)

84 MAY 8 1975

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
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Ident.	_____
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Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

MAY 03 1975
TELETYPE
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/19/01 BY SP2 am/216

Chase

REC-106 62-116395-98

16 MAY 7 1975

MR 002 BA PLAIN

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

1220PM URGENT MAY 3, 1975 BJD
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
FROM: BALTIMORE (62-NEW)

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUREAU TEL, MAY 2, 1975. *P.S. 93*

DONALD G. HANNING, 18 OXFORD STREET, CHEVY CHASE,
MARYLAND, CONTACTED INSTANT DATE BY SAC, BALTIMORE.
INSTRUCTIONS IN REFERENCED TELETYPE FOLLOWED. HANNING
ADVISED HAD NOT BEEN CONTACTED BY ANY REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE SENATE OR HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES TO DATE. ADVISED
WOULD CONTACT SAC, BALTIMORE SHOULD HE BE CONTACTED IN
THE FUTURE.

ENDDSS FBI HQ CCLR

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/19/01 BY SP/ADM/146
moe/b

MAY 03 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.	_____
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Laboratory	_____
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Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

Craig

REC-106

62-11639-97

16 MAY 7 1975

R

5

Jill 62-11639-97

D. Nichols
cc: 62-41450-6 (Loring)

84 MAY 8 1975

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 02 1975

TELETYPE

NR 09 OM PLAIN

7:00 PM CST URGENT MAY 2, 1975 SKH

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM: OMAHA (62-NEW) (P)

SENSTUDY 75.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE, MAY 2, 1975.

FORMER SA JOHN J. QUINN WAS CONTACTED BY ME PERSONALLY AND ADVISED PER INSTRUCTIONS IN RETEL. HE WAS APPRECIATIVE OF ADVANCED NOTICE RE POSSIBLE INTERVIEW AND STATED THAT HE WOULD DESIRE AN AGENT BE PRESENT IF SUCH INTERVIEW OCCURS. STATED HE WOULD PERSONALLY CONTACT ME IF HE IS CONTACTED BY STAFF MEMBERS.

BUREAU WILL BE KEPT ADVISED.

END.

REC-106

62-116395-96

MAH FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE

WA CRLR

16 MAY 7 1975

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

(C. Quinn)
cc 61-43672-4 (Quinn)

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
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Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JFB

April 30, 1975

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Policies and Procedures of the FBI
2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI
3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum with enclosures described below
4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified except for one enclosure which is classified "Secret."
5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have
6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:

Following excerpts from the FBI Manual of Instructions:

- (a) Table of Contents.
- (b) Preface. Guidelines for FBI Investigations.
- (c) Section 36. Espionage (classified "Secret").
- (d) Section 84. Registration Act.
- (e) Section 86. Sabotage.
- (f) Section 87. Investigations of Subversive Organizations and Individuals.
- (g) Section 88. Sedition. REC-106
- (h) Section 95. Treason. 62-11435-*SP:ekw* 1975-188
- (i) Section 97. Voorhis Act.
- (j) Section 122. Extremist Matters and Civil Unrest.

16 MAY 7 1975

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____

Asst. Dir.: _____

Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____

Files & Com. _____

Gen. Inv. _____

Ident. _____

Inspection _____

SFP:ekw *OKW*

Intell. _____

Laboratory _____

Plan. & Eval. _____

Spec. Inv. _____

Training _____

Legal Coun. _____

Telephone Rm. _____

Director Secy. _____

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

GPO 251-546

Material furnished includes policy, statutes, instructions and related matters covering FBI investigations in the security field generally. Limited, extremely sensitive material excluded but available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the SSC Staff at FBI Headquarters.

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75
8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI
9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/7/75
10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395-75
11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:
No direct relation.

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index
in connection with Senstudy 75.

Routing Slip
02 Rev. 12-17-73

(Copies to _____ Checked)

TO: SAC:

- | | | |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Albany | <input type="checkbox"/> Houston | <input type="checkbox"/> Oklahoma City |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Albuquerque | <input type="checkbox"/> Indianapolis | <input type="checkbox"/> Omaha |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Alexandria | <input type="checkbox"/> Jackson | <input type="checkbox"/> Philadelphia |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Anchorage | <input type="checkbox"/> Jacksonville | <input type="checkbox"/> Phoenix |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Atlanta | <input type="checkbox"/> Kansas City | <input type="checkbox"/> Pittsburgh |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Baltimore | <input type="checkbox"/> Knoxville | <input type="checkbox"/> Portland |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Birmingham | <input type="checkbox"/> Las Vegas | <input type="checkbox"/> Richmond |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Boston | <input type="checkbox"/> Little Rock | <input type="checkbox"/> Sacramento |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Buffalo | <input type="checkbox"/> Los Angeles | <input type="checkbox"/> St. Louis |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Butte | <input type="checkbox"/> Louisville | <input type="checkbox"/> Salt Lake City |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Charlotte | <input type="checkbox"/> Memphis | <input type="checkbox"/> San Antonio |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Chicago | <input type="checkbox"/> Miami | <input type="checkbox"/> San Diego |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cincinnati | <input type="checkbox"/> Milwaukee | <input type="checkbox"/> San Francisco |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cleveland | <input type="checkbox"/> Minneapolis | <input type="checkbox"/> San Juan |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Columbia | <input type="checkbox"/> Mobile | <input type="checkbox"/> Savannah |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Dallas | <input type="checkbox"/> Newark | <input type="checkbox"/> Seattle |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Denver | <input type="checkbox"/> New Haven | <input type="checkbox"/> Springfield |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Detroit | <input type="checkbox"/> New Orleans | <input type="checkbox"/> Tampa |
| <input type="checkbox"/> El Paso | <input type="checkbox"/> New York City | <input type="checkbox"/> Washington Field |
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Date 5/8/75

RE: SENSTUDY 75

PERSONAL ATTN.

- Retention For appropriate
For information optional action Surep, by _____
- The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, conceal all sources, paraphrase contents.
- Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA _____
dated _____

Remarks:

Attached should be brought to the attention of Assistant Legat Armand Cammarota. For his information, the SSC has exhibited an interest in Bureau's communications to Rome in 1964 and is aware Cammarota was then Legat there. He thus may be contacted by SSC personnel.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP-2 RM/126

Enc.

Bufile **62-116395**

Urfile

File
5-8

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. CALLAHAN

DATE: 2/7/75.

FROM : J. B. ADAMS *JBA*

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 1975

#mDEB
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
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FAR P 137011

On 2/6/75 Mr. Kelley and I met with Senator Church and Bill Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee. Senator Church pointed out that he intended to run the Committee in a very responsible manner, had no intention of destroying or impairing the effectiveness of the intelligence community and, in fact, hoped that the efforts of the Committee would help to reestablish public confidence in the intelligence agencies.

Parameters have not been drawn but Senator Church feels that the Committee will confine its activities largely to inquiries into domestic activities. The inquiries will be designed to determine whether agencies have acted outside the law and the type of remedial legislation necessary to prevent such abuses in the future.

Study will be largely concerned with the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency but will, of course, involve the FBI and other agencies involved in domestic intelligence.

The Committee hopes to have a nonpartisan staff of approximately 40 employees headed up by Mr. Miller and would appreciate having necessary background investigations expedited to permit an early clearance. Miller indicated he has already been in touch with Mr. Hotis and Mr. Bowers in this regard. It was explained that the contemplated procedure involved the FBI conducting the full-field investigation necessary with the results being furnished to the Chairman, after which he would, upon being personally satisfied as to their loyalty, furnish the results to CIA for final clearance. Senator Church appeared satisfied with this arrangement. He stated that he wanted to prevent leaks and be hopefully as successful as the Judiciary Committee was on the impeachment inquiry. Our experience in this regard was pointed out wherein the Judiciary Committee in connection with the 17 wiretaps had written us a letter indicating that if we made classified

REC 68

62-5119395-944
APR 27 1975

JBA:am's (8)

- 1 - Mr. Jenkins
- 1 - Mr. Cleveland
- 1 - Mr. McDermott

- 1 - Mr. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Hotis

CONTINUED ON OVER

1975

Memorandum for Mr. Callahan
Re: SENSTUDY 1975

information available they would afford it appropriate security restricted to members only, excluding staff, and would not make the information public. Subsequent to the hearings, the Committee published its report which contained our classified documents right along with the Top Secret classifications. Senator Church was not aware of this, appeared surprised by it, and stated surely the information must have been declassified. I advised him that not by us and it was our information.

Senator Church was asked whether in his opinion the formation of the Select Committee would have any effect on the proliferation of committees seeking to obtain testimony from the FBI and it was his opinion that this would have a favorable effect. He said he had been in touch with other members of the Senate who felt that it was a waste of time to have repetitious testimony on the same subject matter before a variety of committees and he had the feeling that the other committees would hold off until after the Senate Select Committee completed its hearings. He indicated that he could not vouch for what would happen in the House, however, he intended to speak to the House leadership in order to try to effect some coordinated approach there also, because he was well aware of the large number of committees seeking to provide oversight or obtain information from the intelligence agencies.

A question arose as to the extent of cooperation with the Committee and Senator Church was assured that the FBI would be completely responsive subject to certain limitations which would have to be delineated by the President in order to protect sensitive sources and information. Senator Church indicated that he was going to talk to the President in this regard in order to secure his complete cooperation, and it was Senator Church's feeling that the Committee should be entitled to answers to any questions they might ask without restriction other than, of course, the identities of informants. He felt the progress of the Committee would be severely impaired if it were necessary to go to Court over such questions to obtain enforcement of their right to have access to whatever information they need.

ACTION:

Information.

CODE

TELETYPE

NITEL

TO SACS ALL OFFICES
FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395)

1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins 5/2/75

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams

1 - Each Assistant Director

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

SENSTUDY 75

PERSONAL ATTENTION

CAPTIONED MATTER PERTAINS TO BUREAU'S HANDLING OF REQUESTS FROM SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THESE COMMITTEES, STAFF MEMBERS MAY SEEK TO /INTERVIEW CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES.

RECENTLY, THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF HAS INTERVIEWED SEVERAL FORMER EMPLOYEES AND IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT MANY MORE SUCH PERSONNEL WILL BE CONTACTED.

THE FBI HAS PLEDGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE COMMITTEE AND WE WISH TO ASSIST AND FACILITATE ANY INVESTIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, WE DO HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO INSURE THAT SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS AND ONGOING SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIONS ARE FULLY

REC-16

62-116395-93

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Director Sec'y _____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 02 1975

TELETYPE

MAIL ROOM

3 MAY 1975

NW 55118 DocId:32989628 Page 23

SIN 7/7 SEE NOTE PAGE TWO 1975

3B/8
PBM

XEROX
JUN 11 1975

TELETYPE TO ALL OFFICES
RE:: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

PROTECTED. SHOULD ANY FORMER EMPLOYEE CONTACT YOUR OFFICE AND HAVE ANY QUESTION REGARDING HIS OBLIGATION NOT TO DIVULGE INFORMATION OBTAINED BY VIRTUE OF HIS PAST FBI EMPLOYMENT, HE SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT LEGAL COUNSEL, FBIHQ, BY COLLECT CALL. YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH FORMER EMPLOYEES MUST BE IN KEEPING WITH OUR PLEDGE. IT IS BELIEVED SUCH A PROCEDURE WOULD INSURE PROPER PROTECTION AND ALSO FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE SSC.

THE ABOVE PROCEDURE ALSO APPLIES TO CURRENT EMPLOYEES OF YOUR OFFICE. HOWEVER, CONTACT WITH THE LEGAL COUNSEL SHOULD BE HANDLED THROUGH THE SAC.

NOTE: Teletype prepared for all offices to alert SACs to the possibility former employees may contact their offices seeking guidance.

The Office of Legal Counsel in response to requests from former employees will utilize the briefing paper prepared by the Intelligence Community Staff of the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by Assistant Attorney General Antonino Scalia.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. E. W. Larson, Jr.

DATE: May 1, 1975

1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

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Director Sec'y _____

This memorandum for record purposes reports discussion 4/25/75 between Bureau's Liaison Agent, L. F. Schwartz, and Mr. Jack E. Thomas, Chief, Coordination Staff, Intelligence Community Staff, relating to Abstracts we are to prepare for the Central Community Index (CCI) in connection with Senstudy 75.

Attached are (1) memorandum 4/11/75 re CCI and its attachments, memorandum 4/10/75 and Abstract format; and (2) letter 4/21/75 from Thomas to Schwartz and its attachment, Abstract format. On 4/25/75 Schwartz and Thomas discussed applicability of instructions in attachments and arrived at the following understandings.

The FBI will provide Abstracts only, not documents, to have on record in the CCI a summary of what we have furnished to the Select Committees. Abstracts should be dated when typed without regard to delivery date of Abstract or date of communications to which they pertain. Under item number nine of format, enter date of communication involved, not date it is delivered to a Select Committee. We may use an abbreviated version for the Select Committees' names, such as "Senate Select Committee." We will title Abstracts as near as possible in a manner keyed to the language of the request from the Select Committee. Inasmuch as we will honor only written requests from the Select Committees, the "Requester" will always be shown as the name of the requesting Committee and not the name of any Committee personnel.

ACTION: None. For information and record purposes. *62-776395-92*

62-116395

Enclosures

SFP:ekw
(6)

REC-88

16 MAY 6 1975

ENCLOSURE

84 MAY 6 1975

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

11 April 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Principals of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Reviews

Inspector General, CIA


SUBJECT : Central Community Index

1. The central indexing capability detailed in the attached memorandum has been implemented. Format for preparation of abstracts has been accepted and the Community Index is ready to receive material. The address of the Community Index is

Room 6E25
CIA Headquarters
Langley, Virginia 20505.

2. The timeliness of reporting to the Central Index is critical and you are requested to make this information available to the appropriate organizational components within your agencies.

Sincerely,


John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachment

ALL THE INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP2 ALM/JZG
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ENCLOSURE

File # 62-116395
b

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

10 April 1975

#moe16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-9-01 BY SP-2-PAM/716

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Principals

SUBJECT: Community Aspects of Inputs to Congressional Committees Investigating Intelligence

1. The Intelligence Community Staff, with John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy/IC, as my representative in these matters, will keep the Board and other appropriate officials advised as to progress of the investigations conducted by the Senate and House Select Committees investigating intelligence activities. In particular, it will ensure that we are kept informed as to materials which are formally being provided to the Select Committees by all elements of the Community. The USIB Ad Hoc Group will assist on this matter and provide the mechanism for regular and constant communications.

2. In response to this assignment, the Intelligence Community Staff is establishing a registry for documentation relating to the investigations. This registry will be a source of reference of all responses, testimony, et cetera, provided by USIB agencies and available to your designated representatives.

3. In order to make the registry useful to the Board, it is essential that it include:

a. File copies of documents or other materials which each Intelligence Community element provides to one of the Select Committees where the originating agency considers the materials to involve aspects of Community activities, and/or which may result in follow-on queries concerning the functioning of the Community. The availability of this documentation will be of particular importance if it is expected there will be subsequent inquiries relating to the materials provided and involving elements of the Community other than the originating element.

b. An abstract of each formal input to a Select Committee - unless the Intelligence Community registry is provided with an actual copy of the material itself. A proposed format for such abstracts is attached.



W. E. Colby

Attachment:

As stated

FORMAT FOR ABSTRACT TO BE SUBMITTED TO
USIB AD HOC COORDINATING STAFF REGISTRY

MATERIAL FOR THE SENATE (HOUSE) SELECT COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT:
2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION:
3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: (Report, briefing, chart, etc.)
4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION:
5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP (YES/NO)
6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: (Brief narrative statement describing content, problems addressed and any conclusions or recommendations. Summary should clearly convey basic thrust of whatever was provided to the Select Committee.)
7. DATE OF REQUEST:
8. RELEASING AUTHORITY:
9. DATE OF SUBMISSION:
10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY:
11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS. (Identify)

11-18-01
SP2 ALM/JTG
At more 16

Ad Hoc Staff

75-358

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

21 April 1975

Mr. L. Frank Schwartz
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Room 4637
J. Edgar Hoover Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Frank:

Reference is your request for comments on the sample abstracts prepared in the FBI as a report on materials being provided to the Senate Select Committee.

As you know, we want to make the Community Registry as complete a record as possible of what is provided to the Committee, and for this reason hope that the actual copy of special reports and particularly important documents will be provided to the Registry. Where this is not done, an abstract or summary of each document or homogenous set of documents.

We have amended the abstract format slightly to include an entry for "Document Classification." A copy of the amended format is enclosed.

Your sample abstracts require a few alterations to make them more "indexable."

a. Item 1, "TITLE/SUBJECT" refers to the subject matter of the material which is being provided. The abstract on the FBI Manual of Instructions should have an entry here something like "Instructions covering FBI Investigations in the Security Field," rather than the title of the Senate Committee.

b. The date at the head of the page should be the date of preparation of the abstract. The date of submission to the Committee is listed at Item 9.

c. The entry "ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION" identified the organization with authority to release the document.

ENCLOSURE

File 62-116395
5
OAS
62-116395-92

d. The "SUMMARY OF CONTENTS" section should be brief, but also should clearly indicate what is being provided to the Committee. I wonder, for instance, whether your sample on the letterhead memoranda was issued in widely separated time periods. The summary as written gives no indication as to the particular subject of any of the memoranda and the single sentence now used to describe all of them covers the waterfront.

e. If the request for information comes officially from the Committee, the Committee title should be entered under "REQUESTOR," but if the requestor is an individual member of the Staff, his name should be indicated.

f. The last entry in the format, "PROBLEM AREAS," has particular significance since it is important to know if there are Third Agency, or sources and methods, or other sensitivity problems involved, and this is the place to identify them. We are beginning to use the abstracts prepared in our office as an aid to obtaining release clearance when we are dealing with the document for which another agency must concur in the release. The "PROBLEM AREAS" section gives such other agency an idea as to whether we see any important reason why they should be concerned about release of the document. The entry in this final section of the format is expected to prove useful for this purpose.

5. One copy of the document or its abstract is all that is needed by the registry.

6. The mailing address of the registry is:

JFK Act 6 (1) (B)

JFK Act 6 (1) (A)

Enclosure: as stated

FORMAT FOR ABSTRACT TO BE SUBMITTED TO
USIB AD HOC COORDINATING STAFF REGISTRY

MATERIAL FOR THE SENATE (HOUSE) SELECT COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. TITLE/SUBJECT:
2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION:
3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: (Report, briefing, chart, etc.)
4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION:
5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP (YES/NO)
6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: (Brief narrative statement describing content, problems addressed and any conclusions or recommendations. Summary should clearly convey basic thrust of whatever was provided to the Select Committee.)
7. DATE OF REQUEST:
8. RELEASING AUTHORITY:
9. DATE OF SUBMISSION:
10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY:
11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS.. (Identify)

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-19-01 BY SP8 ALM/jtg

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALLS

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

DATE: April 21, 1975

1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

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Director Sec'y _____

S. J. B.

On Thursday, 4/17/75, Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President for Congressional Inquiries, was furnished the following four documents with a request that he advise whether copies of such documents could be made available to the Senate Select Committee: (1) An internal FBI memorandum dated 5/16/72 captioned "FBI Jurisdiction, Criminal Intelligence Information"; (2) An internal FBI memorandum dated 5/18/72 captioned "FBI Authority in Domestic Intelligence Matters"; (3) A study on subversion prepared for former Acting FBI Director L. Louis Patrick Gray III dated 5/19/72; (4) A memorandum from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General dated 8/7/73 recommending the issuance of an Executive Order concerning the conduct of domestic intelligence investigations.

On 4/18/75 Mr. Wilderotter advised Section Chief William O. Cregar that the above four documents were cleared for delivery to the Senate Select Committee. *T*

ACTION: For information and record purposes.

WOC:ekw *ekw*

62-116395

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16 MAY 6 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/19/01 BY SP2 ALM/116

84 MAY 6 1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

The Attorney General

April 28, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Gregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by a Staff Member of captioned Committee of retired FBI Special Agent Lish Whitson. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for your use in the event you desire to furnish it to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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62-116395

DATE 2-20-71 BY SP/PLM/KA

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 67-29405 (Personnel File Former SA Lish Whitson)

SFP:ekw
(11)

REC-6

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EX-110

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1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

62-116395

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED~~

April 23, 1975

~~DATE 2-20-81 BY SP4JDMW~~

6026

1 - Mr. W. O. Gregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO 1 - Mr. S. F.
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH Phillips
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) BY SSC
STAFF MEMBER

Set out below is information available to the FBI
concerning captioned matter.

SSC Interview of Retired FBI SA Lish Whitson

On the afternoon of April 23, 1975, Mr. Lish Whitson personally appeared at the office of an FBI official, stated that he had just been interviewed by Mr. Michael Epstein, Staff Member of the SSC, and was desirous of reporting the result of that interview which Whitson related as follows:

Epstein first asked Whitson when he entered the FBI, when he first arrived for assignment at FBI Headquarters, to which Headquarters Division he had been assigned, and when he retired. (FBI records reveal that Whitson joined the FBI as an SA November 20, 1933, and retired June 19, 1972. He was assigned at Headquarters December 16, 1941, attached to the Domestic Intelligence Division and served in that Division until his retirement. The current name for that Division is Intelligence Division). Epstein then told Whitson that he knew that Whitson had at one time mailed a package to

Mr. Martin Luther King from Tampa, Florida, and asked Whitson to relate the details concerning this matter. Whitson thereupon

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62-116395-90
ENCLOSURE

GPO 954-546

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMMERCIAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA) BY
SSC STAFF MEMBER

told Epstein that in the late summer of 1964, former FBI Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan had telephoned Whitson at his home one Saturday and told him that late FBI Director Hoover wanted Whitson to deliver a package to Miami, Florida, by plane and on arrival at the Miami airport to telephone Sullivan for further instructions. Whitson did as directed and upon calling Sullivan, was instructed to address the package to Mr. Martin Luther King. Accordingly, Whitson had the package weighed, put postage stamps on it, and addressed it to Martin Luther King (not Mrs. Martin Luther King as Epstein had indicated). The following day, Sunday, Whitson flew back to Washington and on the next day, Monday, he informed Sullivan that his instructions had been carried out. Sullivan commented to Whitson "Someday I will tell you about that."

Epstein asked Whitson who had paid for the stamps to mail the package and Whitson said that he had probably done so utilizing per diem money. Epstein asked whether he had put a return address on the package and Whitson replied in the negative. Epstein asked if Whitson had gone to the Miami FBI Office, whether any Agent had met him at the Miami airport, and whether Whitson had discussed this matter with anyone. Whitson told Epstein that he had not gone to the Miami Office, that no Agent had met him, and that he had discussed the matter only with Sullivan. At this point, Whitson asked Epstein how he got the story. Epstein merely laughed and did not reply to the question.

Epstein also asked Whitson whether he had ever written a memorandum regarding this matter, to which Whitson replied in the negative. Epstein asked if Whitson had ever seen a memorandum on this matter and Whitson again replied in the negative.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA) BY
SSC STAFF MEMBERS

On April 24, 1975, Whitson telephoned the FBI official referred to above on two occasions to report additional information which Epstein had received from Whitson by telephone on April 24, 1975. This additional information was as follows:

Epstein asked how Whitson had made the trip to Miami; that is, how it was paid for. Whitson told him he had issued a Government Transportation Request (GTR). Epstein asked whether there was any prior written authorization for Whitson to make the trip and Whitson told him there was none. Epstein asked what kind of record would have been made covering the trip and Whitson explained that the only record he knew of would be the expense voucher he submitted covering the expenses involved and possibly the copy of the GTR which he had issued. Whitson explained to Epstein that the voucher would merely show that the GTR had been issued for a round-trip to and from Miami and how much per diem had been claimed in connection with the trip. Epstein inquired as to whether Whitson had registered at the Airport Hotel in Miami, and, if so, whether it was under his own name. Whitson told Epstein that he had registered under his name at this hotel.

Additional Information Furnished to FBI By Whitson

In addition to the foregoing, Whitson furnished to the FBI official the following information on April 23, 1975, which information he did not furnish to Epstein.

When Sullivan told Whitson he wanted him to fly the package to Miami, he stated that only he, Sullivan, Mr. Hoover, Mr. Tolson, (then FBI Associate Director) and Mr. Belmont (then FBI Assistant to the Director) knew of this situation. (At the time, 1964, Sullivan was an Assistant Director.) Sullivan never did explain to Whitson anything more regarding this incident.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA) BY
SSC STAFF MEMBER

Whitson said that when he arrived at the North Terminal at National Airport, following Sullivan's telephonic instructions, a young man who was unknown to Whitson but who addressed him as "Mr. Whitson," turned over to him a package which was wrapped in brown paper and sealed with sealing tape. It is Whitson's recollection the package measured approximately eight inches by eight inches by one inch.

It is Whitson's further recollection that at the time the foregoing occurred, King was either just about to go abroad to receive the Nobel Peace Prize or probably had already gone abroad. It was Whitson's recollection that sometime shortly after the mailing of the package, Sullivan commented to Whitson that the package had not yet been received by King. Because of this remark, Whitson is of the belief that the package was mailed to King at the headquarters of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and not to King's residence. Further, it was Whitson's recollection that it was not long after he had mailed the package that King had a personal meeting with Mr. Hoover in the latter's office.

Whitson observed that in his opinion, the information which was in the possession of Epstein prior to interviewing Whitson must have originated with Sullivan. Whitson noted that Mr. Hoover and Mr. Tolson are both deceased and that he has heard nothing to indicate that Mr. Belmont has been contacted by members of the Staff of the SEC. One other factor that causes Whitson to feel that Sullivan was the source of the information was a question Epstein raised as to whether Whitson had put a return address on the package when he addressed it to King. Whitson said he recalls that when he was in Miami and received the telephonic instructions from Sullivan, Sullivan told him that he should put a return address on the package and Whitson then pointed out to Sullivan that if he did so, and the name of the addressee became smeared, the package would end up at someone's return address rather than in the

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA) BY
SSC STAFF MEMBER

dead letter office. Sullivan concurred that no return address should be used. Thus, Sullivan would probably have reason to have commented regarding the use or nonuse of a return address.

On April 24, 1975, Whitson furnished by telephone to the aforementioned Bureau official the following additional information which he had not furnished to Epstein. Whitson stated it was now his recollection he had made the Miami trip either in the late Summer or early Fall of 1964 and that King was "away" at the time.

FBI Records Concerning Whitson's Travel

The following information is on record in the FBI concerning the travel of Whitson discussed above. On December 9, 1964, a Travel Voucher was processed for payment to Whitson the sum of \$19.40 for travel during the period November 1-30, 1964. On record also is a memorandum copy of a Government Transportation Request issued November 21, 1964, to National Airlines in the sum of \$107.40 for air coach travel, Washington, D. C., to Miami, Florida, and return. November 21, 1964, has been determined to have been a Saturday. There is not available in the FBI any copy of the actual voucher submitted by Whitson.

NOTE: Original and one copy to the Attorney General (AG may forward the copy to James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President). Information herein taken from two memoranda W.R. Wannall to J. B. Adams 4/23, 24/75, "Senstudy 75; Former Supervisor Lish Whitson, Assigned Intelligence Division." Voucher and GTR information from J. D. Cox, Voucher Unit, Computer Systems Division.

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 18, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. R. H. Horner
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and specifically Part IV, Policies and Procedures.

Since the enclosed memorandum captioned "Microphone Surveillance," dated May 20, 1954, originated with the Office of the Attorney General and is covered under this request, we are deferring to your judgment in this matter. The FBI interposes no objection to furnishing this document to the Committee, it being noted that the document appeared in toto in the United States Government Printing Office publication captioned "Warrantless Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillances, 1974."

Also enclosed for your approval is the original of a memorandum to the Senate Select Committee apprising the Committee of our referral of this matter to you. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.

Enclosures - 2
62-116395

TEB:vb
(8)

NOTE:

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Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.: Admin. _____
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Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

The request referred to above is one of several contained in the referenced communication. We are referring this matter to the Department as a matter of protocol in line with our policy of furnishing the Committee only documents originating with the FBI.

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

PLM

W.M.H.

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. H. Horner
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

April 18, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of the captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

This is to advise that with respect to the memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director, FBI, captioned "Microphone Surveillance," dated May 20, 1954, we are deferring action on this request to the United States Department of Justice inasmuch as this communication originated with that Department.

62 - 116395

1 - The Attorney General

TEB:vb
(8)

WPA/SP2 ALM/18-01
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/18-01

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Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

NW 55118 DocId:32989628 Page 41

GPO 954-546

Se-89

#moe16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS
DATE 1-18-91 BY SP2 RTM/246
THIS ENVELOPE
IS UNCLASSIFIED

62-116 395-89

ENCLOSURE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE May 26, 1954.

FROM The Attorney General

SUBJECT MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCE

155-26

X
declassified 4/26/2024
FEB 2024


The recent decision of the Supreme Court entitled Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, denouncing the use of microphone surveillances by city police in a gambling case makes appropriate a reappraisal of the use which may be made in the future by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of microphone surveillance in connection with matters relating to the internal security of the country.

It is clear that in some instances the use of microphone surveillance is the only possible way of uncovering the activities of espionage agents, possible saboteurs, and subversive persons. In such instances I am of the opinion that the national interest requires that microphone surveillance be utilized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This use need not be limited to the development of evidence for prosecution. The FBI has an intelligence function in connection with internal security matters equally as important as the duty of developing evidence for presentation to the courts and the national security requires that the FBI be able to use microphone surveillance for the proper discharge of both of such functions. The Department of Justice approves the use of microphone surveillance by the FBI under these circumstances and for these purposes.

I do not consider that the decision of the Supreme Court in Irvine v. California, supra, requires a different course. That case is readily distinguishable on its facts. The language of the Court, however, indicates certain uses of microphones which it would be well to avoid, if possible, even in internal security investigations. It is quite clear that in the Irvine case the Justices of the Supreme Court were outraged by what they regarded as the indecency of installing a microphone in a bedroom. They denounced the utilization of such methods of investigation in a gambling case as shocking. The Court's action is a clear indication of the need for discretion and intelligent restraint in the use of microphones by the FBI in all cases, including internal security matters. Obviously, the installation of a microphone in a bedroom or in some comparably intimate location should be avoided wherever possible. It may appear, however, that important intelligence or evidence relating to matters connected with the national security can only be obtained by the installation of a microphone in such a location. It is my opinion that under such circumstances the installation is proper and is not prohibited by the Supreme Court's decision in the Irvine case.

Previous interpretations which have been furnished to you as to what may constitute trespass in the installation of microphones, suggest that the views expressed have been tentative in nature and have attempted to predict the course which courts would follow rather than reflect the present state of the law. It is realized that not infrequently the question of trespass arises in connection with the installation of a microphone. The question of whether a trespass is actually involved and the second question of the effect of such a trespass upon the admissibility in court of the evidence thus obtained, must necessarily be resolved according to the circumstances of each case. The Department in resolving the problems which may arise in connection with the use of microphone surveillance will review the circumstances in each case in the light of the practical necessities of investigation and of the national interest which must be protected. It is my opinion that the Department should adopt that interpretation which will permit microphone coverage by the FBI in a manner most conducive to our national interest. I recognize that for the FBI to fulfill its important intelligence function, considerations of internal security and the national safety are paramount and, therefore, may compel the unrestricted use of this technique in the national interest.

H.B.



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. WALSH

DATE: 4/3/75

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
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Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

FROM : L. C. GROOVER

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/01 BY SP-2 ALM/1216

Ref 160 Reference Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams memorandum dated 3/20/75 captioned as above and letter of Senator Frank Church dated 3/19/75.

Relet requested, among other things, the titles and number of FBI field office agents assigned to internal security, intelligence collection and/or counterintelligence matters, operations or activities, together with the percent of total agent man-hours devoted to such matters, operations and activities (page 3, item IIIC of relet).

The purpose of this memorandum is to forward to the Legal Counsel Division, through the Intelligence Division, the response, attached herewith, to the above request.

It is noted the request specifically mentions internal security, intelligence collection and counterintelligence matters. Our response has been constructed in the traditional two categories of internal security and counterintelligence. Intelligence collection (informants) is included in the data for both of the other categories as appropriate.

RECOMMENDATION:

REC-100

62-116375-88

That this memorandum with enclosure be forwarded to the Intelligence Division for review, classification and approval and, thereafter, forwarded to the Legal Counsel Division which is coordinating replies to the Senate Select Committee.

Enclosure

MAY 2 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Jackson

JJC:jmb

SEE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
ADDENDUM PAGE TWO

SEE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION
ADDENDUM PAGE THREE

ENCLOSURE

Memorandum to Mr. Walsh
Re: Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence Activities

wob

ADDENDUM: Intelligence Division, WOC:aso, 4/4/75

The Intelligence Division has reviewed the attached figures prepared by the Administrative Division. Under the criteria of the current Classification Act it would be impossible to justify classification of these figures; however, should they be made public or fall into the hands of a hostile foreign intelligence service, it would reveal the current capability the FBI employs in the field of counterintelligence against the total foreign threat. In view of the above, the Intelligence Division strongly recommends that the Legal Counsel Division discuss this with the staff of the Senate Select Committee pointing out the vulnerability implicit in this attachment in an effort to have the Committee withdraw its request identified as III C.

JWR /
HWW

WAB
BS

FBD

end

wrd

JVER

Regarding the observations of the Intelligence Division concerning the making available the amount of manpower dedicated to counterintelligence and domestic intelligence work in the FBI, the Legal Counsel Division has the following observations:

*of the
classifications
confidential* (1) Based on our analysis and conversations this Division has had with Fred B. Griffith of the Inspection Division, it appears that the information contained in this memorandum may be classified confidential under Executive order 11652.

Re: (2) Before making any determination as to whether we make such information available to the Senate Select Committee, it would appear we should determine from CIA what their response to such a request will be so that our position and that of CIA will be consistent in this area. In this regard SA Paul V. Daly has contacted Leon F. Schwartz, Liaison Section of Intelligence Division, and requested he determine from CIA what their position in this regard is.

(3) It is not believed that we should take a hard and fast position that this information not be made available to the Committee or that we make an effort to have the Committee withdraw their request for this information. We should rather develop some fallback position such as that this information will be made available to the Chairman of the Committee or will be made available during an oral briefing, etc.

IVD
for review activity
for review OK'd during
Walsh classification
authority 4/26/75
woc f ekw

JW
Jarboe
See memo Clegg to Wm. M. dated 4/11/75
woc f ekw

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~4-00216
DECLASSIFIED BY 5-22-2014
ON 1-18-01 BY SP2 EAM/JG

THE NUMBER OF FBI FIELD OFFICE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO
INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Based on a survey of all FBI field offices, it has been determined that matters relating to internal security and counterintelligence require the following commitment of manpower in FBI field offices, stated in terms of equivalent full-year employees:

	<u>Special Agents In Charge</u>	<u>Assistant Special Agents In Charge</u>	<u>Special Agent Supervisors</u>	<u>Special Agents</u>	<u>Total Equivalent Full- Year Agent Employees</u>
Internal Security	2.80	1.75	47.06	671.07	722.68
Counterintelligence	2.34	2.16	46.18	904.29	954.97

These equivalent full-year employees represent the following percentages of total field office agent personnel assigned as of 2/28/75:

	<u>Special Agents In Charge</u>	<u>Assistant Special Agents In Charge</u>	<u>Special Agent Supervisors</u>	<u>Special Agents</u>	<u>Percent of Total Agent Personnel</u>
Internal Security	4.2%	2.9%	11.9%	9.5%	9.5%
Counterintelligence	3.5%	3.6%	11.7%	12.8%	12.6%

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9
Classified by _____
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

88
1/16/375
ENCLOSURE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 4-14-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
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On 4-11-75 Doug Marvin, Assistant to the Attorney General, was apprised of the fact we intended to affix a property stamp on certain nonclassified documents we were furnishing the Senate Select Committee (SSC). It was explained the stamp contained a caveat that the particular document may not be made available to unauthorized individuals without the Bureau's consent. He advised he felt this procedure was excellent.

On 4-14-75 Mr. Marvin requested that all future contacts with the Department concerning SENSTUDY be coordinated with Jack Fuller, extension 3892. Mr. Fuller is assigned to the Attorney General's office.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/2TS

- 1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:dkg (7)

REC-106

APR 23 1975

84 APR 30 1975

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL [initials]

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: April 14, 1975
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
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Director Sec'y _____

Mr. L. C. Groover to Mr. Walsh memorandum dated 3/4/75 entitled "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities" forwarded to the Intelligence Division for review the titles and numbers of FBI field office Agents assigned to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counter-intelligence matters, operations or activities. This was in response to requirement IIIC of Senator Church's letter dated 3/19/75.

By addendum dated 4/4/75 the Intelligence Division recommended that the Legal Counsel Division discuss with the staff of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) our reluctance to provide these type figures to the SSC.

On 4/11/75 I discussed with Mr. John Clark, Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the intelligence community, the request of Senator Church. Specifically, Mr. Clark was asked if Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had received such a request and how they responded. Mr. Clark advised that CIA had not received a specific request for the titles and numbers of CIA officers assigned to intelligence collection or counter-intelligence matters. However, CIA had received a request to identify the names and numbers of CIA covert officers assigned overseas.

Mr. Clark advised that CIA intended to advise the Staff Director of the SSC that CIA was unwilling to provide such names and numbers to the SSC for retention in its files. However, CIA would be willing to allow a senior staff member or the Staff Director to review the names and numbers of CIA covert officers overseas at the CIA headquarters building.

APR 29 1975

WOC:ekw (CKW)
(7)

CONTINUED - OVER

#MOR/6
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DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/KBS

SEE LEGAL COUNSEL ADDENDUM
PAGE 3


Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75

ACTION:

If approved, the Legal Counsel Division should advise the SCC that because of security considerations, the ~~titles~~ and numbers of Special Agents of the FBI assigned to internal security and counterintelligence matters cannot be furnished to the SCC in documented form for the Committee files. However, the FBI would be willing to show the titles and figures to Mr. Miller or a senior staff member at FBIHQ in an effort to demonstrate a spirit of cooperation and credibility.

WIZW/Har

Addenda M



ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION PVD:dkg 4-15-75

Legal Counsel Division interposes no objection to Intelligence Division's recommendation. If approved, Intelligence Division prepare necessary communication to notify the SSC.

JCF
JKT
*See memo to A.D.
with enc for A.D. 55C
4/20/75 Earth/EKO
WJS*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall *JK* *was*

FROM : W. O. Cregar *W.O.C.*

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
BRIEFING FOR STAFF MEMBERS
BY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
APRIL 11, 1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

DATE: 4/11/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

morib
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM 146

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Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

On 4/11/75, from 10:00 am until 12:20 pm, staff members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities were briefed by Assistant Director Wannall and members of his staff in the Conference Room at INTD. Briefed from the Committee were Mr. William Miller, Staff Director; Mr. Frederick A. O. Schwarz III, Chief Counsel; and Messrs. Mark Gitenstein, Marvin Epstein, Patrick Shea, Britt Snider and Loch Johnson, all staff members.

The first hour of the briefing was occupied with the showing of the INTD slide presentation and commentary which provided highlights of the work of the INTD, both in the counterintelligence and internal security field. Following this presentation a question and answer period ensued for the rest of the briefing. Mr. Miller and Mr. Schwarz posed most of the questions.

In the counterintelligence field the thrust of the questioning was directed toward the continuing growth of the hostile intelligence presence in the United States and its short-term and long-term effect on the FBI's operations.

Mr. Wannall pointed out that the Director on previous occasions had indicated his intention to "beef up" the counterintelligence effort of the FBI by the addition of some 250 Special Agents, and that INTD had also effected certain programs designed to assign certain counterintelligence functions to non-Agent personnel, thereby freeing additional Special Agents to function as case officers. In response to a question as to whether the additional investigative effort necessary to counter the mounting hostile intelligence threat might not involve investigation of more and more American citizens, Mr. Wannall conceded

62-116395

REC-106

62-116395
© APR 29 1975

EWL:jvl
(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
Briefing for Staff Members
by Intelligence Division
April 11, 1975

[that this was inevitable. He stressed, however, the investigative policies of the FBI which protected the constitutional rights and right of privacy of such individuals.]

[On the domestic internal security side the thrust of the questioning appeared to indicate an interest in the predication, duration and administrative controls of investigations of domestic organizations and individuals. Again, Mr. Wannall stressed the precautions inherent in FBI policy and instructions to the field in these matters, pointing out, in effect, that these investigations are founded on statutory authority and are closely supervised by experienced personnel at Headquarters level. The Committee staff appeared to accept these answers and no critical or hostile attitudes on their part were evident.]

The briefing was terminated at 12:20 pm, due to commitments on the part of the staff. Mr. Miller and Mr. Schwarz both expressed their appreciation for the briefing and indicated it had been most instructive. They indicated a desire to continue these discussions at some later date and Mr. Wannall assured them that he would be happy to continue the briefing at any future mutually agreeable time.

Perhaps most significant of all questions posed was the final question by Mr. Schwarz in which he inquired as to what advantages and disadvantages to the FBI could be anticipated as a result of the Committee fulfilling its mandate. Mr. Wannall replied that any statutory authority defining and affirming the FBI's role in the intelligence collection field would certainly be a positive achievement. He also stated that any result of the Committee's investigation which would tend to limit the investigative resources or the investigative effectiveness of the FBI would surely be an unfortunate negative factor.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

Esh

*WRW/HB
MCN*

*JRW
JRW*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: April 23, 1975

FROM : W. R. Wannall *WR*

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
FORMER SUPERVISOR LISH WHITSON
ASSIGNED INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD _____
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Director Sec'y _____

At 3:17 p.m., 4/22/75 former Special Agent Lish Whitson who for many years was a supervisor in the Intelligence Division telephoned me to advise that he had received a request to appear for an interview by Michael Epstein, staff member of the Senate Select Committee. The interview was scheduled for 4/23/75.

In response to a question by Mr. Whitson, he was advised that to the writer's knowledge this was the first former Bureau employee who had been requested to appear for an interview by any member of the staff of the Select Committee. Whitson stated that he was proceeding on the basis that he would respond to questions propounded to him but he had some reservation in his mind concerning answering questions which would involve material which he knew to be classified at the time he retired. He commented he had noted in the news media that staff members of the Committee were reportedly to be granted clearances through TOP SECRET - Q (Atomic Energy Matters).

Whitson was advised by the writer that while it was true staff members were being granted clearances, the Bureau was endeavoring to establish procedures through the Attorney General whereby highly sensitive and classified material could be revealed on a restricted basis in response to Committee inquiries; for example, in some instances we would request that only the Majority and Minority leaders on the Committee be furnished certain types of material and in other instances only the Senators themselves as opposed to all staff members.

Mr. Whitson said in view of this, it was his intention to be as responsive and candid during the interview by Mr. Epstein as he could be but if any questions arose in his mind with respect to revelation as to what he, Whitson, considered to be sensitive material, he anticipated he would express his concern to Mr. Epstein and advise him he felt it would be appropriate to check with the Bureau since he is aware of regulations by the Attorney General which preclude revealing FBI information without the Attorney General's specific approval. APR 29 1975

WRW:lml

(5)

- 1 - Mr. Adams
- 1 - Mr. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. Wannall

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/01 BY SP2 ALM/MS

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: SENSTUDY 75
FORMER SUPERVISOR LISH WHITSON
ASSIGNED INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

prior approval. Whitson stated that if the writer had no objection, he would telephone again after his interview with Epstein in the event any matters came up which he felt would be of interest to the Bureau. He was assured that the writer had no objection whatsoever and would appreciate any observations which he cared to pass along.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

[Handwritten signatures and initials follow]

JH

whn

JBA
PLW

JHM

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 22, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

AM INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/PTG

By letter dated March 19, 1975, the Senate Select Committee requested information from the FBI. Part I of the Committee's letter pertained to the legal authority for investigations.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum and four documents on the subject of legal authority for investigations.

A copy of this memorandum, with enclosures, is being provided for your records.

Enclosures - 10

AFW:vb. (6)

NOTE:

The Senate Select Committee's 3/19/75, letter was transmitted with an attachment, prepared by the Committee's staff, which set forth examples of the type of information concerning domestic intelligence jurisdiction of interest to it. Among those items cited in the attachment to the Committee's 3/19/75, letter was a study on jurisdiction prepared for former Acting FBI Director Louis Patrick Gray III by the Office of Legal Counsel, dated 5/18/72. Representatives of the Legal Counsel Division do not believe the 5/18/72 study is, in itself, appropriate to furnish in response to the question of the Senate Select Committee on legal authority. However, Legal Counsel Division believes that two internal FBI memoranda, prepared in connection with the drafting of the 5/18/72, study, would be pertinent to the Senate Select Committee's inquiry. Accordingly, these two documents, items one and two of attached memorandum for the Committee, are being furnished.

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Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Secy. _____

ENCLOSURE
ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 22, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: LEGAL AUTHORITIES

Reference is made to the March 19, 1975, letter from the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee to the Attorney General, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached are the following documents responsive to Part I of the Senate Select Committee's request, entitled "Legal Authorities":

1. An internal FBI memorandum dated May 16, 1972, captioned "FBI Jurisdiction; Criminal Intelligence Information."
2. An internal FBI memorandum, dated May 18, 1972, captioned "FBI Authority in Domestic Intelligence Matters."
3. A study on subversion prepared for former Acting FBI Director Louis Patrick Gray III, dated May 19, 1972.
4. A memorandum from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General dated August 7, 1973, recommending the issuance of an Executive Order concerning the conduct of domestic intelligence investigations.

Enclosures - 4

1 - The Attorney General

Asst. Dir. _____
Dep. Adm. _____
Dep. Ad Inv. _____
Asst. Dir. Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Lab. _____
Laboratory _____
Res. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Testing _____
Training _____
Trans. _____
Tele. Res. _____
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ENCLOSURE

GPO 954-546



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

April 22, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
 TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
 WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: LEGAL AUTHORITIES

Reference is made to the March 19, 1975, letter from the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee to the Attorney General, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached are the following documents responsive to Part I of the Senate Select Committee's request, entitled "Legal Authorities":

1. An internal FBI memorandum dated May 16, 1972, captioned "FBI Jurisdiction; Criminal Intelligence Information."
2. An internal FBI memorandum, dated May 18, 1972, captioned "FBI Authority in Domestic Intelligence Matters."
3. A study on subversion prepared for former Acting FBI Director Louis Patrick Gray III, dated May 19, 1972.
4. A memorandum from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General dated August 7, 1973, recommending the issuance of an Executive Order concerning the conduct of domestic intelligence investigations.

Enclosures - 4

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42-76515-83

ENCLOSURE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Dalbey

DATE: 5/16/72

FROM : J. A. Mintz *JAM*

SUBJECT: FBI JURISDICTION: CRIMINAL
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

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You requested analysis of the legal authority for FBI criminal intelligence collection and its relationship to our statutory jurisdiction in criminal matters.

"The gathering of criminal intelligence information" describes activity not subject to precise definition. However, its general objective is well understood by those engaged in law enforcement. There exist individuals and groups whose daily occupations are directed toward profit without regard to the restraints of the law. Yet, by the very nature of their associations, little actual participation in criminal acts may be observed by the most astute law enforcement observer. Their existence and contribution to the sum of criminal behavior has been detected and to some degree measured by the collection of data concerning their personal life-styles, property holdings, associates, influence, and access to capital. Such information has been characterized as "criminal intelligence."

For years, the FBI has been aware of the need to identify these resources of the criminal element. Congress responded to this need through the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. The Congressional findings were that organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and by the illegal use of force, fraud and corruption. Legitimate business and labor unions are infiltrated and corrupted and our democratic processes are subverted. The problem was declared to be of national concern both as to our economy and the domestic security.

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62-116500-163
ENCLOSURE

Memorandum J. A. Mintz to Mr. Dalbey
RE: FBI JURISDICTION; CRIMINAL
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

The Act attempted to attack organized crime by making criminal the management of syndicated gambling and by prohibiting racketeering activity characteristic of organized crime including the use of illegal proceeds for investment in legitimate business enterprises.

The long-established suspicions of law enforcement officers were confirmed by the Congressional findings but statutory enactments did not eliminate the conduct described as evil therein. There remains the task of establishing the identities of those constituting the national menace and developing prosecutable evidence of their guilt. "Criminal intelligence" collection is one means by which this responsibility may be fulfilled. It may be the only practical means in view of the scarcity of witnesses willing to testify and of the high mortality potential of those who do appear. A classic example of such intimidation is reported in United States v. Addonizio, 451 F2d 49 (3rd Cir. 1972) where a prospective witness in a corruption case found an anonymous note on the seat of his car which read "This could have been a bomb. Keep your mouth shut."

Accepting the need for intelligence gathering as a practical necessity, the issue remains as to its propriety in the face of Constitutional protections. If the Supreme Court announces that individuals have a Constitutionally protected right of privacy that may be overcome only through established arrest, search, and subpoena procedures, the issue will be settled. But, thus far, the Court has only drawn upon the concept of Constitutional privacy to resolve cases involving special circumstances such as marital affairs (Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)) and interception of communications (Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).

More specific Constitutional limitations on the criminal intelligence function may be found in the First Amendment protections of speech and assembly; the Fourth Amendment prohibitions of unreasonable searches and seizures; and the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.

The theme consistently found in decisions having a bearing on the relationship between these rights and the collection of criminal intelligence is that, when in direct conflict, the collection efforts must yield. Such is

Memorandum J. A. Mintz to Mr. Dalbey
RE: FBI JURISDICTION; CRIMINAL
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

not to label criminal intelligence as necessarily the product of malpractice, but to recognize the paramount nature of the Constitutional interests being safeguarded. Other incidents of government regulatory authority have been required to yield as well when confronted with legitimate claims of Constitutional protection, e.g. the administrative search cases, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).

Overt and obtrusive conduct susceptible of being characterized as harassment may well be enjoined as, for example, was the case of an obvious 24-hour-a-day physical surveillance of an individual, his home, relatives, friends, and associates (Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F2d 366 (7th Cir. 1964) cert. den. 379 U.S. 1001). Similar results might be expected where an identified officer loiters in the subject's place of business (Bee See Books, Inc. v. Leary, 291 F. Supp. 622 (SD N.Y. 1968) or openly attends organizational meetings where his presence inhibits communication and the transaction of the business of the assembly (Loral 309, United Furniture Workers v. Gates, 75 F. Supp. 620 (ND Ind. 1948)). However, open photographic surveillance of public gatherings (Donahoe v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308 (ED Va. 1971)) and secret monitoring of criminal activities through the use of undercover agents (Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966)) and informants (Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 295 (1966)) have met with judicial approval.

Obviously, criminal intelligence information gained by unreasonable search and seizure or through compelled self-incrimination is tainted and subject to judicial condemnation upon complaint of one having the requisite standing.

Perhaps, the decision coming nearest to discussing the legality of criminal intelligence collection was Anderson v. Sills, 106 N.J. Super. 545, 256 A2d 298 (1969), (reversed on the ground more complete record was needed to support the decision) 56 N.J. 210, 265 A2d 678 (1970). New Jersey had responded to the threat of continuing civil disorders by collecting intelligence information on persons and events alleged to have some relationship to such activities. The trial court held the collection effort to be unconstitutional because it conflicted with the First Amendment.

Memorandum J. A. Mintz to Mr. Dalbey
RE: FBI JURISDICTION: CRIMINAL
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

However, the court order to destroy the intelligence files excepted instances "where such information will be used to charge persons with specifically defined criminal conduct." 256 A2d at 305. Thus, the decision may be interpreted as drawing a distinction between collection of intelligence information where political or social factors are involved and First Amendment freedoms therefore may be directly inhibited and collection of criminal intelligence information where the objective is the establishment of criminal conduct and the identities of the offenders. While the Fourth and Fifth Amendment may be enjoyed by the guilty and innocent alike, it is improbable that the First Amendment would be stretched so far as to protect freedom of speech and assembly when such speech and assembly constitute elements of a criminal offense. On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey returned the case for further development of the record and observed ". . . the executive branch may gather whatever information it reasonably believes to be necessary to enable it to perform the police roles, detectional and preventive. A court should not interfere in the absence of proof of bad faith or a willfulness." 265 A2d at 300.

A tentative conclusion may be stated, subject to further development of the case law. The gathering of criminal intelligence information for the purpose of developing evidence of specific offenses characteristic of organized crime is legally justified as well as practically necessary. Where there is diversion from the proper objective and such collection efforts are manipulated to cause harassment or where such activity conflicts with Constitutional rights, to that extent the criminal intelligence program must be reformed.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Dalbey

DATE: 5/18/72

FROM : J. B. Hotis

SUBJECT: FBI AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

#MDR16
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You requested an analysis of the Bureau's authority to conduct domestic intelligence investigations. The question of the jurisdictional basis for these investigations is being examined at length by the Domestic Intelligence Division and will not be discussed here.

It is fair to say that the domestic intelligence program is one of the more controversial areas of the Bureau's activities. For one thing, an intelligence investigation casts a broader net than inquiries that are directed toward the proof of a specific offense. A large amount of raw data is collected, much of which has no immediate bearing on potential offenses or offenders. But seemingly trivial information may later become important in the detection and prevention of violence or civil disorder. There are also fears that these investigations may eventually touch upon one's political beliefs, habits or associations; or that information collected for proper purposes may eventually be misused at the hands of Government. Each is a legitimate concern. The notion of Government prying into the personal lives of its citizens is repellent to all of us. And yet there is a strong sense that the Government must acquire necessary intelligence information if it is to meet its responsibilities in connection with the national security.

One of the major concerns about our domestic intelligence activities is that they are not supervised or monitored by any outside agency. The claim is made that the Executive Branch has been left wide discretion to define its own authority, and to choose the directions, methods, and focus of its investigations. For one thing, the law has never made clear what facts and circumstances must be present to authorize an intelligence investigation, nor how far such an investigation may lawfully proceed without being directed toward proof of a specific offense.

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ENCLOSURE

Memorandum J. Hotis to Mr. Dalbey
RE: FBI AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

And unlike the practice in criminal cases, our electronic surveillances in security matters are not submitted for prior court approval. For another, the exclusionary rule which provides the usual method of judicial control over investigative procedures, is not often available in security cases. Since the goal is largely preventive, these cases seldom come before the courts. As a result, the public, the courts, and the Congress have very little information about how we operate in domestic intelligence matters and what we do with the information acquired.

In response to this situation, some members of the Congress have pressured for tighter controls over the Bureau, perhaps in the form of a watchdog committee to oversee our operations. Senator Ervin, who chairs the Senate Subscommittee on Constitutional Rights has expressed particular concern about the right of privacy and the authority of the Government to gather information. In an exchange of correspondence with the Department of Justice, the Senator has requested specific documentation of the Department's guidelines for the gathering and retention of domestic intelligence information. He has also suggested that legislation might be enacted, requiring a showing of probable cause before an investigation can be initiated by the Government. It is doubtful that any such measure would pass the Congress, but the proposal does show the mood of the times.

A parallel trend may be developing in the courts. In several recent cases, plaintiffs have made the claim that Government information gathering, which goes beyond the effort to apprehend criminal suspects, may have a "chilling effect" on the exercise of First Amendment rights. These challenges thus far have not been successful. Anderson v. Sills, 56 N.J. 210, 265 A2d 678 (1970); Donahoe v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Va. 1971); American Civil Liberties Union v. Westmoreland, 323 F. Supp. 1153 (N.D. Ill. 1971).

The courts have generally recognized that one of the principal functions of the Bureau is to gather information law violators, agitators of violence and possible subversives. Tatum v. Laird, 444 F2d 947, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1971) cert. granted, 404 U.S. 955 (1971); The Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee, et al. v. J. Edgar Hoover, et. al., 70 Civ. 2846 HRT, decided February 16, 1972. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, has observed that the identity of the agency gathering such information is determinative of the significance of any alleged chill to

Memorandum J. B. Hotis to Mr. Dalbey
RE: FBI AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

to First Amendment rights. Thus, in Davis v. Ichord, 442 F2d 1207 (D. C. Cir. 1970) although appellants allegedly felt chilled by a Congressional Committee's investigation of them, the Court of Appeals found there was insufficient justiciability in their claims to create a viable case or controversy. This was because appellants had "failed to bring the fear of investigation by the present Committee home to themselves," their fears were wholly speculative; there were no criminal proceedings confronting them; nor was any action pending. Moreover, the Court in Davis found that the power of a Congressional Committee began and ended with the investigation; whenever a Committee of the Congress seeks punitive action, the Judiciary must become involved, and thus every investigation has a judicial check which operates to guarantee the protection of constitutional rights.

This latter aspect of the Davis decision was given perspective by the Court of Appeals in Tatum. In contrasting the potential impact on First Amendment rights occasioned by investigations conducted by the military with investigations conducted by a civilian investigative agency, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Court observed:

The compilation of data by a civilian investigative agency is thus not the threat to civil liberties or the deterrent on the exercise of the constitutional right of free speech that such action by the military is, because a civil investigative agency has no inherent power always being subject to the well-defined restrictions of law and the approval of the courts. * * *

There, the Court pointedly examined the "source of the chill" as it had in Davis, and in applying the "chilling effect doctrine", singled out the FBI as a source which does not generate a reasonable basis for inhibitions or apprehensions. In this connection the Court stated,

Memorandum J. B. Hotis to Mr. Dalbey
RE: FBI AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Referring to our holding in Davis that the "source of the chill" is important in determining whether there is any inhibiting effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights, we think that there is a significant difference between investigative actions taken by a military agency in reference to civilians and similar investigative actions taken by a regular investigative agency of a civilian branch of the Government.

One of the functions of a civilian investigative agency, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, is to compile information on law violators, agitators of violence, and possible subversives. It has always been recognized that this is a delicate function, and it is exercised under the direction of the Attorney General. Investigation is performed by men a majority of whom are under the direction of lawyers in the Justice Department, and the information compiled is only usable and effective through court action. The FBI is powerless to imprison or to affect his liberty in any way except through the action of the courts.

As to the surveillance of public meetings through the use of informants, it has been held that such surveillance is not per se actionable. See Donahoe v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Va. 1971) (police surveillance of street demonstrations held not to offend First Amendment rights).

The Supreme Court in Hoffa v. U.S., 385 U.S. 293 (1966), held that the use of secret informants is "not per se unconstitutional", and does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, nor the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court upheld, as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, admission at trial of evidence obtained by an undercover informant to whom a defendant spoke without knowledge that he was in the employ of the police. 385 U.S. at 300-303. See also Lewis v. U.S., 385 U.S. 206 (1966) and Lopez v. U.S., 373 U.S. 427 (1963).

Memorandum J. B. Hotis to Mr. Dalbey
RE: FBI AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Moreover, the Supreme Court in U.S. v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), recently held that the use of secret informants does not violate any constitutionally justifiable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, even when an informant uses electronic equipment to transmit his conversations with defendants to other agents.

If the use of undercover government informants without a warrant does not violate the Fourth Amendment and invade a defendant's constitutionally justifiable expectations of privacy, Hoffa v. U.S., supra, and such informants may write down their conversations with defendants and testify concerning them, or simultaneously record and transmit such conversations to others, who may testify against them, On Lee v. U.S., 343 U.S. 747 (1952); U.S. v. White, supra, then clearly mere visual "surveillance" of plaintiffs in plain view by informants at public meetings would not violate their constitutional rights.

It would seem that those who elect to present their views actively in the public arena deliberately expose themselves to the public. See Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Any recording of their activities by the defendants does not invade their privacy any more than does a newspaper, radio, or television story, and, indeed, much less since any information compiled is usable and effective only through court action. Tatum v. Laird, 444 F2d 947, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

More difficult questions are presented where the investigation delves into the private affairs of the individuals or organizations. But even here, the courts have generally sustained our procedures so long as they comport with the restrictions of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee, et. al. v. J. Edgar Hoover, et. al., 70 Civ. 2646 HRT, decided February 16, 1972. (examination of bank records) U.S. v. Gerhart, 275 F. Supp. 443 (S.D. W. Va. 1967) (examination of bank records); Minker v. U.S., 312 F2d 632 (3d Cir. 1962) (trash covers); Cohen v. U.S., 378 F2d 751 (9th Cir. 1967) (mail covers); U.S. v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970) (detention and examination of packages in the mail); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) (seizure of union records); Hoffa v. U.S., supra; U.S. v. White, supra; (use of informants).

Memorandum J. B. Hotis to Mr. Dalbey
Re: FBI AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

In summary, it is premature to say that the First Amendment line of cases, dealing with the "chilling" concept offers any substantial impediment to our intelligence investigations. There is less reason for optimism, however, with regard to congressional intervention. We should be prepared, therefore, to meet arguments regarding the need for outside supervision. The sound answer, which should satisfy governmental needs and individual rights, is found in tight internal controls and carefully developed guidelines.

POSITION PAPER
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

INVESTIGATIONS OF SUBVERSION

May 19, 1972

OVERVIEW

This paper deals with the conduct by the FBI of intelligence-type investigations supervised by the Domestic Intelligence Division. Authority for these investigations is documented and outlined, including situations where there is no direct violation of law. Criteria and controls and dissemination policies implementing this authority are detailed.

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62-116395-83

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INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

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The FBI's intelligence function is well established and documented. Yet, our work in gathering intelligence has been the subject of continuing criticism from segments of the press with charges being made that the FBI is conducting without authority security investigations of persons who are not in violation of the law. It has also been charged that our intelligence collection is uncontrolled, capricious and dwells on personal idiosyncrasies without there being any security interest involved. Fragments of information, distorted and twisted to convey the false impression that the FBI is wantonly disregarding the privacy of citizens, have been published.

The FBI does not conduct security investigations of individuals without clear-cut authority and tight controls. Critics have taken fragments of intelligence which have come to their attention and built them up into what is represented as the end product of security investigations with political overtones. In these instances, the items upon which such importance was placed have been fragmentary intelligence from substantive

investigations and could not be viewed in their real significance, except as they fit into the overall perspective of the case. This is indicative of the danger of using piecemeal intelligence taken out of context; properly used, however, intelligence is a legitimate and necessary part of all security investigations.

Intelligence is information and the collection of it is inseparable from efficient investigative operations. In fact the two--investigation and intelligence--are mutually dependent.

In the security field, it is vital that the Federal Government detect factors which have a direct bearing on possible violations of law related to the overthrow or destruction of the Government. Intelligence developed to identify individuals who have a propensity for revolutionary or racial violence or have affiliations with subversive or revolutionary groups is essential in the enforcement of the laws designed to protect the integrity of the Government. Intelligence is also essential to the detection of attempts or conspiracies to move against the Government, actions which may themselves be crimes.

No constitutional provisions, statutory enactments or judicial rulings have attempted to deprive law enforcement of its intelligence function, although various attempts have

been made to define or limit the areas encompassed by intelligence and particularly the techniques of collection. It is also recognized that some intelligence gathering activities may have an incidental "chilling" effect on individual citizens. The spectre of the Government's investigatory presence may cause a reaction in citizens, inhibiting the exercise of their full constitutional rights. Therefore, a balance between the requirements of the Government and the constitutional rights of citizens must be maintained.

The intelligence function of investigation, must be both reasonable and practical. It varies in scope and intensity with the seriousness of the provision it seeks to enforce. It is neither reasonable nor practical to launch an aggressive intelligence collection effort concerning the activities of those who might potentially violate a local antilittering ordinance. Detection of a conspiracy to bomb the White House, on the other hand, certainly justifies a continuous and intensive intelligence effort to identify the participants and gain knowledge of any specific plans.

It is mandatory that a Government protect its integrity and this has been recognized by judicial authorities. Ordinary crimes victimize an individual or groups; crimes against the existence of the government victimize society. Carrying these crimes to their ultimate produces the ultimate crime against society--the destruction of that society.

It is clear that the aspirations of most revolutionary groups far exceed their capability to achieve their ultimate objectives. They are, however, quite capable of eroding the integrity of the democratic system by lesser acts and, if not discouraged or thwarted, might well accumulate the will and power for more decisive action. The dramatic success of the Castro revolution is a sufficient example. Consequently, continuing intelligence collection relating to all revolutionary individuals and organizations, commensurate with the immediate threat posed, is imperative to proper vigilance.

The FBI serves as a prime producer of intelligence for the Executive Branch. Over the years it has provided information concerning hostile actions directed against the U. S.

by foreign governments, their intelligence services and others acting in their behalf. On the domestic scene the FBI has penetrated conspiracies ranging from the communist underground to the hooded night riders of the Klan who terrorized our black citizens. But, in the 1960's explosive changes occurred in the internal security problems faced by the country. These changes were reflected in both the scope and nature of the FBI's response and in the intelligence requirements levied upon the FBI by the Executive Branch.

In the decade of the '60's, social change and upheaval added to the critical areas of the FBI's intelligence responsibilities the problems of revolutionary and extremist activities. America was stunned by violent student disruptions, bombings and riots. Spanning the decade were civil rights protests, reactions against them, and tragically, the burning and looting of Watts in 1965 and the conflagrations in Detroit, Newark and Washington, D. C. And, what had been the youthful idealism of the emerging new left in the 1962 Port Huron Statement was drowned out by the obscene Weatherman war cries

as they took their revolution to the streets of Chicago in 1969 during their "Days of Rage."

As the tide of crime and disruption swelled, it brought with it new and pressing problems on the domestic security scene. FBI domestic security investigations increased accordingly. There was also an immediate increase in FBI intelligence collection concerning the lawlessness and violent tactics of these emerging revolutionary elements.

Intelligence collection was essential in contending with these new domestic security problems. This fact was recognized by the reports of two Presidential Commissions. The report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission, 1968) stressed that the absence of accurate information before and during disorders created special control problems. It emphasized that law enforcement organizations must develop the means to obtain adequate intelligence for planning purposes and that law enforcement should "gather, evaluate, analyze and disseminate information on potential as well as actual civil disorders."

Similarly, the President's Commission on Campus Unrest (1970) took special note of the need for intelligence in effective law enforcement. The Commission stated in its report, "It is an undoubted fact that on some campuses there are men and women who plot, all too often successfully, to burn and bomb, and sometimes to maim and kill." The report concluded that the best, ~~and~~ sometimes the only, means law enforcement has to thwart or prevent such plots is through "clandestine intelligence work."

Prevention is the very essence of the proper use of intelligence. To be forewarned is to be placed in a position to carry out countermeasures to meet a threat. During the mass actions and violent confrontations of the 1960's, FBI intelligence collection was crystallized in dissemination of information to other government agencies. This intelligence provided them with an essential working tool to contend with public disorders and activities of a revolutionary nature.

In a memorandum to the Director of the FBI, 9/14/67, Attorney General Clark stressed the importance of intelligence. The Attorney General asserted, "It is most important that

you use the maximum available resources, investigative and intelligence, to collect and report all facts bearing upon (riot activity)." Elaborating on this point, he said, "In these circumstances we must be certain that every attempt is being made to get all information bearing upon these problems; to take every step possible to determine whether the rioting is pre-planned or organized; and, if so, to determine the identity of the people and interests involved; and to deter this activity by prompt and vigorous legal action." The Attorney General's evaluation of the importance of intelligence in this instance applies with equal force to other areas of the FBI's security work.

In December, 1967, the Department of Justice, aware of the high priority of intelligence in dealing with civil disorders, created the Inter-Division Information Unit. This is a repository for "reports which relate to individual or organizational activities which may play a part in instigating or spreading civil disorders" and includes intelligence "relating to black power and black nationalist organizations,

officers and members thereof, racial incidents throughout the country, and any specific demonstrations which are being planned and are of such nature as to render them subject to the possibility of violence." Quick retrieval of this intelligence was emphasized through the use of computers.

Attorney General Mitchell wrote to the FBI Director on May 17, 1971, concerning the Intelligence Evaluation Committee, created to analyze and evaluate intelligence for the guidance of the White House and other departments of the Executive Branch. In this memorandum, the Attorney General stated, "Intensified activities on the part of militant groups here in Washington, D. C., and elsewhere in the country clearly point up the need not only for the gathering of the highest quality intelligence available but also for an expert analysis and evaluation of the intelligence product itself."

AUTHORITY

All FBI investigations and intelligence collection functions in the internal security field are based on authorizations in Congressional enactments, Presidential directives, policy instructions of the Attorney General, National Security Council directives and interagency agreements as set forth below.

Congressional Enactments

Attorney General direction of FBI - 28 U. S. Code, Section 533

Treason - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2381
(U. S. Constitution, Article III, Section 3)

Rebellion and insurrection - 18 U. S. Code,
Section 2383

Seditious Conspiracy - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2384

Advocating violent overthrow of Government -
18 U. S. Code, Section 2385 (Smith Act)

Sedition - 18 U. S. Code, Sections 2387, 2388,
2391

Recruiting for armed hostilities against U. S. -
18 U. S. Code, Section 2389

Designation of Organizations as "communist-action"
and of Individuals as members of such groups
after hearings by Subversive Activities Control
Board - 50 U. S. Code, Sections 781-798 as amended
or repealed (Internal Security Act of 1950, Subchapter
I, called Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950
and amendments by Communist Control Act of 1954)
See also Executive Order 11605 below

Espionage - 18 U. S. Code, Section 792 et seq.

Sabotage - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2151 et seq.

Private Correspondence with Foreign Governments -
18 U. S. Code, Section 953 (Logan Act)

Registration of Foreign Agents - 22 U. S. Code,
Sections 611-621

Atomic Energy Act of 1954 - 42 U. S. Code,
Section 2122

Deportation for Subversive Activities - 8 U. S. Code,
Section 1481 (Immigration and Nationality Act 1952)

Possession, threatened use, or use of explosives
for illicit purposes - 18 U. S. Code, Section 844

Travel in or use of facility of interstate commerce
to promote or incite riot, to commit violence in
furtherance of riot or to abet others in inciting
or participating in a riot. - 18 U. S. Code, Sections
231-233, 245, 2101-2102

Neutrality Matters - 18 U. S. Code, Sections 956,
958-962; 22 U. S. Code, Sections 1934, 401
(Munitions Control Act)

Intelligence exchange with CIA - 50 U. S. Code,
Section 403 (National Security Act)

Presidential Directives

Directive of the President - 6/26/39
directing that investigation of all espionage,
counterespionage, and sabotage matters are handled
by FBI.

Directive of the President - 9/6/39
requesting the Attorney General to instruct FBI
to take charge of investigative matters relating
to espionage, sabotage, and violations of the
neutrality regulations.

Presidential Directive - 1/8/43
reiterated instructions of previous directive of 9/6/39 and requested law enforcement officers, patriotic organizations and individuals turn over to FBI all information regarding espionage, sabotage and violations of neutrality regulations.

Presidential Directive - 7/24/50
reiterated substance of 9/6/39 and 1/8/43 directives, noting they provided for FBI to take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related matters.

Directive of President 12/15/53.
referred to previous Presidential Directives and added investigation by FBI of violations of Atomic Energy Act.

Executive Order 10450 4/27/53
established programs to insure that the employment and retention of any Government employee is clearly consistent with the interests of national security. Requires check of FBI Fingerprint Files and, in cases where derogatory information develops, FBI conducts a full-field investigation.

Executive Order 11605 7/2/71
calls for Subversive Activities Control Board, when petitioned by the Attorney General, to determine after hearings if any organization is totalitarian, fascist, communist, subversive, or whether it has adopted a policy of advocating the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their Constitutional or statutory rights. By inference, the FBI, as investigative arm of the Attorney General, would develop evidence for hearings required. Also, FBI, by inference, would develop evidence of membership in such organizations, which may be basis for denial of Government employment.

Policy Instructions of Attorney General

September 14, 1967: instructions of then Attorney General Ramsey Clark for FBI to investigate possibility of conspiracy to plan, promote, or aggravate riot activity.

February 18, 1969: instructions from the Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, for FBI to obtain information concerning possibility that underlying subversive groups were giving illegal directions or guidance to numerous campus disorders.

(Other policy instructions from Attorney General and Department have been received, amplifying points set forth above; many of these concerned specific cases.)

National Security Council Directives

Directive on Internal Security, March 23, 1949, establishing Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee (IIC) responsible to coordinate investigation of domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversion and other related intelligence matters affecting internal security. FBI represented on IIC.

United States Intelligence Board (USIB) established September 15, 1958, to maintain coordination between CIA and other intelligence agencies. FBI a member of USIB to provide domestic intelligence for correlation with foreign intelligence.

Interagency Agreements

Delimitations Agreement signed by IIC members March 23, 1949, to establish jurisdiction in investigations by members of espionage, counterespionage, subversion, and sabotage and to provide for exchange of information on above matters.

FBI-Secret Service Agreement signed November 26, 1971, to provide for transmittal of information from FBI to Secret Service regarding individuals and organizations who, because of their propensities, represent or may represent a danger to the safety of the President and certain other persons.

IMPLEMENTATION OF AUTHORITY

The criteria and guidelines for FBI investigations are furnished to the field in a "Manual of Instructions," the "F. B. I. Handbook," and in Letters to all Special Agents in Charge. In addition, instructions and guidance are given to the field in Headquarters communications on specific cases. Compliance with criteria and guidelines is obtained by supervision in both the field and at Bureau Headquarters. In addition, regular inspections of field and Headquarters Divisions assure that Bureau policies concerning investigations are being followed.

In the security field, the basic responsibility of the FBI is to investigate revolutionary organizations dedicated to the violent overthrow or destruction of the United States Government. These include old-line Marxist groups, for example, the Communist Party, USA, and the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party; and such new revolutionary groups as the Students for a Democratic Society, the Black Panther Party and the Weatherman. In the investigation of subversive individuals a determination is made of the dangerousness of the individual and efforts are made to obtain evidence of violations of any applicable

Federal laws. To assist in cataloguing the level of dangerousness of those individuals and to retrieve quickly information concerning them, the Domestic Intelligence Division maintains a card file known as the Administrative Index.

Administrative Index

Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (Emergency Detention Act) before it was repealed on September 25, 1971, provided for emergency detention of subversive individuals in the event of a national emergency. To implement that provision of the act, the FBI and the Department of Justice maintained the Security Index. This Index was, of course, discontinued with the repeal of the Emergency Detention Act. By memorandum of October 22, 1971, however, the Attorney General noted that the repeal of Title II "does not alter or limit the FBI's authority and responsibility to record, file and index information secured" in this field and concurred in the establishment of an administrative index to assist in "making readily retrievable and available the results of its (the FBI's) investigations into subversive activities."

To this end, such an index (called Adex) was instituted for making quickly retrievable information on four categories of individuals in order of dangerousness:

I) National leaders of revolutionary or extremist groups, members who have exhibited a propensity for violence, members with training in sabotage, espionage, or guerrilla warfare, unaffiliated revolutionaries with a propensity for violence, and revolutionaries with access to key facilities.

II) Secondary leadership of revolutionary and extremist groups, active members of these groups, and unaffiliated revolutionaries or extremists with a propensity for violence against property rather than persons.

III) Rank-and-file members of revolutionary groups within the previous five years, leaders of fronts for revolutionary groups, and individuals with revolutionary ideologies likely in a national emergency to commit acts of espionage, sabotage, or terrorism.

IV) Persons likely to assist, financially or otherwise, revolutionary groups, or persons in a position to influence others to commit acts inimical to the national defense.

Investigation of an individual is conducted to determine whether or not he should, consistent with the criteria of these categories, be listed on the Adex. If, as

the result of the investigation, it is determined he does not meet the criteria the case is closed. If, on the other hand, he does meet the criteria, he is listed in the Adex according to the determined degree of dangerousness. Category I cases continue under investigation for as long as the individual continues to warrant that Category listing. When an individual is listed in Categories II, III, and IV, however, the investigation is closed, subject to periodic reopening to verify his location, to determine his activities and to ascertain whether he still qualifies for inclusion in the Adex. Provision is made for upgrading, downgrading and purging an individual from the Adex as his activities and level of dangerousness fluctuate.

Revolutionary Groups

Investigations of individuals for a determination of whether or not they meet the criteria for Adex generally involve their degree of affiliation with revolutionary and extremist groups. The purpose of investigations of basic revolutionary and new-left type groups is to: (1) provide intelligence to the Executive Branch which will enable the President to fulfill his Constitutional responsibilities;

- (2) detect developing conspiracies to violate substantive laws and initiate prosecutive action whenever possible to prevent such conspiracies from being carried out; and
- (3) develop evidence necessary for the Attorney General to file petitions before the Subversive Activities Control Board in accordance with provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 and Executive Order 11605.

The criteria, guidelines and restrictions on the investigations of revolutionary groups are outlined below:

Investigation is initiated upon receipt of information indicating that organization advocates overthrow of Government or engages in activity to deny others their Constitutional or statutory rights.

Investigation is conducted to establish aims and objectives, location and size, domination and control by hostile foreign power, identities of all leaders and members..

In regard to their front groups and organizations which they have infiltrated:

Investigation is initiated upon receipt of information that organization is dominated, controlled or influenced to substantial degree by revolutionary organization.

Investigation is conducted to determine degree of infiltration, aims and objectives, location and size and identities of all leaders.

Extremist Groups

The purpose of investigations of white hate and black extremist organizations is to: (1) provide intelligence to the Executive Branch which will enable the President to fulfill his Constitutional responsibilities; and (2) detect developing conspiracies to violate substantive laws and initiate prosecutive action whenever possible to prevent such conspiracies from being carried out. Investigations of white hate groups are confined to those which have actually or allegedly committed or have conspired to commit acts of violence or have adopted a policy of advocating or inciting the use of violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution. Investigations of black extremist organizations concern those groups which take extremist, anti-U. S. Government, anti-white positions and whose activities have involved them or may involve them in civil unrest and/or subversive activity.

Subversive, Revolutionary and Extremist Individuals

Individuals referred to as subversives are generally affiliated with old-line basic revolutionary organizations; those termed revolutionaries are usually new left types; and those called extremists are fundamentally

involved in violent or revolutionary activities based on race. Procedures for the investigation of these types of individuals are similar and the criteria are outlined as follows:

- Membership in a basic revolutionary organization
- Espousing the ~~LINE OF~~ REVOLUTIONARY movements
- Special training ~~ABROAD~~, or leadership training, in a revolutionary group
- Individuals having access to key facilities who have been members of a revolutionary group at any time
- Persons with revolutionary, terrorist, anarchistic or extremist beliefs who are likely to seize upon a national emergency to endanger public safety
- Individuals who have actually or allegedly committed, conspired to commit, or adopted policy to commit acts of violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution
- Extremists and revolutionaries who have demonstrated a propensity for violence, have involved or may involve themselves in civil unrest, or who advocate violent overthrow of the Government
- Persons who influence others to engage in acts inimical to the national defense or who are likely to furnish financial or other assistance to revolutionary or extremist elements because of their sympathies, associations or ideologies

Unaffiliated Individuals

In the areas of revolutionary (new left) and extremist activities, some investigations are conducted of individuals who are not affiliated with organizations. Investigation of an individual is undertaken when information is received that the person:

Is a revolutionary and adheres to the Weatherman ideology of advocating a revolution now and uses terrorist tactics in furtherance of revolution

Is a revolutionary or extremist and demonstrates by acts or statements propensity for violence against property

Exhibits revolutionary or extremist ideology and is likely to seize opportunity in national emergency to commit espionage, sabotage, terrorism or otherwise interfere with Federal or local governments or defense efforts

Influences others to engage in acts inimical to national defense or likely to furnish financial or other assistance to revolutionary or extremist elements

Espionage and Foreign Intelligence Investigations

The mission of the FBI in the foreign intelligence field is one of counterintelligence. The objectives and priorities of counterintelligence have been variously stated and evaluated. Generally, these objectives may be listed in declining priority as follows: (1) the detection and

identification of intelligence operations and agents; (2) the penetration of these operations for the purpose of control and the development of intelligence information; (3) neutralization of hostile intelligence operations through disruption and disinformation; and, (4) prosecution. Whatever the assigned priority, the overall objective is to deny access to information sought by whatever practical means are available.

Foreign intelligence investigations are grounded in the Espionage statute and related laws including the Registration and Atomic Energy Acts. Individual investigations are initiated usually on the basis of a known or suspected connection with a foreign intelligence service, foreign country or subversive organization with such connections. Since these investigations emanate from various sensitive sources and involve special considerations, extensive criteria and limitations are defined and enumerated in current instructions.

In general terms, the governing criteria are designed to preclude initiation and continuance of investigations which are not justified. The limitations are designed to control the scope of investigation in order to insure security of our interests through close supervisory scrutiny.

Restrictions on Investigations

FBI guidelines go beyond the rules for opening, investigating and closing cases; they also impose restrictions to make certain that we do not violate the constitutional rights of any individual and to preclude investigations from becoming "fishing expeditions." In the security field these are some of the restrictions WHICH are applied:

Security cases are evaluated continually to determine if we are fulfilling our responsibilities. Those cases not warranting further investigation are closed promptly.

There are no investigations of members of an organization which does not advocate use of force to bring about existing changes in the Government. Examples are the Socialist Party, the Independent Workers of the World and Independence Party of Puerto Rico.

Persons arrested during disruptive demonstrations are identified since circumstances of an arrest, in some cases, may indicate a propensity for violence. However, a mere arrest in connection with a demonstration is an insufficient basis in itself for security investigation. The arrest must be coupled with a demonstrated propensity for violence or with subversive or revolutionary activity on the part of the individual arrested.

When it is determined that a security subject is a member of the armed services, the investigation is discontinued immediately and the military advised.

Civil rights organizations are not investigated.

Ambassadors or heads of permanent missions to the United Nations are not investigated.

No surveillances are conducted at the White House, the Capitol, the Supreme Court, the House and Senate Office Buildings or the United Nations.

No telephone or microphone surveillances are operated without prior written approval of the Attorney General.

Bureau authority is REQUIRED for:

Investigations of officials and diplomatic representatives of foreign countries.
(Department of State authority is also required.)

Investigation of communist infiltration of a political organization.

Developing sources connected with an institution of learning.

Interviews of subjects of active, current security investigations.

Investigations of faculty members. If approval is granted, only established sources functioning in an administrative capacity may be contacted on the campus. Other established sources and informants must be contacted away from the campus. Contacts with students, graduate students and faculty members must also have Bureau authority.

Interviews of labor leaders and persons in educational, mass media or publishing fields.

These examples demonstrate a consciousness of the need to impose limitations on investigations and the continuing imposition of them.

Information Storage and Retrieval

The storage and retrieval of information is a basic operational necessity of any investigative or intelligence-gathering agency. Procedures within the FBI for these functions provide for written records of information received from a variety of sources--confidential informants, confidential ~~INVESTIGATIVE~~ techniques, and open sources--and the storage of this information in different types of files. These include active investigative files on organizations and individuals and some general files. These "raw" files are maintained both at the Seat of Government and in the various field offices. Information in the files is thoroughly indexed so that data can be retrieved.

In the intelligence field, when an allegation within the jurisdiction of the FBI is received, a case on an individual or on an organization may be opened, depending on the quality of the allegation. Nonspecific information that is received on an individual or organization is placed in the pertinent file, if one exists, or is placed in a general file if the organization or individual is not the subject of a specific file.

These files are an integral part of the intelligence-gathering function. By the very nature of the FBI's assignment to coordinate internal security information, the maintenance of data over a period of time is required and it is necessary that a system for retrieving this information be used.

Because those files often contain derogatory information that may not be substantiated by further investigation (the derogatory information received may not be germane to a matter within the FBI's jurisdiction), the Attorneys General have long taken the position that these files should not be available for public scrutiny. Incalculable damage to individual reputations could result from the disclosure of single items of information without knowing the full background concerning the receipt of a particular item and the context within which it was recorded.

The late Justice Robert Jackson, in his capacity as Attorney General, wrote in 1941:

Disclosure of information contained in the reports (FBI files) might also be the grossest kind of injustice to innocent individuals. Investigative reports include leads and suspicions, and sometimes even the statements of malicious or misinformed people. Even though later and more complete reports exonerate the individuals, the use of particular or selected reports might constitute the grossest injustice, and we all know a correction never catches up with an accusation.

Dissemination

The Bureau's general policy on dissemination is that information developed by or coming to the attention of the FBI is promptly referred to all agencies of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government having a potential interest in it or responsibility for taking action concerning it, whenever their interest or responsibility is apparent or known. This policy is in accordance with numerous formal agreements entered into between the Bureau and other Government agencies. It is also in accordance with Presidential directives obligating the Bureau to act as clearing house for information affecting the internal security of the U. S.

Despite this general liberal policy of dissemination, we have recognized that with regard to highly sensitive information a determination must be made on an individual basis as to what information should be disseminated and how it should be transmitted. The degree of sensitivity and/or the security classification will determine level of dissemination to any interested agency and the method of transmittal. In certain instances, sensitive information may be furnished to a high-level official with a request that dissemination in his agency be restricted to his personnel on a need-to-know basis. Such information might be disseminated by secure teletype, courier, liaison, and where necessary, by secure telephone. Information furnished orally is confirmed in writing.

27

The Attorney General

August 7, 1973

Director, FBI

X SCOPe OF FBI JURISDICTION
AND AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP/ JAL/MS/1G
mde/b

During our meeting on July 26, 1973, you referred to a discussion you had with Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., of Maryland during your confirmation hearings as to the statutory authority of the FBI and the Department of Justice in the field of domestic intelligence investigations. You then asked Mr. William D. Ruckelshaus to work with the FBI in weighing the pros and cons with regard to statutory authority in this area. I mentioned that research was being performed on this subject at the present time and that we would be in touch with Mr. Ruckelshaus with regard to this matter when we have completed the results of our consideration and findings within the FBI.

Actually, a study has been going on in the FBI for more than two years as to the scope of FBI jurisdiction and authority in domestic intelligence investigations. When Mr. L. Patrick Gray, III, was designated as Acting Director of the FBI, he instructed that a position paper be prepared concerning the jurisdiction and authority of the FBI to conduct domestic intelligence investigations. A position paper was prepared which in essence stated that authority of the FBI in this field is based on legislative enactments, even though we may have publicly relied heavily on Presidential directives as the basis for such authority. Mr. Gray ordered an in-depth study made of the position and in August, 1972, a detailed report was furnished to him. The following is a summary of that report.

Over a period of several months there were a number of public statements questioning authority and jurisdiction of the FBI to conduct domestic intelligence-type investigations, particularly where there is no clear-cut legislative authority apparent. One of the most searching inquiries was contained in a paper presented by Professor John T. Clift at a two-day conference at Princeton University in October, 1971, sponsored by the Committee for Public Justice.

62-116-15-83

ENCLOSURE

The Attorney General

A major thrust of Professor Ellif's paper concerned FBI authority derived from legislative enactments as opposed to that derived from Presidential directives, beginning with a directive issued by President Roosevelt in September, 1939. Professor Ellif is of the opinion that the 1939 directive, which was reiterated on three subsequent occasions, was magnified by the FBI from its original purpose to a definitive order to conduct intelligence-type investigations.

Senator Sam J. Ervin, as you know, had been probing into the nature and extent of FBI intelligence-type investigations. Senator Ervin had even announced that he intended to propose legislation to prohibit the FBI from investigating any person without that individual's consent, unless the Government has reason to believe that person has committed a crime or is about to commit a crime. Other Congressmen indicated a similar interest in FBI investigative activities.

Our study revealed that the FBI had declared publicly over a long period of time that its responsibilities in the domestic intelligence field are authorized under legislative enactments, Presidential directives, and instructions of the Attorney General. The Presidential directives are obviously the 1) directive dated September 6, 1939, and reiterated January 8, 1943; July 24, 1950; and December 15, 1953, and 2) Executive Order 10450 dated April 27, 1953 (and amended but not yet implemented by Executive Order 11605 dated July 2, 1971).

In carefully analyzing the language of the first directive, dated September 6, 1939, and considering that the subsequent directives are all hinged on that one, we believe that there is a misconception as to the extent of jurisdiction or authority conveyed to the FBI by these directives. It appears that while the 1939 directive fixed responsibility on the FBI to handle espionage, sabotage, and neutrality matters, it did not convey any authority or jurisdiction which the FBI did not already have from legislative enactments. It is difficult to read into this directive or in any of those which followed any authority to conduct intelligence-type investigations which would or could not be conducted under an umbrella of legislative enactments.

The Attorney General

As a matter of historical fact, President Roosevelt in August, 1936, did request former Director J. Edgar Hoover to conduct investigations of subversive activities in this country, including communism and fascism. This request, however, was a confidential oral request and there is doubt that any record of it was made outside the FBI. This request, or Presidential mandate, was based, incidentally, on the fact that the law provided that the FBI could conduct such investigations if the Secretary of State should so request.

The study revealed that while the 1939 et seq. directives did not grant any special intelligence-gathering authority to the FBI, we were responsible under these directives to collect all intelligence information furnished by local, state, and Federal law enforcement agencies and patriotic citizens and to sift and coordinate all such information for indications of subversive activity covered by Federal statutes.

The study concluded that the FBI has the responsibility to conduct whatever investigations are necessary to determine if statutes relating to espionage, sabotage, insurrection or rebellion, sedition, seditious conspiracy, advocacy of overthrowing the Government, and other such crimes affecting the national security have been violated. In this connection we note that in a letter dated September 14, 1967, the Department of Justice advised that the FBI is continually alert to the problem of recurring riots and is submitting intelligence reports to the Department of Justice concerning such activity. This letter enumerated several Federal statutes and stated these could be applicable in using maximum available resources, investigative and intelligence, to collect and report all facts bearing on the question of schemes or conspiracies to plan, promote or aggravate riot activity.

In other words, the Department was requesting all possible intelligence-type investigative activity based on the existence of certain statutes. We see this as being no different from our intelligence-type investigations relating to plans of groups or individuals to overthrow, destroy, interfere with or threaten the survival of effective operation of national, state, and local governments.

The Attorney General

Based on this study, we believe that had there never been a single one of the Presidential directives in question the FBI would have conducted and will, through necessity, continue to conduct the same intelligence-type investigations as were conducted from 1939 to the present date. We also believe, however, that in order to counter the criticism and skepticism of such individuals as Professor Elliff and Senator Sam J. Ervin that an up-to-date Executive order should be issued clearly establishing a need for intelligence-type investigations and delineating a clear authority for the FBI to conduct such investigations based on guidelines established by the Attorney General and adhering to constitutional principles.

The study concluded with two basic recommendations.

- 1) That the Department of Justice be requested to sponsor comprehensive legislation spelling out the FBI's investigative authority in the collection of intelligence information relating to the national security and; 2) that the Department of Justice be requested to seek a comprehensive Executive order which would cover any possible gap between statutory authority and Executive necessity in protection of the national security.

At first glance these recommendations may appear to contradict our position that we already have statutory authority to conduct security-type investigations; that this being the case we do not need additional legislative enactments, nor do we need an Executive order. But being realistic we think that the basic statutes upon which we rely for our authority to conduct domestic intelligence investigations need to be updated to fit 1973 needs. Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 2383, 2384, and 2385 relate to the national security, but the legislative history of 2383 and 2384 indicates that they were designed for the Civil War era, not the Twentieth Century, and Section 2385 has been reduced to a fragile shell by the Supreme Court. These statutes are unquestionably still valid, but updating is certainly indicated. The bills introduced as H.R. 6046 and S. 1400 in the 93rd Congress appear to contain language which should fill our statutory needs, except perhaps for those groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, which do not seek to overthrow the Government, but nevertheless are totalitarian in nature and seek to deprive constitutionally guaranteed rights.

The Attorney General

As to the need for an Executive order, we think that two issues are involved. We have statutory authority, but what we need is a definitive requirement from the President as to the nature and type of intelligence data he requires in the pursuit of his responsibilities based on our statutory authority. In other words, there is a need, from our standpoint, for both authoritative and definitive guidelines. The statutes give us the authority. The Executive order would define our national security objectives.

Members of Congress, including such men as Senator Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, have proposed legislation to spell out jurisdiction and authority of the FBI in this field. It would appear that the President would rather spell out his own requirements in an Executive order instead of having Congress tell him what the FBI might do to help him fulfill his obligations and responsibilities as President.

The political climate of suspicion and distrust resulting from disclosures coming out of the Watergate hearings could present an obstacle to getting any such Executive order signed in the immediate future. However, the rationale is nevertheless valid and when scrutinized closely, the language in the Executive order we hereinafter propose establishes definitive guidelines which have heretofore been unclear. It is my belief that we should go forward with this.

We therefore propose and recommend that an Executive order along the following lines be submitted to the White House with a strong recommendation for approval. The language which follows is merely to illustrate the type of Executive order which we think would be appropriate and does not necessarily represent an ideal format or style which should be submitted to the White House.

EXECUTIVE ORDER

"Whereas the Constitution of the United States was established to insure, among other things, domestic tranquility; to provide for the common defense; and to promote the general welfare for the people of the United States; and

The Attorney General

"Whereas the President of the United States has the constitutionally imposed responsibility of defending the Constitution and the existence of the Government thereunder; and

"Whereas there have been continuing unlawful acts of violence perpetrated against the Government of the United States or against citizens of the United States or against persons entitled to the protection of the United States thereby endangering the domestic tranquility, threatening the common defense, and jeopardizing the general welfare of the people of the United States; and

"Whereas the Congress has enacted laws prohibiting acts such as treason, sedition, sabotage, espionage, insurrection and rebellion, seditious conspiracy, civil disobedience, rioting, assassination, kidnaping, deprival of civil rights, and conspiracies to commit such acts; and

"Whereas the President of the United States as Chief Executive in the maintenance of the Government thereunder must have intelligence information for appropriate decisions in the discharge of his constitutionally imposed responsibilities;

"Now by authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States and in the interest of orderly operation of this Government and in furtherance of the domestic tranquility, common defense, and general welfare of the people of the United States it is ordered that;

"The Attorney General prepare and issue guidelines, conforming to the principles of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and outlining the necessary direction, coordination, and guidance of investigations to assure that the Federal Bureau of Investigation provides on a continuing basis intelligence information essential to the execution of laws pertaining to subversive activity and other such activity affecting the national security, domestic tranquility, and general welfare of the United States."

The Nation has been going through a time of terror. The concept of urban guerrilla terrorism has been adopted by various extremist elements in the United States. Bombings of public buildings and national institutions;

The Attorney General

killing of police officers who, by their uniform, are a symbol of the democratic establishment; hijacking of aircraft in furtherance of revolutionary movements; terrorist assaults on foreign diplomatic personnel and establishments; and open declaration of war on our form of government are only a few of the violent acts which have been perpetrated by domestic subversives who seek to destroy or seriously cripple our Government. Terrorist guerrilla attacks which were once confined to far away places and related to problems of no immediate concern of ours are now possible in this country. Foreign terrorist groups in collusion with domestic terrorists have laid plans for an airport massacre of the type which recently occurred in Israel. Other foreign terrorist elements have laid plans for terrorist attacks on American soil. Already one foreign official has been assassinated, possibly by terrorists.

It would be folly to adopt an investigative policy based on the concept of investigation only when there is reason to believe a crime involving the national security has been committed. The FBI must obviously anticipate the crimes described above. We believe that in order for the Government to be in position to defend itself against revolutionary and terrorist efforts to destroy it, the FBI must have sufficient investigative authority to conduct intelligence-type investigations not normally associated with enforcement of the statutes. In other words we think the President has the inherent Executive power to expand by further defining the FBI's investigative authority to enable it to develop advance information concerning the plans and aspirations of terrorists and revolutionaries who seek to overthrow or destroy the Government. However, we also believe that such expanded authority must be formally set forth in an Executive order and that this recommendation is responsive in the Attorney General's expressed interest in laying more formal guidelines to our work in areas where definition is not now clear.

We consider the issuance of a new Executive order delineating our jurisdiction, authority, and responsibility to gather and report intelligence information relating to the national security to be a very important and high priority matter. We believe the issuance of guidelines by the Attorney General under Title 28, Section 533, United States Code, to be equally important.

The Attorney General

For your information, our own investigative guidelines as contained in our Manual of Instructions relating to domestic subversive investigations have been completely rewritten to conform with the concept that our domestic intelligence-type investigations are based on Federal statutes. These guidelines provide that in each instance, the domestic intelligence investigation must be predicated on information indicating that the organization or individual is engaged in activity which could involve a violation of specific statutes relating to the national security. A copy of the new guidelines was previously provided to the Department of Justice in connection with the request of Senator Edward M. Kennedy to obtain a copy of the FBI's Section 87 of the Manual of Instructions. The effective date of the new guidelines was August 1, 1973.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
2 - Legal Counsel Division

The Attorney General

April 22, 1975

Director, FBI

(1-Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. E. W. Larson, Jr.

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/HB

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a response to one of the requests set forth in referenced letter. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

EWL:ekw (H.W.)
(8)

4/24 Approved by A.G. (Incl. 4, 11, 12)
4/25 Delivered to Mr. E. Larson
of SSC

P.O.

REC'D

62-116395-82

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sector Sec'y _____

NOTE: The Senate Select Committee has made a request for titles and number of FBI field office Agents in the internal security and counterintelligence field as well as the percentage of manpower assigned in these areas.. The Administrative Division has compiled this information. However, it is not felt this data should be furnished formally in a written response to the Committee. This data can be classified "Confidential" under Executive Order 11652. Over and above this technical classification a great deal of sensitivity attaches to these figures since should they be made public or otherwise fall into the

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE TWO APR 29 1975

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

GPO 954-346

The Attorney General

NOTE CONTINUED:

hands of hostile foreign intelligence services, they would reveal the current capability the FBI employs in the field of counterintelligence against the total foreign threat.

It is noted that a precedent exists for making the information available for review only at FBIHQ. By letterhead memorandum 4/8/75 we advised the Committee that we would not furnish them a requested list of names and titles of all Intelligence Division personnel at FBIHQ down to and including Unit Chiefs together with a number of personnel below that level but that this list would be made available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the Committee staff at FBIHQ.

- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Gregar
2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. Farrington)

April 21, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1 - Mr. E. W. Larson, Jr.)

RE: ORGANIZATION

Reference is made to letter dated March 10, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of said Committee which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Under Item III entitled "Organization," paragraph C requested at the field level, the titles and number of FBI field office Agents assigned to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities, together with the percentage of total Agent manhours devoted to such matters, operations, and activities.

You are advised that a current survey of all FBI field offices has been made to obtain the data requested. Since this information is considered to be highly sensitive, it is not being furnished directly to the Committee; however, the requested data is being maintained in the Intelligence Division of FBIHQ and is available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the Committee staff upon request.

1 - The Attorney General
EWL:ekw
(8)

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. 62-116395
Dep. AD Inv. _____

Asst. Dir.: _____

Admin. _____

Comp. Syst. _____

Ext. Affairs _____

Files & Com. _____

Gen. Inv. _____

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Training _____

Legal Coun. _____

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Director Sec'y _____

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

ENCLOSURE

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DP - 10

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS
DATE 11/8/01 BY SP-2 ALM 116
IS UNCLASSIFIED

EXPOSURE

62-116395-82

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. WALSH

DATE: 4/3/75

FROM : L. C. GROOVER

LCG/WC

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

T
Response
IX

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep. AD Adm.	_____
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Director Sec'y	_____

Reference Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams memorandum dated 3/20/75 captioned as above and letter of Senator Frank Church dated 3/19/75.

Relet requested, among other things, the titles and number of FBI field office agents assigned to internal security, intelligence collection and/or counterintelligence matters, operations or activities, together with the percent of total agent man-hours devoted to such matters, operations and activities (page 3, item IIIC of relet).

The purpose of this memorandum is to forward to the Legal Counsel Division, through the Intelligence Division, the response, attached herewith, to the above request.

It is noted the request specifically mentions internal security, intelligence collection and counterintelligence matters. Our response has been constructed in the traditional two categories of internal security and counterintelligence. Intelligence collection (informants) is included in the data for both of the other categories as appropriate.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum with enclosure be forwarded to the Intelligence Division for review, classification and approval and, thereafter, forwarded to the Legal Counsel Division which is coordinating replies to the Senate Select Committee.

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Jackson

JJC:jmb

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/HAG

SEE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
ADDENDUM PAGE TWO

SEE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION
ADDENDUM PAGE THREE

Memorandum to Mr. Walsh
Re: Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence Activities

WOB
ADDENDUM: Intelligence Division, WOC:aso, 4/4/75

The Intelligence Division has reviewed the attached figures prepared by the Administrative Division. Under the criteria of the current Classification Act it would be impossible to justify classification of these figures; however, should they be made public or fall into the hands of a hostile foreign intelligence service, it would reveal the current capability the FBI employs in the field of counterintelligence against the total foreign threat. In view of the above, the Intelligence Division strongly recommends that the Legal Counsel Division discuss this with the staff of the Senate Select Committee pointing out the vulnerability implicit in this attachment in an effort to have the Committee withdraw its request identified as III C.

JWR/HHW
WMC/CB

CCP

GW


WFO

Regarding the observations of the Intelligence Division concerning the making available the amount of manpower dedicated to counterintelligence and domestic intelligence work in the FBI, the Legal Counsel Division has the following observations:

(1) Based on our analysis and conversations this Division has had with Fred B. Griffith of the Inspection Division, it appears that the information contained in this memorandum may be classified confidential under Executive order 11652.

(2) Before making any determination as to whether we make such information available to the Senate Select Committee, it would appear we should determine from CIA what their response to such a request will be so that our position and that of CIA will be consistent in this area. In this regard SA Paul V. Daly has contacted Leon F. Schwartz, Liaison Section of Intelligence Division, and requested he determine from CIA what their position in this regard is.

(3) It is not believed that we should take a hard and fast position that this information not be made available to the Committee or that we make an effort to have the Committee withdraw their request for this information. We should rather develop some fallback position such as that this information will be made available to the Chairman of the Committee or will be made available during an oral briefing, etc.



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Adams

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-10-75 BY SP2 ALM/KL

DATE: 4-10-75

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Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Soc. _____

UNRECORDED COPY

In connection with our investigations of staff members for captioned Committee, we have developed derogatory information on two individuals which has been brought specifically to the attention of William Miller, Staff Director of the Committee. One of these involved Mrs. Diane Eloise LaVoy whose sister-in-law questioned her loyalty and declared she "does not love America." The sister-in-law said Mrs. LaVoy constantly criticized the U. S. Government and its policy and underlying weaknesses of our society. Another individual said she was highly critical of CIA activities. This information was pointed out to Miller on 3-25-75 when the results of the investigation were delivered to him, and he also was advised that the CIA would be furnished the same data in accordance with our agreement concerning these matters.

On 3-24-75 and 3-28-75 results of the investigation concerning Mrs. Betty Dale Ellison were delivered to Miller and he was advised that a prior supervisor with eight years of training and experience in psychiatric care stated he felt Mrs. Ellison needs psychological examination. He termed her a trouble maker and said he would have fired her if he had the authority. He described her definitely as a security risk due to her mental and emotional instability. It also was pointed out to Miller that other former supervisors described her as unstable when working under pressure and unable to get along with fellow employees. Miller was told that this information also would be furnished to CIA.

On 4-2-75 Miller advised Inspector Bowers he had considered the matter involving Mrs. LaVoy and had discussed it with the Committee Chairman, and they had decided to proceed with her as a staff member since they did not feel the derogatory remarks by her sister-in-law were sufficiently strong enough to disqualify her since the remainder of the investigation was favorable.

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz

REC-100 1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Steel
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Bowers
APR 22 1975

DWB:kjs (10)

CONTINUED - OVER

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams Memo
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Miller also advised on 4-2-75 that their review of the Ellison investigation showed justifiable concern for her being cleared for the staff, and he asked for any guidance we might give him. It was pointed out that the only real solution to the situation seemed to be that she not be added to the staff. Miller said he would appreciate any comments from the CIA also in this regard. This request was conveyed to [redacted]

[redacted]
JFK Act 6 (1) (A)

These views were conveyed to Miller on 4-9-75. Miller stated at that time that they had resolved the situation by assigning Mrs. Ellison to purely administrative tasks and that she would be fully isolated from any sensitive or classified information in connection with her responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

DWB *JP* *WAN* *GP*
PJM
gpm *angie*
K

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

DATE: 3-21-75

#mvr6
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/10/01 BY SP-2 ALM/MGE

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Director Sec'y _____

On 3-19-75 Inspectors John B. Hotis, David W. Bowers, and Special Agent Paul V. Daly met with William Miller, Staff Director; Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; and Michael T. Epstein of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) staff. During the meeting Mr. Schwarz requested a briefing be arranged for staff members of SSC concerning the operations of the Intelligence Division, that they be furnished copies of training documents pertaining to matters handled by the Intelligence Division, and that they be furnished a glossary of terms used in the intelligence field. He pointed out the aforementioned material would greatly assist in the SSC staff developing an understanding of the Intelligence Division operations and hopefully prevent misunderstandings or needless requests of the FBI.

Mr. Miller advised that Senators Frank Church and John Tower intended to contact the Director in the immediate future to discuss arrangements relating to the SSC's review of the FBI activities.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Intelligence Division review and where possible make available training documents relating to training concerning Intelligence Division matters and a glossary of terms used in the intelligence field, or recommend a counter offer,

(2) Legal Analysis Office in conjunction with the Intelligence Division arrange a briefing for Senate Select Committee staff members.

- 1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:kjs/dk 1975

REQ 44

17 APR 22 1975

J-EWS

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 4/17/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE

moe16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 A.M./HGP

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Director Sec'y _____

At 11:00 a.m. on April 17, 1975, Inspector John B. Hotis Special Agent Paul V. Daly and I met with Deputy Attorney General Tyler and Associate Deputy Attorney General James Hutchinson at the request of the Deputy Attorney General.

Deputy Attorney General Tyler advised that he had been requested by Burke Marshall and F.A.O. Schwarz, III, who are consultant and General Counsel, respectively, for the Senate Select Committee, to meet with him on Monday afternoon, April 21, 1975, to discuss matters relating to the Committee's activities. The Deputy Attorney General said that he has been personally acquainted with Mr. Marshall for a long time and also is acquainted with Mr. Schwarz. He considered the possibility of having a Bureau representative attend the meeting, but then decided it would be best if he would meet with Marshall and Schwarz privately to determine whether they desire to discuss details of the Committee's responsibilities and if it became necessary, he would request the Bureau to send a representative to the meeting. REC 44 62-116395-79

The Deputy Attorney General said that he would, of course, advise us orally or in writing of the results of his conference with Mr. Marshall and Mr. Schwarz.

✓ APR 22 1975

The Deputy Attorney General inquired as to the procedure currently being employed in responding to the Committee's requests and Inspector Hotis explained the current procedures. I mentioned to the Deputy Attorney General the existence of the Ad Hoc Committee of Intelligence Agencies and suggested to him that he might desire to designate a representative to attend those meetings in order to be on notice as to the policies being developed by the White House and the intelligence community in responding to Committee requests. I explained to him that James Wilderotter, formerly Associate Deputy Attorney General, was the 62-116395

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Mintz

5 APR 22 1975
JAM:mfd (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Department's representative on the Committee, but he has now been reassigned to responsibilities at the White House. I told him that Assistant Attorney General Scalia had been scheduled to attend the last meeting of the Committee, although he was unable to attend. The Deputy Attorney General said that he would discuss with Mr. Scalia the possibility of having Mr. Scalia attend as the Department's representative.

I asked the Deputy Attorney General whether he was undertaking the principal responsibility in the Department for matters relating to the Senate Select Committee and other committees that may be inquiring into the FBI and he said that that was not clear as yet because the Attorney General has taken a personal interest in these matters and it appeared that the responsibilities are still fragmented within the Department. It was his opinion that the responsibilities should be centralized and he appeared to be willing to undertake that responsibility.

It was my impression that the Deputy Attorney General was interested in being of assistance to the FBI in these matters and expressed a willingness to cooperate by having the FBI participate as much as possible with the Deputy Attorney General.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

*Dir. was advised 4/7
and ready on 4/17.
JPL PWS*

JPL

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: WILLIAM G. MILLER

IS - R

- 1 - Mr. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 4/14/75

- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. V. H. Weimar

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Director Sec'y _____

Sen Study - 75

W. Branigan

Branigan

Mr. William G. Miller is the Staff Director for the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to intelligence activities. On 10/5/73, representatives of our Washington Field Office, (WFO) interviewed Mr. Miller, with Bureau approval, [relative to contacts he had had with members of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C.] At that time, Mr. Miller was the Director of the Special Senate Committee to Terminate the National Emergency. On that occasion he was most cooperative, and upon being advised that the FBI's interest in [Soviet Embassy personnel focused more on their personalities rather than Soviet policies] per se, Mr. Miller agreed to be interviewed whenever the FBI felt such was necessary.

WFO has recently conducted an interview with Mr. Albert Ashton Lakeland, Jr., Executive Assistant to Senator Jacob Javits of New York, [relative to his past contacts with Grigoriy A. Rapota, a former Third Secretary assigned to the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C. Rapota was a known officer of the Committee for State Security (KGB), Political Branch (PB), who was extremely active on Capitol Hill.] In the course of the interview with Mr. Lakeland, he advised that among others Mr. William G. Miller was known to have had [numerous contacts with Soviet Embassy personnel], although he was not able to state with certainty that Mr. Miller had been [in contact with Rapota].

62-116395-21 APR 25 1975
WFO has now requested that the ~~NOT RECORDED~~ Legal Analysis Office obtain concurrence of the Chairman of the aforementioned committee for Agents of WFO to again interview Mr. Miller concerning his possible contact with

[105-213145] (S)

CONTINUED - OVER

CONFIDENTIAL

VHW:dano

(7)

Classified by 5683 NPS/AM
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

Enc.

- Sent 4-17-75

RECORDS

Place cc wby 116395

(SEN STUDY - 75)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: William G. Miller

105-213145 (S)

Rapota and possibly other Soviets. WFO has noted that Mr. Miller is also known to have been in contact with Aleksandr A. Kokorev, a First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., and a known officer of the Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU). (S)

While Mr. Miller was most cooperative on the last occasion he was interviewed by the FBI, it is noted he did not provide any particularly significant information concerning [the Soviets with whom he had contact]. (S) While it is not known at this time whether he could presently provide meaningful information, an interview with him at this time, when he is now the Staff Director of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, could well be untimely and indiscreet.

ACTION:

(1) In view of impending contacts which will be had by FBIHQ with Mr. Miller, the purpose of this memorandum is to draw attention to the fact that Mr. Miller has had past contact with representatives of Soviet intelligence services and may be continuing to have same. (S)

WRI WRW/CSF
EF WRW/CSF

(2) If you agree, there is attached a communication to WFO captioned, "Grigoriy A. Rapota; IS - R (SOVEMB-KGB)" which denies authority for an interview with Mr. Miller at this time and instructs that office to promptly advise FBIHQ of any additional contacts between Mr. Miller and representatives of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., which may come to its attention. (S)

WRI WRW/CSF CONFIDENTIAL
EF WRW/CSF - 2 -
MOM PBM JPA
QMC
SECRET

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 10, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/21G

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction," dated February 13, 1975, setting forth a study and analysis of the investigative authority granted by Presidential Directives, the National Security Council and Attorney General instructions, as well as a list of statutes from which the FBI draws investigative jurisdiction in the security and intelligence area of operation. Certain exhibits are extracted due to the "Third Agency Rule," however, approval for release is now being sought and the exhibits will be forwarded as soon as possible. Certain names are deleted in the exhibits due to privacy considerations.

Also enclosed with the jurisdiction paper is an original memorandum for the Committee and one copy for your records.

Enclosures - 3

ALL: vb
(6)

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Director Secy. _____

ENCLOSURE IN BULLY ROOM

REC-106

APR 25 1975

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

GPO 954-546

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/ZB

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 10, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Attached is the FBI "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction," dated February 13, 1975, which, though not specifically named, falls within the spirit of the documents requested in the letter of March 19, 1975.

The purpose of this paper is to set forth a study and analysis of the investigative authority granted by the Presidential Directives, the National Security Council and orders of the Attorney General, as well as to list statutes from which the FBI draws investigative jurisdiction in the security and intelligence area of operation.

It is noted that certain exhibits are extracted. Extractions were made because of "Third Agency Rule" requirements. Approvals are being expeditiously sought and these exhibits will be made available as soon as approvals are obtained. Certain names are deleted in the exhibits due to privacy considerations.

We are attempting to identify Items 1, 2, 3, and 4, of the examples cited in the attachment to your March 19th letter. When identified, immediate consideration will be given to furnishing the Items to your Committee.

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Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

Enclosure

1 - The Attorney General

ALL:vb

(6)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

ENCLOSURE

8 APR 18
April 16, 1975

This is to acknowledge receipt of
classified material by letterhead memorandum
dated April 10, 1975, from the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.

Bernie Marshall
for Senate Select
Committee on
Intelligence Activities

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP2 A/M JTG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-78

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. T. Jenkins

DATE: April 15, 1975

1 - Each Assistant Director

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Ass't Dir. _____
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Director Sec'y _____

My memorandum to you 4/10/75, tickler copies as above, advised of the formal establishment of a task force called Project Senstudy 75 for the purpose of implementing responses to requests for information from Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities.

From time to time, requests will be made of various Divisions at FBIHQ for assistance in preparing responses. The Office of Legal Counsel has already contributed considerably in support of Senstudy 75 and is an integral part of the Project.

In order that we may keep an up-to-date record of the cost to the Bureau in handling this Project, each Assistant Director is requested to effect the necessary procedures to maintain such records and by the third of each month furnish by routing slip to W. O. Cregar, Room 4063, JEH Building, the following information: (1) Name of Division reporting; (2) Month for which reporting, which will be month just ended; (3) Main days devoted to Project assistance, broken down by (a) Agent and (b) clerical, including GS level for both Agent and clerical. An example submitted by 5/3/75 would be as follows: (1) GID; (2) Report for 4/75; (3)(a) one-half day @ GS-16; one day @ GS-15; three days @ GS-14; (3)(b) two days @ GS-7; two days @ GS-5.

This is effective commencing 4/1/75 and first routing slip report due 5/3/75 will be for the month of April, 1975.

If a Division has not participated during the preceding month, merely submit a routing slip to this effect.

The cooperation of all is urged so that the necessary cost data may be compiled each month. It is recognized that exact figures will not be feasible and that estimates will be most practical and will suffice.

ACTION: For action as above by each Assistant Director.

62-116395

15 APR 22 1975

SFP:ekw (18)

REC-4302-116395-19

ekw

XEROX

82

JUN 11 1975

51 APR 28 1975

WBW/HM

Par JMB

5-1

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall *W/R*

FROM : W. O. Cregar *WOC*

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

- 1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Each Assistant Director

- DATE: 4/10/75
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/01 BY SP-2 ALM 12/96

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. Adm.
Dep. Adm. Inv.
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Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Soc'y

This memorandum records the formal establishment of a task force entitled Project Senstudy 75.

The concept behind the establishment of this Project is to develop a capability of implementing requests received from Select Committees of the Congress in a comprehensive and timely fashion but yet allow the Bureau to continue to conduct its day-to-day business in as normal a manner as possible. We believe that by creating this facility we will be able to meet the requirements of these Select Committees with the exception of the research that will have to be done in the substantive Divisions.

While the Project will direct internal work and related liaison with the intelligence community and the White House staff, we envision the Legal Analysis Unit Office of Legal Counsel Division as continuing to be the primary point of direct contact with the Select Committees of the Congress. They will receive all requests and deliver all responses to these Committees. In addition, they will meet with the staffs of the Committees to insure the reasonableness of requests. If necessary, they will call upon the expertise of the substantive Division for determination as to whether a proposed request from the Committees can be responded to within a reasonable period of time and within the capabilities of the FBI's information retrieval system.

At the present time four Supervisors have been delegated to work exclusively on the Project. They are as follows:

REC-100 62-111-375-11
12 APR 23 1975

The Project Manager will be Section Chief William O. Cregar, CI-2 Section, Intelligence Division. His duties will encompass the review of all incoming requests from the Select Committees in an effort to identify policy questions;

WOC:lmh/mh
(18)

XEROX
JUN 11 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

WOC

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75

ambiguities requiring recontact with Committee staffs; the assignment of research responsibilities to substantive Divisions; following such responsibilities to insure timely responses; as well as representing the FBI on the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community. Assistant Director John A. Mintz is also a member of the Executive Committee. This latter responsibility will provide Cregar and Mintz with direct liaison not only with senior officials of the intelligence community but also with the President's counsel.

Mr. Elmer W. Larson, Unit Chief, Training Unit, IS-3 Section, Intelligence Division will act as Cregar's Number One Man; will administer the work of the Project; and act in the absence of Cregar.

Seymor F. Phillips, Unit Chief, Civil Disorders Reporting Unit, IS-1 Section, Intelligence Division will serve as the Review Coordinator for the Project. His responsibilities will be to review all research; coordinate all responses; be available to consult with substantive Divisions as to proper form of our responses; identify any conflicts in FBI positions where several Divisions are responding to a particular question; as well as to insure the quality, completeness and adequacy of responses to Select Committees requests. Additionally, Phillips will be responsible for the preparation of abstracts to be furnished to the Interagency Registry maintained at CIA Headquarters. This Registry established by the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Group at the suggestion of and with the concurrence of the White House will serve as the coordinating mechanism for the entire intelligence community.

Mr. Leon F. Schwartz, Liaison Officer with CIA, CI-4 Section, Intelligence Division will function as the Liaison Officer with the intelligence community responsible for coordinating and clearing all information under the third agency rule where FBI responses are of interest to or are of a proprietary interest to other agencies of the intelligence community. Schwartz will serve as the Bureau's representative on the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community.

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75

Because of the White House insistence that all requests and responses be completely coordinated and available for review by White House representatives, it is imperative that the Project have a self-sustained records facility to insure immediate access to requests received from and responses furnished to the Select Committees. In addition, in those instances where certain FBI documents furnished to the Select Committees must be sanitized (excised), it is imperative this records facility not only retain copies of the sanitized documents but also copies of the original text. For these reasons a senior clerical employee has been requested to function as a Records Manager for the Project.

In addition to the above, there will be stenographic and clerical personnel assigned to the Project to support the work of the Bureau Supervisors. We have not committed any more personnel to the Project than are absolutely necessary at the present time. Should the requests of the Select Committees require additional personnel, appropriate memoranda will be submitted with a complete justification for additional personnel assigned to the Project.

Although the physical space for the Project is limited, all personnel connected with Project Senstudy 75 will be located in Room 4063, J. Edgar Hoover Building. This space is physically located within the Intelligence Division.

As a matter of interest, Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, has requested that should any member of the intelligence community get requests from other Committees of the Congress which impact on the intelligence community; could be of interest to the White House; or are of such sensitivity that coordination is required, copies of both the requests and an abstract of the responses should be made available to the Interagency Registry.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 9, 1975

H/ov
Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

AMDRK
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/JHG

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which responds to the Committee's request for the table of contents of the FBI Manual of Instructions and the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations and those portions of these Manuals which pertain to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.

Processing of the additional requests is continuing on an expeditious basis and further responses will be forthcoming.

REC-106

Enclosures - 13

62 11-1395-75

12 APR 23 1975

EWL:jvl.
(7)

ENCL BEHIND FILE

3-ENCLOSURE

PM

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

Assoc. Dir. _____
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GPO 954-546

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DATE 11801 BY SP2 ALM/116

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 9, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Under IV. A. (Policies and Procedures) the table of contents of the FBI Manual of Instructions and certain portions of this Manual were requested. In accordance with this request the following material is enclosed:

1) Table of contents; 2) Preface. Guidelines for FBI Investigations; 3) Section 36. Espionage (classified "Secret"); 4) Section 84. Registration Act; 5) Section 86. Sabotage; 6) Section 87. Investigations of Subversive Organizations and Individuals; 7) Section 88. Sedition; 8) Section 95. Treason; 9) Section 97. Voorhis Act; 10) Section 122. Extremist Matters and Civil Unrest.

Not included as enclosures are Section 105, Internal Security - Nationalistic Tendency (Foreign Intelligence), classified "Secret"; Section 107, Part I, Internal Security Informants and Confidential Sources; Section 107, Part II, Foreign Counterintelligence Assets; or Section 130, Extremist Informants and Sources. These Sections are deemed to contain extremely sensitive information and for that reason are not being transmitted; however, they are available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the committee staff at FBI Headquarters.

Under IV. B. the table of contents of the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations and pertinent portions of this Manual were requested. There is enclosed a copy of the table of contents of the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations.

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(7)

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

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SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ENCLOSURE

GPO 954-546

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UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

From a review of the table of contents of this Manual it can be seen that the material contained in this Manual pertains to administrative rather than investigative operations of the FBI, and for that reason it has not been possible to select portions of this Manual which pertain directly to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counter-intelligence matters, operations, or activities responsive to the Committee's request. The various other requests contained in the Committee letter of March 19, 1975, are receiving attention and further response will be forthcoming at the earliest possible time.

Enclosures - 11

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

Table of contents for Manual of Instructions and Manual of Rules and Regulations, as well as the several Sections of the Manual of Instructions which are being transmitted to the Select Committee, have already been made available to the General Accounting Office in the past, with the exception of Section 36, Section 105, and Section 107, Part II. Sections 105, 107, Part I and Part II, and Section 130 are not being furnished to the Committee, but the Committee will be allowed to examine these Sections at FBIHQ. Section 36, dealing with espionage, although classified, does not contain sensitive material involving sources and we feel in the spirit of the requirement we should furnish this Section to the Committee.

As a matter of interest, all of the material with respect to the Manual of Instructions which has been made available to GAO is actually maintained in FBI space.

April 16, 1975

8-per PVD/8

This is to acknowledge receipt of
classified material by letterhead memorandum
dated April 10, 1975, from the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.

Barbara

for Senate Select
Committee on
Intelligence Activities.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/KAG
#moe16

62-116395-75
ENCLOSURE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 4-8-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
BRIEFING FOR STAFF MEMBERS
BY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
APRIL 11, 1975

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As you were previously advised, William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, requested that we provide a briefing for certain staff members of the Committee on the functions of the Intelligence Division. He asked that the briefing cover both internal security and foreign counterintelligence operations and that it provide a broad overview of our investigative responsibilities.

The Intelligence Division is prepared to offer a two-hour briefing beginning at 10:00 a.m. on Friday, 4-11-75. It will include a slide show to be followed by a general discussion and an opportunity to afford questions and answers. After a luncheon break, the staff members will be given a brief tour of the Files and Communications Division.

Since the briefing will cover classified materials, no staff members will be invited unless they have appropriate security clearances. As a consequence Professor John Elliff, who has been tentatively named Director of the Committee's Task Force on Domestic Intelligence, will not attend. It is hoped that we may provide him with a private meeting at some later date.

REC-106

It is expected that those attending the briefing will include: Mr. Miller, F. A. O. Schwarz III, Chief Counsel, Mark Gitenstein and Marvin Epstein, staff members. Since no Committee members will be present, we are not recommending that the staff meet with the Director.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the above-named staff members of the Senate Select Committee be given a briefing by the Intelligence Division and the Files and Communications Division on 4-11-75.

- 1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. Wannall

- 1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Hotis

PLM

wav

JBH:dkg (10)
82 APR 23 1975

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 4-10-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

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"The Washington Post," Thursday, 4-10-75, edition on page A31 contains an article reporting an interview of Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. Senator Church, according to this article, stated that the Committee is reserving the right to make public eventually any documents it gets and is accepting nothing with "strings attached."

Inasmuch as this Committee is also the Committee which the FBI is furnishing information to, it is believed a clarification of Senator Church's statement must be obtained and in the interim we should furnish the Senate Select Committee only those documents which do not have a caveat such as classified documents or documents bearing the property stamp.

Section Chief William O. Cregar advised that he had contacted Dr. John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Committee concerning Senator Church's reported statement. Clarke stated that CIA Director William E. Colby was highly upset at Church's remark and that this statement would be a topic of a discussion of the Executive Committee meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review the morning of 4-11-75. We will be represented at that conference by Section Chief William O. Cregar and Assistant Director John A. Mintz. Clarke indicated the position that the CIA will apparently take regarding this problem is that the White House should obtain the clarification although CIA Director Colby initially was prepared to send a letter over his signature to Senator Church to obtain such clarification.

Inasmuch as the request by this Committee was forwarded through the Department, Senator Church's statement was brought to the attention of Douglas Marvin, Assistant to the Attorney General, who has been handling all FBI responses to Senate Select Committee requests. Marvin indicated he was concerned at Church's statement and stated it was the Attorney General's desire that he be advised of any Bureau response to the Committee concerning this matter.

Enc.

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

RECOMMENDATION
CONTINUED - OVER

PVD:dkg (9)

Legal Counsel to Adams Memo
RE: SENSTUDY 75

RECOMMENDATION:

No action be taken by the Bureau to obtain clarification of Senator Church's statement pending the results, 4-11-75, meeting of the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review, and that in the interim we furnish the Senate Select Committee only those documents which do not have a caveat such as classified documents or documents bearing the property stamp.

pvd JBA/pvd

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Senate CIA Committee Says White House Stalls on Data

By George Lardner Jr.,
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate Committee on Intelligence Operations disclosed yesterday that the White House is still stalling on a month-old request for the directives involving covert activities by the Central Intelligence Agency and other arms of the Government.

Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), the committee chairman, told reporters after a closed, 2½-hour meeting that he had been authorized to write another letter to President Ford asking him to expedite the request.

The committee asked Mr. Ford on March 12 for all the executive orders and top-secret National Security Council directives concerning the CIA and the rest of the intelligence community, including the command structure at the White House.

The President was also asked to supply the committee with a copy of CIA Director William E. Colby's January report to Mr. Ford on allegations of illegal domestic spying by the agency.

But all the committee has gotten so far, Church said, has been what the White House evidently regards as the least sensitive documents on the list.

Church said he did not know "what the hang-up is" since White House aides have indicated they consider the committee's entire request as "perfectly proper."

Church did not spell out all of "the more sensitive data" that is still being withheld, but he said it includes both the Colby report and the top-secret White House and National Security Council directives dealing with covert operations, both foreign and domestic.

The Idaho senator said the committee is reserving the right to make public eventually any documents it gets and is accepting nothing with "strings attached." But he declined to speculate on whether this might be the reason for the administration's hesitance.

Church said all of the records were essential to the committee's mandate to investigate the CIA and the rest of the government's intelligence community. He said he still had no reason to think at this point that the White House would refuse to give them up, but he emphasized that he saw no reason for further delay.

Church said the committee also authorized its staff of about 35 lawyers and investigators to start gathering evidence and interviewing witnesses as the prelude to a pro-

jected round of public hearings this summer. The House has also ordered a similar inquiry but its committee, headed by Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.), has yet to choose a staff director.

The Senate committee's chief counsel, Fritz Schwarz, said directors have now been named for all four of its task forces. They are William Bader, head of the foreign intelligence task force; John Elliff, head of the domestic intelligence task force; Alton H. Quarbeck, head of the Military intelligence task force, and David Aaron, head of the task force that will study the intelligence community's "command and control structure."

Bader is a former Senate Foreign Relations Committee aide and has recently been working with the Ford Foundation. Elliff is a Brandeis University professor and expert in domestic law enforcement activities. Quarbeck has been director of the Brookings Institution's defense analysis project and Aaron has served on the National Security Council staff.

Schwarz said that each of the task forces will cut across the lines of various intelligence agencies and focus on general avenues of inquiry, such as the "legal authority and legal restraints" for intelligence work; the targets and techniques of intelligence-gathering, counterintelligence and covert operations, and the question of who orders and controls those activities.

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"The Washington Post"
April 10, 1975

62-17395-93
ENCLOSURE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM : W. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

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1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams

DATE: 4/7/75

1 - Mr. Bassett
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Cregar

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This memorandum reports the results of a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community (hereafter referred to as the EXCOM), held at CIA Headquarters on the morning of 4/4/75.

This meeting was chaired by Mr. Colby in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence. In attendance were Mr. Roderick Hills, Assistant Counsel to the President; Associate Deputy AG Wilderotter; Mr. John Clarke; as well as senior officials from Defense, Treasury, National Security Council, Office of Management and Budget, and the Energy Research and Development Administration.

The following items of interest were discussed:

Mr. Roderick Hills reported that he had a meeting with the Counsel and Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) to discuss having Legal Counsel present when members of a particular agency were being interviewed by SSC staff personnel. The essence of this meeting resulted in the SSC being receptive to such an arrangement but it would be incumbent upon each agency, department or bureau to negotiate the specific arrangements for such representation with the SSC. Hills also discussed the problem of the unknown employee or former employee who might request to be interviewed unbeknownst to the parent agency. It was suggested to the Counsel and Staff Director by Hills that such an employee be interviewed by only one staff member, that the staff member attempt to determine the scope of this individual's testimony and then discuss such testimony with the parent agency to insure the agency could provide advice as to the sensitivity of the unknown employee's testimony. No firm decisions were made but it would appear the Counsel and Staff Director will agree to allow Counsel to be present during the

Enclosures

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CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE
5 APR 21 1975

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75

testimony of a secret employee and following such testimony the employee will be allowed to meet with staff members of the SSC in an Executive Session. It is anticipated more definitive information on the final decisions regarding this aspect will be forthcoming from the White House.

The question was raised by the Bureau representative as to whether the Ad Hoc Group and/or the interagency registry should be notified as to requests members of the Intelligence Community receive from other Congressional committees. Mr. Wilderotter advised that this would be a judgment question; however, if a request from a Congressional committee other than the Select Committees impacted on the Intelligence Community, involve sensitive issues or would be of interest to the White House, such requests should be provided to the interagency registry along with an abstract of the response.

Attached is a list of those members of the SSC staff who have been certified for access to compartmented information. Also attached is a paper identifying 10 issues likely to grow out of Select Committee deliberations. The pencil notation in the right-hand column identifies those agencies of the Intelligence Community responsible for preparing a paper which addresses these issues. It is noted that issue identified as number eight is entitled, "Intelligence Files and Privacy." Mr. Colby asked that the FBI prepare this paper. Assistant Director Mintz advised that the Bureau has a study underway on this very subject and agreed that the Bureau would prepare this study. The deadline for completion of the study is 4/25/75.

Also attached is a copy of the survey of the SSC facility, Room G-308, Dirksen Building, covering all aspects of physical and technical security. None of the participants of the EXCOM had any objection to the facility and we presume the SSC will abide by the procedures outlined in the attached survey report.

Attached also for information is a draft of an employee notice and agreement concerning treatment of confidential material being considered by the SSC. It is to be noted that to date neither the Committee nor its staff has signed any such Secrecy Agreement.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

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AGREEMENT

I have read the foregoing employee notice concerning treatment of confidential material and have read the Resolution establishing the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, and the Committee Rules.

I understand that to qualify as an employee of the Select Committee, I am required to, and I hereby agree to, abide by those Rules. I further understand ~~that~~ and agree that the obligations hereby placed upon me continue after my employment with the Committee has terminated.

SIGNATURE

SWORN TO BEFORE NOTARY

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those staff members with appropriate security clearances and a ~~need~~ need to know.

"7.5 Testimony taken in Executive session or papers and other materials received by the staff shall not be made public or disclosed to any person outside the Committee unless authorized by a majority vote of the Committee, or upon termination of the Committee, as determined by a vote of the Senate.

"7.6 Before the Committee is called upon to make any disposition with respect to the testimony, papers, or other materials presented to it, the Committee members shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine all pertinent testimony, papers, and other materials that have been obtained by the inquiry staff. No member shall release any of that testimony or those papers or other materials to the public or any person outside the Committee unless authorized by a majority vote, a quorum being present at the time the vote is taken.

"9.3 The staff of the Committee shall not discuss either the substance or procedure of the work of the Committee with anyone other than a member of the Committee or other Committee personnel. Upon termination of employment by the Committee, each member of the staff, or consultant, shall surrender any classified material which came into his possession while in the employ of the Committee.

"9.4 The employment of any member of the staff who fails to conform to these Rules shall be immediately terminated."

In addition to the strict security precautions adopted by the Committee there are, as you no doubt know, sections of the United States Code and Executive Orders which relate to keeping certain material confidential--they are sections [70 87] annexed hereto.

~~ANNEXED~~ which are annexed hereto.

Pursuant to the Resolution, the Committee Rules include provisions relating to the confidential treatment of material received by the Committee. These provisions are contained in Rules 6.11; 7 (and each of its subsections), 9.3 and 9.4 which provide the following:

"6.11 Release of Testimony and Other Matters. No testimony taken or material presented at an Executive session shall be made public, in whole or in part or by way or summary, unless authorized by a majority vote of the Committee. Unless authorized by the Chairman the name of any witness scheduled to be heard by the Committee shall not be released prior to his testimony.

"RULE 7. Procedures for Handling Select Committee Classified or Sensitive Material

"7.1 Staff offices on the first floor of the Dirksen Office Building shall operate under strict security precautions. One guard shall be on duty at all times by the entrance to control entry. All persons before entering the offices shall identify themselves. An additional guard shall be posted at night for surveillance of the secure area where sensitive documents are kept.

"7.2 Sensitive documents and other materials shall be segregated in a secure storage area. They may be examined only at secure reading facilities. Copying or duplicating of such documents and other materials is prohibited except as is necessary for use in Committee meetings or to prepare for the taking of testimony or for interviews.

"7.3 Each member of the Committee shall at all times have access to all papers and things received from any source by subpoena or otherwise. The staff director shall be responsible for the maintenance, under appropriate security procedures, of a record of all papers and things in the possession of the Committee, which log shall be available to any member of the Committee.

"7.4 Access to classified information supplied to the Committee shall be limited by the staff director, the chief counsel and the counsel to the minority, and to

DRAFT 3/28/75

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Employee Notice and Agreement Concerning Treatment of
Confidential Material

NOTICE

Concern about security and the maintenance of confidentiality of information provided the Senate Select Committee has been stressed since the outset by the Senate and the Committee.

Section 7 of the resolution which established the Committee requires the Committee to:

"institute and carry out such rules and procedures as it may deem necessary to prevent the disclosure, outside the Select Committee of any information relating to the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other department or agency of the Federal Government engaged in intelligence activities, obtained by the Select Committee during the course of its study and investigation, not authorized by the Select Committee to be disclosed; and (2) the disclosure, outside the Select Committee, of any information which would adversely affect the intelligence activities of the Central Intelligence Agency in foreign countries or the intelligence activities in foreign countries of any department or agency of the Federal Government."

~~SECRET~~

DD/A 75-1549

1 APR 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

VIA

: Deputy Director for Administration

2 APR 1975

SUBJECT

: Security Survey, Senate Select Committee
Facility, Room G-308, Dirksen Building,
Capitol Hill

1. Attached to this memorandum is a letter to
Mr. William G. Miller for your signature.

2. A security survey of the Senate Select Committee
facility, Room G-308, Dirksen Building, as requested by
Mr. Ben Marshall, Security Director of that Committee,
was completed on 24 March 1975.

3. With the security procedures now in effect and
those planned for implementation, the facility will provide
adequate protection for the handling and storage of CIA
documents of all levels of classification. Also attached
for your information is a copy of the survey report.

Charles W. Kane
Charles W. Kane
Director of Security

Att:

cc: DD/A
Chairman, SECOM

Refer
CFK

Regraded Unclassified when separated
from Classified Attachment(s)

NW 55118 DocId:32989628 Page 143

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SURVEY REPORT

Senate Select Committee Facility
Dirksen Bldg. 1st & C Street, N. E.
Washington, D. C.

1. In response to a request from Mr. Ben Marshall, Security Director, Senate Select Committee, (tele. 224-1700) Messrs. Nicholas R. Zubon and Robert E. Burgener conducted a comprehensive security survey of the Senate Select Committee's Facility on 24 March 1975.
2. Mr. Marshall provided both a comprehensive tour of the facility and a detailed explanation of the operation.
3. The following are pertinent facts concerning the security procedures as related to the Senate Select Committee Facility:

A. Type of Facility

The Committee is in the auditorium (Room G 308) of the Dirksen Building at 1st and C Streets, N. E., Washington, D. C. Access to the auditorium is gained easiest by entering the building from the 1st and C Streets entrance. A 24-hour guard post is located just inside this entrance. The Select Committee facility is 40' east of the building guard post. It is nearly in direct line of sight, however, a foyer surrounded by a 6' high temporary partition precludes the auditorium entrance door from being visible. The entrance to the auditorium is protected by a 24-hour guard post.

The auditorium (Room G 308) is approximately 100' long x 45' wide. The floor, ceiling and walls are made of 6" to 8" solid masonry. The ceiling has a false ceiling approximately 18" deep in which the air handling equipment and sundry other service components are housed. All major air handling equipment is on the roof above the auditorium. Access to the roof which is strictly controlled by the Director of Security, is gained by a stairway in the southeast corner of the auditorium. The sidewalls each have a 2' x 3' register approximately 12' above the floor through which

~~SECRET~~

air is passed from the auditorium to the air handling equipment on the roof. These registers are solidly bolted into the walls.

The front of the auditorium (south wall) is covered by a large movie screen. To the right and left of the movie screen are two rooms 6' wide and approximately 15' long used by the research section clerical personnel. These rooms have countertop openings approximately 3' above the floor for access from within the auditorium. Countertop openings exist along both sidewalls for approximately three quarters of the length of the wall. The sidewalls have intercorridors on the opposite side of the countertops which have been converted into unpartitioned office space. The only reproduction machine, a xerox model 3100, is located in the west corridor. The east corridor has been converted into a compartmented information storage room and a compartmented document reading room. The Security Director indicated that he may move his office to the head of the compartmented reading room to provide a larger measure of access control to this sensitive area.

The auditorium has six wooden exterior doors, 7' high and 3" thick. The entrance door into the auditorium (west and north wall) will have an electrical push-button lock installed. A similar door in the east end of the north wall will be barred and bracketed on the inside to prevent unauthorized entry. The west wall has 2 exterior doors leading into the Capitol Police offices. The east wall has two exterior doors with one leading to the roof while the second door exits into the Capitol Police Garage. All exterior doors will be alarmed. The doors now have Yale 197 1/4 locks with the keys controlled by Mr. Marshall. The fire safety factor concerning these locked doors was discussed with him.

The auditorium has a small second floor area at the north end. Access is gained by two stairways on the east and west side of the auditorium. The second floor space consists of a large projection room, currently filled with projection equipment, and five small private film viewing rooms.

The five small rooms will be converted into witness interview rooms. The windows in each of these rooms will be covered during the stay of the Select Committee in the auditorium.

B. Access Controls

Access to the Dirksen Building is gained by either the main entrance on 1st and C Streets, ground level, or the Basement Tunnel Entrance at the rear of the building. Both entrances have a 24-hour guard post where persons entering are checked for identification. Brief cases and packages are processed through x-ray machines. Vendors entering the main entrance are checked for ID, however, all boxes are not checked.

Entry into the auditorium is controlled by a guard at the door. His instructions are that all persons entering must show an ID card. Visitors are permitted only by appointment. They are logged in and escorted at all times while in the auditorium. From 1800 hours Friday through 0800 hours Saturday, and from 1300 hours Saturday to 0700 hours Monday everyone must sign the log in and out and show an ID. In the event an access problem arises at the guard post, regardless of the hour, Mr. Marshall is alerted.

C. Guards

The Dirksen Building and the auditorium are protected by members of the U. S. Capitol Police Department. The Building has two 24-hour/7day-a-week guard posts at the entrances while the Senate Select Committee has one 24-hour/7 day-a-week guard post at the entrance and an after-hours roving patrol inside the auditorium. All police officers are well trained, wear the Capitol Police uniform and carry Smith and Wesson .38 caliber revolvers. After-hour patrols check all doors, the entire auditorium for classified material that may not have been secured, and the second floor hourly during the night. The guards on duty at the time of the survey were alert and responsive to their duties. During off-duty hours, guard supervisors make at least two unscheduled visits to the guard posts during each shift. In addition the guard at the stationary post has four telephones, two of which have a pickup and automatic ring feature with Capitol Police Headquarters. There will be no rotation of police officers during the occupancy of the Committee. The same officers will be assigned to these posts.

~~SECRET~~

D. Alarms:

All exterior doors to the auditorium will have contact (microswitch) alarms. The Remington Rand safes, being obsolete, will be protected by a proximity alarm. The compartmented storage room and an adjacent reading area will be protected by a volumetric alarm. For fire protection a smoke detector/rate of rise alarm will be installed in the compartmented area. All alarms will enunciate at the guard desk at the entrance to the auditorium. The ADT Company will install and maintain the alarms.

E. Safes

The facility has 22 safes. Sixteen 4-drawer Remington Rand Safes located below the movie screen. Three class six Mosler 5-drawer, two class 1 Diebold 2-drawer, and one class 2 Diebold four-drawer are located in the compartmented storage room. With the exception of the Remington Rand safes, all other safes are in good working order.

The safe combination and repairs are under contract with the Safemaster Company. The safe combinations were recently changed by that company. All safe combinations are under the control of Mr. Marshall. However, an assist on day-to-day operations is provided by Mr. Pat Shea, Assistant Staff Director, who acts as backup for safeguarding the combinations to the safes in the compartmented storage room. Messrs. Larry Kieves, John Petersen and Ms. Jan Orloff are backup for the combinations to the sixteen Remington Rand Safes. Mr. Marshall was given two change keys in the event he decides to change the combination himself should staff personnel rotate.

F. Document Control

Incoming CIA documents will be delivered by Agency courier to the guard at the entrance door to the auditorium. The registry officer will receipt for them and take them to the Registry Section where all documents will be logged. Compartmented and Top Secret material will be taken to the Compartmented Storage Room and placed in a safe after it has been logged in Registry. Individuals, on an access list promulgated by Mr. Marshall draw the compartmented documents from the safes but must read them in the adjacent area dedicated for this purpose. Documents classified below TS/Codeword will

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

be stored in the Remington Rand safes. The documents in the Remington Rand safes can be drawn by anyone on the staff, but must be receipted for with the Registry Officer. The documents are to be read on the tables placed there for that purpose in the Research Section.

Further control of classified documents is directed through the assigning of a staff employee given responsibility for the reproduction of documents on the xerox machine. He will control the number of copies made on typewriters.

All classified material is secured in safes at the end of the working day.

H. Classified Waste

It is estimated that one 50-pound bag of classified waste will be generated each week while the Committee is in session. Once the bag is filled with classified waste, it will be placed in the locked trunk of Mr. Marshall's automobile and taken to the Federal Reserve Building incinerator where he will witness destruction by burning. In the event this incinerator is booked to capacity, he will take the classified waste and burn it at the D. C. incinerator. Should either incinerator become unavailable to the Committee, Mr. Marshall was assured that CIA would consider assisting him in the secure disposition of Committee classified waste.

I. Compartmented/TS Storage

A room dedicated as the codeword/TS storage room is in the northeast corner of the auditorium. Its five walls are solid masonry ranging from 6" to 8" thick. A 1/8" stainless steel door frame is bolted to the masonry walls. A pre-fabricated 9 gage wire cross-patch metal frame door is attached to the steel frame serving as access control to the dedicated room. The door will be secured by lock and key once classified material arrives for storage. This room will be alarmed.

J. Telephone

The Facility has six standard telephones in the auditorium. Five of the telephones will be equipped with conversation

~~SECRET~~
masking devices. A central switch installed ahead of the telephone instruments will disconnect all telephones simultaneously, should the need arise. The telephone system is maintained by the local telephone company.

K. Security Briefings

All new members of the committee receive a thorough briefing from Mr. Marshall on security procedures and security responsibilities. Briefings are periodically reinforced when conditions warrant.

L. Security Duty Check Procedures

Custodians secure the safe cabinets assigned to them, i.e. Mr. Shea, codeword room, Messrs. Kieves, Petersen, and Ms. Orloff, Research area. Mr. Marshall double checks behind them. The custodian, Security Director and the roving guard patrol check the entire auditorium to ensure all classified material has been secured at the end of the day.

M. Counteraudio Inspection

Mr. Marshall has taken action on this requirement and continues to monitor this area to provide the Committee with as much security protection against the Audio threat as possible.

N. Shredder


The facility has one Destroyit Model 51 Shredder used only for shredding the most sensitive documents. Other documents are not shredded in this machine because of its limited shredding capability.

O. General Observations


The security procedures implemented within the Senate Select Committee facility are sufficient to provide a proper environment for the protection of classified materials. The survey officers were pleased with the security director's dedication to the objective of providing the best security possible for the Committee.

~~SECRET~~

Capitol Park Police
Garage



SECOND FLOOR



NOTES FOR SESSION

#MD816
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 11-20-01 BY SP-2 ALM JRS

In previous sessions we discussed the importance of highlighting issues likely to grow out of Commission or Committee deliberations. We observed that we should identify some of those on which a legal brief or annex would be helpful to Executive Branch initiatives. The idea was to select a few where a solid research paper with options, pros and cons, etc., could help us develop a firm grip on the questions in the issue and identify options. For example, the question of Executive privacy presents itself, and I gather is being worked on.

There are others we feel it would be useful for the group to address and assign responsibility for further work. For example:

	<u>Suggested Action</u>
1. Economic Intelligence and National Security--new discussion	Treasury
2. Covert action and the law	CIA
3. The Intelligence Budget--open, black, or closed--rational and procedures for handling past, present and future	OMB
4. Joint Congressional oversight committee for Intelligence	CIA
5. GAO and the audit authorities of U.S. Intelligence Agencies	CIA Staff <u>help from legal counsel</u>
6. Confidential funds authorities, contingency reserves, legal base, history and uses	CIA-DOD
7. Cover for Foreign Intelligence Actions legal and administrative issues	CIA-SAC
8. Intelligence files and privacy	FBI <u>first</u>
9. The "fact of" question--international, legal and political considerations	State
10. "Sources and methods" legislation	ONI/B <u>of Justice</u>

What human being responsible by next Friday
Topics at Executive Session

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 31, 1975


Mr. John Clarke
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear John:

With respect to our letter to you of March 17, 1975
you will find attached the first list of members of the Committee
staff designated to receive compartmented information.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



William G. Miller
Staff Director

Enclosure

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 11/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/jtg
#MOB16

ATTACHMENT

The following staff officials of the Senate Select Committee as identified below by date and place of birth and social security number have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are hereby certified as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret and are designated to receive compartmented information. *They also meet the requirements as set forth in DCID 6/44*

<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH</u>	<u>SOCIAL SECURITY NO.</u>
William G. Miller	8-15-31 N.Y.	[REDACTED]
Frederick A. O. Schwarz	4-20-35 N.Y.	JFK Act 6 (3)
William Bader	9-8-31 N.J.	545-30-3377
Burton V. Wides	6-14-41 N.J.	[REDACTED]
Elliot E. Maxwell	7-24-46 N.Y.	[REDACTED]
Daniel O'Flaherty	11-4-42 Ill.	JFK Act 6 (3)
Michael J. Madigan	4-18-43 D.C.	[REDACTED]
Lawrence Kieves	1-4-48 N.Y.	068-38-6464
Charity I. Benz	7-23-46 N.Y.	JFK Act 6 (3)
Benjamin Marshall	5-4-19 Neb.	485-28-4530
Maratha E. Mecham	2-11-40 Cal.	528-48-6848
Audrey H. Hatry	6-10-23 Md.	JFK Act 6 (3)

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DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JG
#MOP16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP2 BLM/EMG
#MDR16
IS UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE

102-116395-100

ENVELOPE

EMPTY

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall *W.W.*

FROM : W.O. Cregar *W.C.*

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

DATE: 4/10/75 *REC-40*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/BK

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. Asst. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

On 4/8/75 Mr. Donald E. Moore, Chairman of the Security Committee, U. S. Intelligence Board, forwarded the attached copy of a letter dated 3/28/75 from Mr. William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee, enclosing a list of staff members who have been certified for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

Copies of the list are attached to tickler copies of this memorandum for retention by personnel who may be in contact with the Select Committee staff.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

Enclosures (2) **ENCLOSURE** *YD*

62-116395

LFS:tdp (8) *tp* VPS PLM
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. J.B. Hotis
1 - Mr. J.C. Farrington
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Schwartz

ST-106

REC-40

62-116395- *file*

15 APR 16 1975

51APR211975

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
LTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
BERT MORGAN, N.C.
ARY HART, COLO.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
DARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510


March 23, 1975

Mr. John Clarke
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear John:

The following staff members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities as identified below by date and place of birth and social security number have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are hereby certified as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

Sincerely,



William Miller
Staff Director

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 11/18/01 BY SP5 JAM/ATG

62-116395-78
ENCLOSURE

ATTACHMENT

<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH</u>	<u>SOCIAL SECURITY NO.</u>
David Aaron	8-21-38 IL	JFK Act 6 (3)
Nancy Brooks	2-14-40 KY	313-38-6773
Barbara Chesnik	4-18-46 WI	
Mary De Oreo	6-13-47 OH	
Daniel Dwyer	8-24-52 MA	
Peter Fenn	12-12-47 MA	
Edward Greissing	11-27-50 Germany	JFK Act 6 (3)
Mark Enderfurth	9-29-46 NC	
Dorothy Johnson	6-8-25 OR New Zealand	
Loch Johnson	2-21-42	
Howard Liebengood	12-29-42 IN	
Naldeen MacDonald	10-19-51 Brazil	
Benjamin Marshall	5-4-19 NE	485-28-4503
William G. Miller	8-15-31 NY	
Susan Pitts	10-24-53 Canada	JFK Act 6 (3)
Alan Romberg	12-1-38 NY	
Frederick A.O. Schwarz, III	4-20-35 NY	
Patrick Shea	2-28-48 UT	
Stephanie Smith	3-23-54 OH	
Mary Towell	4-25-44 TN	

62-116395-77

ENCLOSURE

The Attorney General

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1 - Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Gregar
April 14, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/jms

Reference is made to the Senate Select Committee letter dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents from the FBI and my letter to you dated April 10, 1975, enclosing a memorandum and a copy of the "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction," dated February 13, 1975, less certain exhibits, for the Committee's use.

The purpose of this letter is to make available for your information a copy of the aforementioned paper with all exhibits intact. The Committee's copy of the paper has missing exhibits because of "Third Agency Rule" requirements. Authority to release these exhibits is being expeditiously sought so they may be made available to the Committee.

The exhibits extracted from the Committee's copy included Exhibit I, J, K, M, and P.

REC-106 62-11633-70
a. Counsel to the President

Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, has reviewed and approved all exhibits left in the paper and has requested to review the extracted exhibits after "Third Agency Rule" approval has been granted and before the exhibits are forwarded to the Committee. This will be done at the earliest possible time.

Enclosure

6 APR 21 1975

ALL:vb

(7)

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
sst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Siles & Com. _____
Inv. _____

tion

Eval. _____
m. _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

The Attorney General

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 9, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-24EM/KG

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a response to a request set forth in referenced letter. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records. Processing of the additional requests is continuing on an expeditious basis and further responses will be forthcoming.

Enclosures (3)

DRD:mjg/mjg
(6)

NOTE: This is the most current FBI Functional Organization Chart. A new chart would not be available if prepared in response to the Senate Select Committee's request for approximately 7 to 10 days.

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____

ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

#mols
1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

April 9, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975 to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

In response to the Committee's request for a detailed current organizational chart attached hereto is a document entitled "FBI Functional Organization Chart."

This chart was prepared January 14, 1975, and since that time the following changes concerning the position of Assistant Director have been made. The Assistant Director of the Files and Communications Division is John J. McDermott. The Assistant Director of External Affairs is Donald W. Moore Jr. The Assistant Director of the Training Division is William M. Mooney.

The various other requests contained in the Committee's letter of March 19, 1975, are receiving attention and response will be forthcoming at the earliest possible time.

Enclosure

1 - The Attorney General

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.: DRD/PVD:mjg/kjs
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____
NW 55118 MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT
DocId:32989628 Page 162

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ENCLOSURE

62-16375-69

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ENCLOSURE

6-2-04 1039 6-69


FBI FUNCTIONAL ORG

FIELD OFFICES		
ALBANY	CHARLOTTE	HOUSTON
ALBUQUERQUE	CHICAGO	INDIANAPOLIS
ALEXANDRIA	CINCINNATI	JACKSON
ANCHORAGE	CLEVELAND	JACKSONVILLE
ATLANTA	COLUMBIA	KANSAS CITY
BALTIMORE	DALLAS	KNOXVILLE
BIRMINGHAM	DENVER	LAS VEGAS
BOSTON	DETROIT	LITTLE ROCK
BUFFALO	EL PASO	LOS ANGELES
BUTTE	HONOLULU	LOUISVILLE

ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR-
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
(ADMINISTRATION)
THOMAS J. JENKINS

DIRECTOR
CLARENCE M. K.

ASSOCIATE DIR
NICHOLAS P. C.



JANUARY 14, 1975

ANIZATION CHART

FF MDC16
 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/PB6

FIELD OFFICES

MEMPHIS	OKLAHOMA CITY	SAN ANTONIO
MIAMI	OMAHA	SAN DIEGO
MILWAUKEE	PHILADELPHIA	SAN FRANCISCO
MINNEAPOLIS	PHOENIX	SAN JUAN
MOBILE	PITTSBURGH	SAVANNAH
NEWARK	PORTLAND	SEATTLE
NEW HAVEN	RICHMOND	SPRINGFIELD
NEW ORLEANS	SACRAMENTO	TAMPA
NEW YORK	ST. LOUIS	WASHINGTON, D.C.
NORFOLK	SALT LAKE CITY	TOTAL 59

ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR-
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
(INVESTIGATION)
JAMES B. ADAMS

OFFICE OF PLANNING AND EVALUATION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
RICHARD J. GALLAGHER

STUDIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

OPERATIONS
PLANNING
POLICIES
PROGRAMS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
W. RAYMOND WANNALL

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH:

CI-1 SECTION:

ESPIONAGE
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT
INTERNAL SECURITY

CI-2 SECTION:

ESPIONAGE
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT
INTERNAL SECURITY

CI-3 SECTION:

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT - VIOLATIONS
ESPIONAGE
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT
FOREIGN ECONOMIC MATTERS
FOREIGN FUNDS
FOREIGN MILITARY AND NAVAL MATTERS
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS
FOREIGN SOCIAL CONDITIONS
INTERNAL SECURITY - NATIONALISTIC TENDENCY
NEUTRALITY MATTERS
SECURITY MATTERS AND INTERNAL SECURITY
BORSENG MATTERS
ANTI-ROB
ACT FOR PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS
AND FOREIGN GUESTS OF U. S.

CI-4 SECTION:

DOMESTIC AND MILITARY LIAISON
FOREIGN LIAISON MATTERS
FOREIGN POLICE COOPERATION

INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH:

IS-1 SECTION:

EXTREMISTS AND ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS
EXTREMISTS
ACTIVITIES
CIVIL UNREST AND ACTS OF VIOLENCE
EXTREMIST INFORMANTS

IS-2 SECTION:

SEDITION
SABOTAGE
COMMUNIST
GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS
OTHER REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS
SECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES (EXCEPT ESPIONAGE)

IS-3 SECTION:

CENTRAL RESEARCH
ANALYTICAL RESEARCH
TRAINING
SPECIAL RECORDS
DEFENSE PLANS

LEGAL COUNSEL

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
JOHN A. MINTZ

LEGAL ANALYST
LEGAL INSTRUCTION
LEGAL LIASON
LEGAL RESEARCH
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
ROBERT E. GEBHARDT

CRIMINAL SECTION:

ASSAULTING OR KILLING A FEDERAL OFFICER
ASSAULTING FOREIGN PERSONNEL
CONGRESSIONAL ASSASSINATION STATUTE
ASSAULTING THE PRESIDENT (OR VICE-PRESIDENT) OF THE UNITED STATES
AUTOMOBILE INFORMATION DISCLOSURE ACT
BANK ROBBERY
BILLS OF LADING ACT
CRIME AGAINST AIRCRAFT
CRIME ON LAND AND GOVERNMENT RESERVATIONS
CRIME ON THE HIGH SEAS
DECORATION OF THE FLAG
DESTROYING OF AIRCRAFT OR MOTOR VEHICLES
EXTORTION
FALSE ADVERTISING OR MISUSE OF NAMES TO INDICATE FEDERAL AGENCY
FALSE ENTRIES IN RECORDS OF INTERSTATE CARRIERS
FEDERAL CIGARETTE LABELING AND ADVERTISING ACT
FEDERAL JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ACT
FEDERAL TRAIN WRECK STATUTE
FIREARMS ACT (NATIONAL (8) STATE FIREARMS
CONTINUATION ACT (C) UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OR RECEIPT
FRAUDULENT PRACTICES CONCERNING MILITARY AND NAVAL DOCUMENTS, AND SEALS AND SYMBOLS OF AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES
ILLEGAL MANUFACTURE, USE, POSSESSION OR SALE OF EXEMPLES AND INSIGNIA
ILLEGAL USE OF GOVERNMENT TRANSPORTATION REQUESTS
ILLEGAL USE OF RAILROAD PASS
ILLEGAL WEARING OF UNIFORM
IMPORtATION
INTERSTATE HARASSEMENT OR HARASING TELEPHONE CALLS
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF FIREWORKS
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF OBSCENE MATTER
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISON-MADE GOODS
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN CATTLE
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN MOTOR VEHICLE OR AIRCRAFT
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN PROPERTY
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF UNSAFE REFRIGERATORS
IRREGULARITIES IN FEDERAL PENAL INSTITUTIONS
KIDNAPING
MAY ACT
POLICE KILLINGS
PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS - CRIMINAL
SWITCHBLADE KNIFE ACT
THEFT, EMBEZZLEMENT, ROBBERY, AND ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY
THEFT FROM INTERSTATE SHIPMENT
WHITE SLAVE TRAFFIC ACT

CIVIL RIGHTS SECTION:

CIVIL RIGHTS
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC EDUCATION
DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC FACILITIES
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING
ELECTION LAWS
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE AND SLAVERY

NAME CHECK SECTION:

NAME CHECKS
SPECIAL MEMORANDA

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
WILLIAM V. CLEVELAND

CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE--ORGANIZED CRIME SECTION:

ANTI-RACKETEERING (INTELLIGENCE)
EXTORTIONATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
ILLEGAL GAMBLING BUSINESS
ILLEGAL GAMBLING BUSINESS - OBSTRUCTION
INTERSTATE GAMBLING ACTIVITIES
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF GAMBLING DEVICES
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF LOTTERY TICKETS
INTERSTATE TRANSMISSION OF WAGERING INFORMATION
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION IN AID OF GAMBLING
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF GAMBLING PARAPHERNALIA
RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS
SPORTS BRIBERY
TOP-ECHELON CRIMINAL INFORMANTS

FUGITIVE SECTION:

BOND DEFAULT
CONDITIONAL RELEASE VIOLATORS
CRIMINAL FUGITIVE MATTERS
DESERTERS AND DESERTER-HARBORING
ESCAPE AND RESCUE
ESCAPED FEDERAL PRISONERS
FUGITIVES
HARBORING
PAROLE VIOLATORS
PROBATION VIOLATORS
SELECTIVE SERVICE, INCLUDING FUGITIVE AND RE-EMPLOYMENT
UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID CUSTODY OR CONFINEMENT
UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID GIVING TESTIMONY
UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID PROSECUTION

EMPLOYEES SECURITY AND SPECIAL INQUIRY SECTION:

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
APPLICATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY AND APPLICATIONS FOR PARDON AFTER COMPLETION OF SENTENCE
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT (APPLICANT OR EMPLOYEE INVESTIGATIONS)
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION)
DEPARTMENTAL APPLICANTS FOR PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS
INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION
LOYALTY OF EMPLOYEES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
MAINTENANCE EMPLOYEES
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
PEACE CORPS
SECURITY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
SPECIAL INQUIRIES FOR WHITE HOUSE, CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
U.S. COURTS APPLICANTS
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams

DATE: 4/7/75

1 - Mr. Bassett
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community (hereafter referred to as the Group), held at CIA Headquarters on the morning of 4/2/75.

The study prepared for the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) entitled, "Human Intelligence," has come to the attention of the Senate Select Committee (SSC). The major contributors to this report were the FBI and CIA. It is an extremely sensitive document and for that reason any requests from any committees of the Congress for copies of this report should be referred to the White House. At the present time, the consensus of those persons in the White House dealing with the subject of release of information to the committees of Congress is that this report will not be provided Congressional committees at this time.

The SSC does recognize a requirement to comply with the Third Agency Rule which states in effect that classified information or material originating in one department shall not be disseminated outside any other department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating department. CIA's General Counsel has produced a paper entitled "The Third Agency Rule," copy attached, which they have requested be reviewed by the Legal Counsels of all agencies making up the Intelligence Community. A copy of CIA's paper referred to above has been made available to Assistant Director Mintz who has indicated he will be in direct contact with Mr. Warner, CIA's General Counsel.

REC-106

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Attached is a copy of sanitization guidelines for documents provided Congressional Select Committees. The Group ^{APR 21} 1975 asked that these guidelines be reviewed and concurrence or

Enclosures

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(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75

objections be furnished to the Security Committee of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) for consideration. A copy of these guidelines has been furnished to the Freedom of Information Unit of the Legal Counsel Division for review. Their comments will be furnished to the Bureau's representative, Mr. Frank Schwartz, on the USIB Committee in compliance with the mandate from the Ad Hoc Group.

Also attached is a copy of the abstract which all agencies of the Intelligence Community are being required to use in abstracting information that agency has provided one of the Select Committees. These abstracts will be retained in an interagency registry to be available for review by any members of the Intelligence Community as well as the White House. The purpose of this interagency registry is to have available in one location all information in abstract form that members of the Intelligence Community have provided the SSC.

Attached is a memorandum for Mr. John Clarke, Chairman of the Group, advising the names and titles of individuals on Congressman Nedzi's staff or on the staff of the House Armed Services Committee who have been approved for access to classified material. It is assumed that these persons will have continuing close relations with Congressman Nedzi and may be officially associated with the House Select Committee.

Also attached is a letter from Senator Church, Chairman of the Select Committee, addressed to the President enclosing a list of documents which the SSC is requesting from the White House.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

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The Third Agency Rule

1. As early as November 1953, the third agency rule was included in Executive Order 10501, which has now been revoked. Section 7(c) prohibited the dissemination of "classified defense information originating in another Department or agency" to an agency "outside the receiving Department or agency without the consent of the originating Department or agency". The only exception to this rule is that dissemination may be made under the authority of Section 102 of the National Security Act. This section authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using, where appropriate, existing agencies and facilities".

2. Historically, the responsibility of the DCI to disseminate intelligence has referred to "finished intelligence". This product is the end result of contributions from members of the Intelligence Community. Therefore, in this situation the finished product is a homogenous product and therefore the approval for further dissemination beyond the receiving agency must come from the Central Intelligence Agency.

3. Executive Order 10501 was superseded by Executive Order 11652 which became effective 1 June 1972. This Executive order did not specifically cover the third agency rule. However, it does provide the following controls: Sec. 9. Special Departmental Arrangements. The originating Department or other appropriate authority may impose, in conformity with the provisions of this order, special requirements with respect to access, distribution and protection of classified information and material, including those which presently relate to communications intelligence, intelligence sources and methods and cryptography.

4. In anticipation of the implementation of Executive Order 11652, a directive was issued on May 17, 1972 entitled "National Security Council Directive Governing the Classification, Downgrading, Declassification and Safeguarding of National Security Information". This directive does not contain the term "third agency rule" but does have four subsections which relate to procedures which are similar to what historically had been called the third agency rule. These sections are:

A.(2) Determination of Need-to-Know. In addition to a security clearance, a person must have a need for access to the particular classified information or material sought in connection with the performance of his official duties or

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ENCLOSURE

62-116395-68

Contractual obligations. The determination of that need shall be made by officials having responsibility for the classified information or material.

D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any other Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating Department.

E. Dissemination of Sensitive Intelligence Information. Information or material bearing the notation "WARNING NOTICE -- SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED" shall not be disseminated in any manner outside authorized channels without the permission of the originating Department and an assessment by the senior intelligence official in the disseminating Department as to the potential risk to the national security and to the intelligence sources and methods involved.

F. Restraint on Special Access Requirements. The establishment of special rules limiting access to, distribution and protection of classified information and material under Section 9 of the Order requires the specific prior approval of the head of a Department or his designee.

5. Examples of the application of the Third Agency Rule are:

(a) In a national security estimate, contributions are received from all members of the Intelligence Community and then disseminated to members of the community under the authority of the DCI;

(b) A CIA intelligence report disseminated to the State Department may not be sent by the State Department to the Department of Commerce without the permission of the CIA;

(c) Information which the CIA furnishes the President's Commission may not be disseminated to other agencies or to the Congress without the concurrences of CIA. Thus, a request from the Congress to the Commission for CIA information should be referred to CIA for action so that the necessary protection of the information can be insured.

(d) If the Navy Department discusses one of its operations with CIA, CIA may not include information about that operation in papers it disseminates to other agencies unless it has received the permission of the Navy Department. The distinction here is that a Navy operation would not be considered part of the finished intelligence mechanism and therefore would not fall within the statutory authority of CIA to disseminate intelligence.

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

28 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Group

SUBJECT: Handling of Third Agency Matters in Response
to Congressional Select Committees

1. As you are aware, Senator Church already has submitted to me a long list of materials which he requests be provided to his Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. He has submitted other lists to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the White House. It is expected that other elements of the Intelligence Community will be hearing from Senator Church.

2. The scope of the investigation necessarily is going to involve Third Agency relationships to a considerable degree.

3. In the implementation of Executive Order 11652, "Classification and Declassification of National Security Information and Material," the President directed the following:

"D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any other Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating department."

4. As regards Section 102 of the 1947 Act, the following quotes 102 (e) in full:

"(3) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security,

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ENCLOSURE

shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation and dissemination: Provided, however, that upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation and dissemination as may be essential to the national security."

5. If I am requested to provide certain materials and investigation indicates that the material asked for involves a document which originated within an organization other than the Intelligence Community Staff or the Central Intelligence Agency, the requestor will be asked to redirect his inquiry to the office of origin.


6. It already is apparent, however, that the documentation being requested inevitably is going to include references to inter-relationships among various of the elements of the intelligence community. Clearing each and every such reference with every agency mentioned could manifestly be extremely consuming of time and manpower.

7. I propose the Ad Hoc Group agree on the following procedure. Where it appears that truly sensitive matters are involved, the material will be sanitized by the agency concerned and a check will be made with the appropriate Third Agency organizations before release. Where the reference concerns a Third Agency indirectly or is not considered sensitive and does not pose policy concerns, the agency concerned may forward the material to the requesting Select Committee without an item-by-item, mention-by-mention clearance with Third Agencies. However, in all cases notification that such material has been forwarded will be made to the central index and

1. Agency issuing request
2. Requesting agency

all agencies alerted through that mechanism. Agencies will designate on their submissions to the central index, the name and telephone number of the releasing party.

8. Ad hoc members should be prepared to discuss and come to some agreement on this matter at the next meeting.



John M. Clarke
AD/DCI/IC

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

28 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Group

SUBJECT: Sanitization Guidelines for Documents
Provided Congressional Select
Committees


1. Attached is a copy of a statement, "Guidelines for Sanitizing Certain Documents Provided Select Committees" prepared by the Chairman, USIB Security Committee, for consideration by the Ad Hoc Group. This step is a follow on to the understanding the DCI has with Senator Church that sanitization of selective documents will be undertaken before the documents are released to the Committee. Similar understandings have been discussed with House Staff as well.

2. It is important that, to the extent possible, all intelligence organizations follow generally the same sanitization guidelines. Accordingly, the USIB Ad Hoc Group should consider utilizing these or similar guidelines within their respective organizations.

3. If requested by the Chairman, the DCI will discuss orally with the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate and House Select Committees the content of the sensitive USIB or CIA material excised from documents. Where appropriate, the DCI may discuss this sensitive material with the entire Select Committee. He considers it essential that the written record provided to the Committee staff not include such sensitive information for the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

John M. Clarke
John M. Clarke
AD/DCI/IC

Attachment: As Stated



enclosed

62-116 375-68

28 MARCH '75

GUIDELINES FOR SANITIZING CERTAIN DOCUMENTS
PROVIDED SELECT COMMITTEES

1. The Director of Central Intelligence has recently discussed with Senator Church the need for special consideration and treatment by the Select Committee of certain sensitive aspects of intelligence activities and the Senator has expressed his recognition of this need. Included in such matters are the identities of sensitive sources, the material provided to the United States by cooperating foreign intelligence services, the details of technical devices and systems and of operational methods, the identities of certain employees whose safety could be jeopardized if revealed, the identities of American citizens and organizations who have cooperated with US intelligence and some additional materials the public disclosure of which would create serious foreign policy or national security problems. Such material should be protected not only from exposure but indeed the risk of exposure. Further, recognition should be given to the need to protect certain other information which, if improperly disclosed, might impair the privacy rights of individuals.

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2. One form of this special consideration may include use of sanitization procedures to avoid the risk of exposing such matters and at the same time satisfy the Select Committee's need for a full understanding of the community's activities.

3. What May Be Sanitized

While it is not possible to anticipate all requirements which may be levied by the Committees for documenting material and not possible to determine specifically what material should be excised from these documents, the following illustrations are offered in certain likely categories. The criteria in all cases should meet the test mentioned above.

4. Collection of Intelligence

(a) The Committee will probably address the matter of how intelligence activities or methods have or may impinge upon individual rights. Documents supporting responses may be sanitized by removal of identities of sensitive agents and informants, covert personnel, and contractual cover arrangements. A descriptive phrase may be substituted, i.e., a foreign journalist, a political official in the opposition party. No sanitization should be used in connection with

names of individuals whose employment or former employment by, or association with a department or agency, does not remain secret or for individuals whose present or future activities on behalf of the department or agency do not require that previous cover arrangements remain secret.

(b) Some information may be required with respect to technical intelligence systems including cryptologic and communications activities and reconnaissance capabilities. Almost all of such material is currently handled in compartmentation control channels under various codewords or nicknames. No security threat is perceived by release of these codenames or nicknames in documents. Details of the technical systems involved, contractual arrangements, funding and/or names of companies or consultants whose participation was obtained under agreement of continued secrecy may be excised from documents. Any question on release of codeword material should be referred to the Program Manager who in turn may consult with the Director of Central Intelligence to ensure a consistent approach in the community's sanitization procedure. While documentary samples of intelligence obtained by technical means may be used in support of verbal testimony, no raw product should be provided the Committees

for retention. If absolutely required by the Committees, sanitization of such raw product should be conducted to mask the degree of technical capabilities.

5. Intelligence Estimates

Finished intelligence reports of departments and agencies and estimates do not usually contain source identifications and will not normally require sanitization. However, departments and agencies should review such publications to ensure deletion of source identities.

6. Administration

Information concerning the internal administration arrangements of intelligence agencies may be requested. This may include staffing chart^s with occupants identified. Sanitization of individual identities of personnel formerly not under cover and now functioning in a cover assignment should be deleted as well as those who may in the future be considered for a covert assignment.

7. General

The following categories of information or specific examples may arise in any number of circumstances in documentation requested by the Select Committees. In all cases, serious consideration should be given by the department or agency concerned to the necessity of

deletion or sanitization of this type of information, prior to providing the document.

- (a) Agent or informant names or operational information revealing them.
- (b) Details which would reveal the effectiveness of sensitive methods and techniques (1) ~~employed overseas in human source~~ collection, (2) employed for the physical security protection of the department's or agency's personnel or physical environment.
- (c) The numbers, locations, times and other indications of recruitment or emplacement of personnel within targetted foreign organizations.
- (d) The success or failure of recruitment attempts in any given targetted foreign organization.
- (e) Names of particular employees whose physical safety or future career might be placed in jeopardy by exposure.
- (f) Foreign or US sources, official or otherwise who agreed to cooperate under terms of explicit or implied confidentiality, who would be embarrassed or endangered by disclosure of their role.
- (g) Identifying information on intelligence services in friendly and neutral countries.

(h) Identifying collaborative operations between the United States intelligence agencies and other foreign intelligence liaison services against targets within the country extending the collaborations or within a jointly targetted third country.

(i) Identifying collaboration with foreign governments in signals intelligence collection, particularly for arrangements which, if revealed, would be politically embarrassing in the countries involved.

(j) Identification of technical intelligence operations of high technical vulnerability and extremely high political sensitivity.

(k) Specific identification of foreign technical collection installations involving high political sensitivity in the host country.

(l) Details or disclosure of monetary arrangements with US and foreign banks, investment houses, etc., in support of foreign intelligence operations.

(m) Specific information on special relationships with private firms established with the approval of top corporate officials. This includes names of firms or industrial associations that collaborate in a special manner such as providing cover for foreign intelligence operations.

(n) Names of firms collaborating with US intelligence agencies in collection and assessment programs (especially those having large foreign clienteles).

(o) Proprietary information relating to contractors or furnished in confidence.

8. What Should Not Be Sanitized

There are general categories of intelligence activities which have already been placed in the public domain by the mass news media or authors with background experience in intelligence departments or agencies of the community. Names, places, dates and events which have been so revealed should not be excised if contained in requested documents.

There is an increasing body of information which has been released under the Freedom of Information Act. No further sanitization of this material should be conducted unless it relates to an individual's rights to privacy.

9. Techniques of Sanitization

Sanitization of intelligence material is usually considered the act of physical removal of the identity of a person, place or thing from written communication with or without regard for the residual

content. Use of a substitution device, either pseudonym or ident is an example of sanitization which permits intelligent continuity of the material without revealing the true identity. Sanitization does not extend to the use of false or misleading substitute material in this context.

The integrity of official records must be maintained. The following sanitization techniques apply only to copies of records.

(a) Physical Sanitization - Names may be cut out and the residual material xeroxed and submitted to Committees. Names may be masked with correction tape and then xeroxed. The xerox copy may be submitted to the Committees.

(b) Names may be deleted and replaced with "IDEN." The deleted material is provided on a separate IDEN list which contains names or descriptive phrases substituted for deletions.

(c) The material can be retyped or reprinted with substitute phrases or substitute descriptions which do not reveal the sensitive material.

(d) Entire pages can be removed from some documents and replaced with a blank page carrying only reference information

as to the location of the sensitive material within the contributing department or agency. This technique may be employed when physical sanitization or excision of material results in unintelligible gibberish as residue.

(e) Within a category of inquiry, it may be desirable to extract a complete document from requested material when the request is broad and all inclusive within its field. The existence of such a document should be made known to the Committees but retained by the agency or department for review under escort of a representative of the department or agency.

10. Management of Sanitization

The original record and a copy of the sanitized version provided should be readily available in all cases. Materials developed within an agency or department in response to requests should be reviewed at an appropriate level for completeness, responsiveness and accuracy. In the case of documents or materials of a community nature, the release should be done in coordination with the departments or agencies and/or the Program Manager concerned and any sanitization should be agreed upon during coordination.

This proposed use of sanitization as a special arrangement to protect selected issues contained in material provided to Select Committees by one agency may prove to be a futile exercise if not practiced in common by all participating departments and agencies. It is essential to the proposal that departments and agencies attempt to employ the same criteria for sanitization and coordinate as required. This paper can serve only as general guidelines on sanitization.

FORMAT FOR ABSTRACT OF MATERIAL SUBMITTED TO
THE SENATE (HOUSE) SELECT COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. SUBJECT:
2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION:
3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: (Report, briefing, chart, etc.)
4. TITLE:
5. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: (A brief narrative statement which describes content of the material provided, problems addressed, and any conclusions or recommendations. Summary should be of sufficient length clearly to convey the basic thrust of whatever was provided to the Select Committee.)
6. REQUESTOR:
7. DATE OF REQUEST:
8. DATE OF SUBMISSION:
9. LOCATION OF FILE COPY/COPIES
10. DOES MATERIAL RELATE TO AN
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
PROBLEM? IF SO, IDENTIFY:

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DATE 1/26/01 BY SP-2 PHM/KG

62-116 395-68

IC-75-1951
28 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Clarke

SUBJECT : SECURITY - House Select Committee -
Cleared Personnel

1. The following information has been obtained from the Office of Legislative Counsel and addresses those individuals on Congressman Nedzi's staff or on the staff of the House Armed Services Committee who have been approved for access to classified material. It is assumed that they will have continuing close relations with Congressman Nedzi and may be officially associated in the near future with the House Select Committee.

Mr. Frank M. Slatinshek
Chief Counsel, Armed Services Committee Staff
Room 2117 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI, TK, B

Mr. William H. Hogan, Jr.
Counsel, Armed Services Committee Staff
Room 2339 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI, TK

Mr. John L. Boos
Chairman Nedzi's Assistant for Intelligence
Matters
Room 2343 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI, TK, B

2. The following secretaries are approved for receipt of classified material at the levels indicated:

Berniece Kalinowski (Slatinshek)
Room 2117 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI, TK, B

62-116395-68

Rita D. Argenta (Hogan)
Room 2339 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI

Oneta L. Stockstill (Boos)
Room 2339 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI, TK

3. Safe storage facilities are available in Mr. William Hogan's office which have been approved by CIA. Mr. Slatinshek and Mr. Boos keep classified material meant for Congressman Nedzi in this area.

Don
Donald E. Moore

Dist: R Taylor:mm/28Mar75
O-Adse
1 - IC Reg
1 - SECOM

JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HORN, SOUTH DAKOTA
WALTER R. MONROE, MINN.
SAM E. HUTCHISON, KAN.
FRANCIS MURKIN, N.C.
CATHERINE COOK, COLOR.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
HARRY COLDWATER, ILL.
CHARLES McC. MATTHEWS, MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, WASH. D.C.

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities

(Pursuant to S. Res. 21, 93rd Congress)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 12, 1973

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities, Senator Tower and I want to thank you for the opportunity we had on March 5 to discuss the work of the Committee. I want to express my personal appreciation for the direct and forthright manner in which you addressed some of the initial questions that lay before the Select Committee, and your willingness to assist the Committee to meet its responsibilities under the mandate of S. Res. 21.

We are in agreement that the work of the Committee should proceed as expeditiously as possible and the Committee is gratified at the full and complete cooperation that we have received from the Executive agencies up to this point. In every respect thus far, the agencies have been fully cooperative with the Committee and the staff and I believe this augers well for a constructive and expeditious conclusion to our inquiry.

At our meeting on March 5th with you, we discussed the general areas in which the Committee would need initial documentation. As we discussed, our first requirements are to determine the legal basis for the activities for the intelligence agencies of the United States Government. In this regard, it will be helpful to the Committee to receive from whomever you may designate, the documents, files, and other papers that might be required to fully determine the legal basis for the activities of United States intelligence agencies. With the unanimous approval of the Committee, I respectfully request that the documents on the attached list directly relevant to the inquiry authorized by S. Res. 21, be supplied to the Committee at the earliest opportunity.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,


Frank Church

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ATTACHMENT

1. The report furnished to the President by Director Colby in January 19
2. All Executive Orders, National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDDs) or Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs), and other White House* directives pertaining to the charter, structure or guidelines for any overt or covert foreign or domestic intelligence agencies or activities.
3. All Executive Orders, National Security Council memoranda and directives, and other White House instructions pertaining to the structure, functions or organization of intelligence policy organizations within the Office of the President, including the Forty Committee and the Washington Special Action Group (and their predecessor organizations, e.g., the Operations Coordinating Board, Special Group, 54/12 Group, 303 Committee, etc.).
4. Organization charts and staffing patterns (for the present and, to the extent reasonably convenient, back to 1947) for all intelligence-related organizations within the White House (NSC, Forty Committee, OEP, WSAG, etc.) including names of key officials and staff personnel.



* "White House" as used in this listing is meant to include the President, the Office of the President, including the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

DATE: 4-3-75

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DATE 11/18/01 BY SP2 AM/17/2006

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. *WPA*
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

By memorandum dated 3-20-75, you were advised of a request received from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. The Intelligence Division requested that an attempt be made to modify portions of the Committee's request.

Regarding Part I titled Legal Authorities, the Intelligence Division pointed out that this particular request was wide-ranging and required a considerable file review as it requested any memorandum discussing the legal authority of the FBI to "(1) investigate internal security matters, (2) collect intelligence information, and (3) engage in counter-intelligence activities; together with copies of all constitutional and statutory provisions, executive orders, presidential directives, Attorney General opinions and memoranda, and any other materials asserted as sources of such authority." With regard to Part III concerning the FBI's administrative organization, they requested the identities by name of personnel in the Intelligence Division, Unit Chief and above. This caused concern in the Intelligence Division that there would be a needless proliferation of a list of Bureau personnel working in this field which list, of course, would be of interest to foreign intelligence sources.

On 4-1-75 Inspector John B. Hotis and SA Paul V. Daly discussed these matters with William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee; John T. Elliff, who has been nominated to head the task force for the Committee looking into FBI activities; F. A. O. Schwarz, Counsel to the Senate Select Committee; and staff member Michael Epstein. They agreed to modify the request in Part III to the extent that personnel in the Intelligence Division need not be identified by name below the level of Assistant Director in the organization chart to be furnished them pursuant to their request of 3-19-75. They asked as an alternative the Bureau prepare a list of personnel in the Intelligence Division down to the level of Unit Chief with names included which they would have access to review in Bureau space.

REC 17

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Callahan - Enc.
1 - Mr. Adams - Enc.
1 - Mr. Jenkins - Enc.
1 - Mr. Walsh - Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall - Enc.

- 1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
1 - Mr. Farrington - Enc.
1 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.
1 - Mr. Daly - Enc.

CONTINUED - OVER

PVD:dkg/4 APR 22 1975

Legal Counsel to Adams Memo
RE: SENSTUDY 75

With regard to Part I relating to legal authorities, they stated they were amenable to the Bureau furnishing them whatever documents they have retrieved up to this time which have been recovered pursuant to their request of 3-19-75 and that no additional detailed review need be conducted until they review the aforementioned documents. At the end of their review they will make any additional specific requests concerning this part of their request. They also asked that in our response we furnish them copies of documents listed on a three-page paper prepared by the staff of the Senate Select Committee, a copy of which is attached.

Staff Director Miller requested that the Bureau expedite their response to the Senate Select Committee's request as the first meeting of that Committee is scheduled for Wednesday, 4-9-75, and he felt strongly that they must have material that showed progress in their study of the FBI prior to that time. Mr. Miller requested that, if necessary, the request be responded to in a piecemeal basis and that the complete response does not necessarily have to be made at one time.

It is suggested that we make available to this Committee as soon as possible those documents which we have furnished the General Accounting Office (GAO) which also fall within the 3-19-75 request of the Senate Select Committee. In this regard staff members have advised they are in contact with GAO auditors concerning the FBI.

By way of observations it is obvious that the staff members of the Committee are well versed in Bureau policy and procedures. To this point they have been cooperative and we should insure that we give a timely response to their various requests.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (1) That the Intelligence Division advise whether modification of the Senate Select Committee's request concerning legal authorities for investigations and the modification of the table of organization of the Intelligence Division are acceptable and, if so, expeditiously prepare the necessary response to the Senate Select Committee.
- 4/18/75
WPP

RECOMMENDATIONS
CONTINUED - OVER

Legal Counsel to Adams Memo
RE: SENSTUDY 75

- (2) That we furnish all information which has previously been furnished GAO and is within the ambit of the Senate Select Committee's request.

Material furnished to GAO reviewed. All information within ambit of SSC has been furnished to SSC 4/8/75 WTB

- (3) That as our response to any one of the five particular areas of inquiry as set forth in the 3-19-75 letter is completed, we furnish it to the Senate Select Committee. Done
4/8/75
WPC

- (4) This material should be sent to the Deputy Attorney General by letterhead memorandum, the first paragraph of which should specifically identify the request, for review and subsequent transmittal to the Senate Select Committee.

*JAC PWD
JSA JSA*

PM

WRW

JAC

OK

*Attala and Jackson, DC, conducted
reviewing material, DC conducted
with (the) Office of the Senate Select
Committee to Adams, 4/8/75
WTB*

examples of the types of materials requested under part I:

1. Studies on Subversion and FBI Jurisdiction which were prepared for Director Gray. See Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress (First Session) on the Nomination of Louis Patrick Gray III, of Connecticut, to be Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (1973), pp. 7 and 17.

2. Paper prepared on jurisdiction which was discussed by Director Gray and others at a Quantico meeting on May 23 and 24, 1973. Id. at p. 151.

3. Memorandum from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General, dated August 7, 1973, recommending the issuance of an executive order concerning the authority of the FBI to conduct domestic intelligence operations. See the Attorney General's reply to this memorandum which is published in the Joint Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure and the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on Surveillance of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), on Warrantless Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance (1974), pp. 51-52.

4. An Intelligence Division study which was furnished to the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, by Director Kelley. See Hearing before the Subcommittee on FBI Oversight of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session) on S. 2106. Ten-Year Term for FBI Director (1974), pp. 12-13.

5. Memorandum from Attorney General Clark to Director Hoover, dated September 14, 1967. See Hearings before the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes, Part I (1974), pp. 3404-3405.

6. The two FBI memoranda which record instructions from President Roosevelt to Director Hoover concerning FBI investigations of subversive activities, and which indicate meetings between President Roosevelt and Director Hoover on August 24 and 25, 1933. Id. at pp. 3372-3373.

7. Memorandum from Director Hoover to Associate Director Tamm, dated September 10, 1936. Id. at p. 3577.

8. Presidential directives dated September 6, 1933; January 6, 1943; July 24, 1950; and December 15, 1953. Id. at pp. 3561 et seq.



ENCLOSURE

62-116395-61

examples of the types of materials requested under Part II:

1. See Delimitation Agreement in the Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Second Congress (First Session), on Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights (1971), Part II, pp. 1172-1179.

2. See Agreement of Coordination in the Hearings before the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes (1974), Part I, pp. 3309-3303.

For references to items requested in Part IV, see:

1. Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Second Congress (Second Session), on the Nomination of Richard G. Kleindienst, of Arizona, to be Attorney General (1972), pp. 63-64.

2. Hearings before the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes (1974), pp. 3509-3570.

3. Hearings before the Judiciary Committee, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress (First Session), on the Nomination of Louis Patrick Gray III, of Connecticut, to be Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (1973), pp. 150-151.

An excised copy of the Report requested under Part V, Item A, is published in the record of the Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), pursuant to H. Res 803 (Impeachment), Book VII, Part 1, pp. 384-431.

The original COINTELPRO Report which is requested in Part V, Item B, is referred to in the Hearings before the Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives (Ninety-Third Congress, Second Session), FBI Counterintelligence Programs (1974), p. 21.

Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director, FBI, dated May 20, 1954, captioned "Microphone Surveillance." See hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Second Congress (Second Session), Warrantless Wiretapping (1972), p. 178.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-3 ALM/166

DATE: 4-3-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SAC-Subd-75
SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
REVIEW OF FBI OPERATIONS

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
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Inspection _____
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Laboratory _____
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Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that all responses for the production of records, etc., received from Congressional committees be forwarded by letterhead memorandum through the Deputy Attorney General to the requesting committee, and also that in selected instances a property stamp or statement be affixed to certain documents limiting access.

With the proliferation of committees in Congress looking into FBI operations, it is essential that a standard procedure for the forwarding of documents to the requesting committees be established. Inasmuch as requests such as the request of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities have been forwarded to this Bureau through the Department, it would appear logical that responses to such inquiries and all other inquiries of Congressional committees, whether they be directed to the Department and/or the Bureau, be responded to through the Department. Such a procedure not only will make all our responses consistent but will also give the Department an opportunity to review and approve documents being made available to Congress.

In connection with our preparation of responses to requests of Congressional committees, it is suggested that all responses should be by letterhead memorandum, the first paragraph of which should clearly describe the specific request which is being responded to in the letterhead memorandum.

In those instances where documents are of a nature that we are not desirous of unauthorized personnel, whether they be in Congress or otherwise, having access to, we should affix a property stamp. This property stamp should read as follows:

62-116395-66
REC-16 APR 11 1975

"This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside of your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the contents may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI."

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - All Assistant Directors

1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

LEGAL COUNSEL

PVD:kjs (21)

JUN 11 1975 RECOMMENDATIONS - OVER

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams Memo
RE: CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
REVIEW OF FBI OPERATIONS

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (1) That all responses to Congressional inquiries concerning FBI operations be forwarded to the Congressional committees by letterhead memorandum through the Deputy Attorney General. Upon approval, these letterhead memoranda will be hand-delivered to the Deputy Attorney General's office by Legal Counsel Division.
- (2) That in instances where access to a particular document should be limited because of the contents of that document, a property stamp in line with the above be affixed thereto.

1/10 JAT JAT PWS JAM
JAT DIV 5 is appropriate
claiming attorney
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP2 AMT/MG

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 8, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Attached are copies of various documents which are jurisdictional agreements between the FBI and other Federal agencies or guidelines prepared by the Attorney General with reference to investigative responsibilities between the FBI and other Federal agencies insofar as they pertain to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities.

1. Delimitations of Investigative Duties of the FBI, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Intelligence Division of the Army and the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U. S. Air Force, dated February 23, 1949, with supplemental agreements 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Supplemental agreement number 2 is no longer in effect.

2. Agreement between the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency, dated February 7, 1966, classified "Secret."

3. Agreement between the FBI and the United States Secret Service, effective July 30, 1973.

RLM:mam
(6) *mam*

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Dep. AD Inv. _____
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~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

The Attorney General

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

Director, FBI

April 8, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Gregar

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a response to the request entitled, "Jurisdictional Agreements." A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records. Processing of additional requests is continuing and further responses will be forthcoming.

Enclosures (2)

REC. 106

RLM:mam
(6)nsm

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DATE 11/18/01 BY SP8 ALM/jgs

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Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
DRAFT SORRY APR 1 1975 ROOM _____

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

4. Investigative guidelines with reference to Title 11, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Regulation of Explosives, prepared by the Attorney General of the United States, submitted by letter to the FBI on January 11, 1973.

The various other requests contained in the Committee's letter of March 19, 1975, are receiving attention and response will be forthcoming at the earliest possible time.

Enclosures (4)

1 - The Attorney General

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ACT 12/16

CONFIDENTIAL//EX-REF ID: A611202

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29 235

ENCLOSURE

February 23, 1949

VI

Subject: Delimitation of Investigative Duties of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Intelligence Division of the Army, and the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U. S. Air Force.

The Agreement for Coordination of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Naval Intelligence, Intelligence Division of the Army, and the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U. S. Air Force.

I. The undersigned have reviewed the directive contained in the President's Memorandum of June 26, 1939, as augmented by his Directive of September 6, 1939, the Delimitations Agreement of February 9, 1942, and the Presidential Directive of October 30, 1947. In addition, cognizance has been taken of the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, and the specific application of that Act is set forth in Section II hereof. All other provisions of this Agreement are apart from and have no relation to the stated requirements of the Atomic Energy Act. In view of the above, it is now agreed that responsibility for the investigation of all activities coming under the categories of espionage, counterespionage, subversion and sabotage (hereinafter referred to as "these categories") will be delimited as indicated herein-after. The responsibility assumed by one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation to exchange freely and directly with the other subscribing organizations all information of mutual interest. When the organization with primary operating responsibility is unable for any reason to produce material in that field desired by the subscribing agencies, such special arrangements as may be legal or desirable will be worked out through negotiation at the national level prior to activity by one agency in another agency's field. It is recognized by the subscribers hereto that the Headquarters Department of the Army has decentralized such functions to its major subordinate commanders. When the major subordinate commanders of the Department of the Army cannot effect satisfactory special arrangements, the matter will be referred to the Director of Intelligence of the Army for further negotiations at the national level. Close cooperation and coordination between the four subscribing organizations is a mutually recognized necessity.

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III. FBI will be responsible for:

1. All investigations of cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals of all classes in the continental United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the State of Hawaii**, and the State of Alaska* except as specifically described hereinafter in Paragraph V, Section 5.

2. All investigations of violations of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. There are no territorial or personnel limitations on this provision.

3. The coordination of the investigative activities of civilian agencies in the United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the State of Alaska except as specifically described hereinafter in Paragraph V, Section 5, which provide information regarding subversive movements and activities in these categories.

4. Keeping the other subscribing organizations advised of important developments in these categories within its cognizance, particularly:

- a. Activities of inactive reserves of the armed service, including the National Guard.
- b. Developments affecting plants engaged in armed forces contracts.
- c. Developments concerning the strength, composition, and intentions of civilian groups within its cognizance which are classed as subversive and whose activities are a potential danger to the security of the United States.
- d. Developments affecting those vital facilities and vital utilities which have been designated by the Secretary of Defense.
- e. Developments affecting critical points of transportation and communications systems which have been designated by the Secretary of Defense.

(For b, d, and e above no protective coverage is contemplated.)

- 2 -

*Editorial revision of this Agreement to reflect the statehood of Alaska was approved by the IIC on January 7, 1959.

**Revision to reflect the statehood of Hawaii was approved by the IIC on September 9, 1959.

III. ID, Army will be responsible for:

1. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving active and retired military personnel of the Army.
2. The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Army in the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
3. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Army stationed in areas other than the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, except that part of such investigations as have ramifications in the United States, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands.
4. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other subscribing organizations, in areas where the Army Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein, including possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
5. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any important developments.
6. Advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity and location of the plants engaged in Army contracts.

IV. ONI will be responsible for:

1. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving active and retired naval personnel of the Navy.
2. The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Navy in the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
3. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Navy stationed in areas other than the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, except that part of such investigations as have ramifications in the United States, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands.
4. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other subscribing organizations, in areas where the Navy Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein, including possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, and in the State of Alaska except as described in Section 5, below.

5. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other subscribing organizations and with the exception of civilian employees of the Executive Branch of the Government on Kodiak and Afognak Islands adjacent to the Alaska Peninsula and Adak Island in the Aleutian Chain.*

6. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any important developments.

7. Advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity and location of the plants engaged in Navy contracts.

V. The Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U. S. Air Force will be responsible for:

1. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving active and retired military personnel of the Air Force.

2. The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Air Force in the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

3. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Air Force stationed in areas other than the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, except that part of such investigations as have ramifications in the United States, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands.

4. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other subscribing organizations, in areas where the Air Force Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein, including possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. The investigation of the same cases described above in that portion of Alaska described in Section 5, below, with the exception of civilian employees of the Executive Branch of the Government.

5. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians, except as described hereinabove, (1) in that part of the Alaska Peninsula which is separated by a line drawn from Iliamna Bay

*This paragraph added. See IIC Working Committee Minutes of September 15, 1954, and June 8, 1955.

northwest to the town of Old Iliamna and thence following the south shore of Lake Iliamna to the Kvichak River to the Kvichak Bay; (2) in the islands adjacent to the Alaska Peninsula excluding Kodiak and Afognak Islands which are the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence; (3) in the Aleutian Islands excluding Adak Island which is the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence; and (4) in the Pribilof Islands.*

6. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any important developments.

7. Advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity and location of the plants engaged in Air Force contracts.

VI. 1. Where Sections III, IV, and V involve general territorial coverage, responsibility for such coverage will pass from one element of the armed forces to another automatically when a change of command responsibility ensues. This provision is subject to modification by direct agreement between the interested elements of the armed forces.

2. While investigative jurisdiction over the civilian populace in former enemy territories occupied by the armed forces has been provided for in Sections III, IV, and V above, those provisions are subject to direct adjustment with the Department of State if and when that Department assumes governmental direction in such areas of occupation.

VII. From time to time it may be desirable in the light of changing conditions to modify or amend this Delimitations Agreement. Subject to the exceptions already provided for above, general amendments or modifications involving all of the four subscribing organizations shall be issued in the form of a revised Delimitations Agreement and not as separate instructions.

VIII. During periods of martial law, or periods of predominant armed forces interest not involving martial law, when agreed upon by the subscribing agencies, the provisions of Appendix A or B, hereto attached, will additionally apply.

IX. All agreements of a continuing nature and applicable to two or more of the subscribing agencies to the Delimitations Agreement which affect the basic jurisdiction thereof which are

*Original paragraph changed. See IIC Working Committee Minutes of September 15, 1954, and June 8, 1955.

now or hereafter mutually entered into by any of the subscribers thereto will be reduced to writing; will thereafter become supplements to the Delimitations Agreement, and distributed only to the extent agreed upon by the co-signers.

(Signed) S. Leroy Irwin
Director of Intelligence,
Department of the Army

(Signed) Thomas B. Inglis
Chief of Naval Intelligence

(Signed) J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

(Signed) Joseph F. Carroll
Director, Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U. S. Air Force

APPROVED

APPENDIX A

PERIOD OF MARTIAL LAW

I. It is further agreed that when a state of martial law has been declared by the President, the armed forces commander will assume responsibilities for coverage in these categories. His authority to direct and control the subscribing agencies of the armed forces will be limited only by such instructions as he may receive from the Secretary of Defense. He will have authority to coordinate the intelligence activities of the subscribing agencies in his area of responsibility, within the limits of their available personnel and facilities, by the assignment of missions, the designation of objectives, and the exercise of such coordinating control as he deems necessary. He is not authorized to control the administration or discipline of the subscribing agencies in the area of his responsibility, nor to issue instructions to them beyond those necessary for the purposes stated above.

II. Personnel of the subscribing agencies in the area of responsibility of the armed forces commander will still send reports to and be under the continued supervision of their respective headquarters. They will render such aid and assistance to the armed forces commander and his designated representatives as are possible and practicable. They will furnish all pertinent information, data, and other material that are or may be necessary or desirable to the armed forces commander by the most expeditious means and methods possible consistent with requisite security. Each headquarters of the subscribing agencies will promptly be advised by its agencies of all information and data appropriately identified as having been furnished to the armed forces commander.

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DATE 11/8/01 BY SP-2 ALM/HMG

APPENDIX B

PERIODS OF PREDOMINANT MILITARY
INTERESTS; NOT INVOLVING MARTIAL LAW

I. In time of war certain areas will come into prominence as potential theaters of operation. When an armed forces commander of such a potential theater is designated, he definitely has interest in, though not control of, the civilian life within the area. In order that the armed forces commander may prepare himself for the discharge of the possible responsibility which may affix to him, the following procedure is agreed upon:

1. Agents of the FBI; of ONI; ID, Army; and the OSI, IG, U.S. Air Force will continue to function in accordance with the provisions of Sections II, III, IV, and V.

2. In addition thereto, the armed forces commander may take steps to analyze the facilities existing and to explore the manner in which complete coverage will be obtained if martial law is declared. Adequate liaison with the other subscribing agencies will insure that the armed forces commander will have the benefit of the experience, judgment and knowledge of the representatives of the other agencies.

3. The armed forces commander is authorized to request and receive such information from the other three agencies as he may desire and they may be able to furnish.

II. The analysis and exploration referred to above will show the coverage furnished by each of the subscribing agencies and any additional coverage each subscribing agency can undertake. When the commander feels that more complete coverage is required, it is recognized that he is authorized to augment the coverage with such elements of the subscribing agencies as are under his jurisdiction. Prior to any invasion of the spheres normally coming under the cognizance of the other subscribing agencies, the armed forces commander should obtain the necessary authority from the Secretary of Defense.

III. Irrespective of the fact that the preceding recommendations have placed the initiative in the hands of the armed forces commander, whenever any of the other services feel that such a survey to determine adequacy of coverage should be undertaken, it should be so recommended.

Supplemental Agreement No. I
to the Delimitations Agreement

Cooperation and Coordination Between
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Intelligence Division of the Army
The Office of Naval Intelligence and
The Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U.S. Air Force

The Director of Intelligence, U.S. Army, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of Naval Intelligence and the Director of the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U.S. Air Force, with a view to promoting the closest possible cooperation and coordination between the Field Services of these agencies agree that the following recommendations will be transmitted to their field installations:

(a) Special Agents in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Divisional Offices, Military Intelligence Officers of the pertinent Armies, District Officers of the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U.S. Air Force, and Naval District Intelligence Officers will maintain close personal liaison between those offices and their representatives, including a meeting of representatives of the four agencies, preferably the officers in charge, at least twice per month, for the purpose of discussing pending and contemplated investigative activities, and any other subject necessary to insure that there is proper coordination of their investigative work.

(b) The close personal liaison to be maintained between representatives of the four agencies at all times should insure that there is not duplication of effort in any field, and that a proper coverage of the whole investigative field is maintained. Particular attention should be paid to avoiding any duplication in connection with the use of informers.

(c) A distinction should be recognized between the investigative interest of individual agencies and the coverage interest. It is believed that all four agencies should study, from time to time, the coverage of the investigative field in order to insure that all channels of interest and avenues of information are adequately covered by at least one of the participating agencies.

(d) Where there is doubt as to whether or not one of the other agencies is interested in information collected, it should be transmitted to the other agency.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

(e) Consideration should be given to the fact that certain classes of information are of general interest to the Military, Naval, and Air Force Intelligence Services in connection with background and knowledge of espionage and sabotage organizations, even though the Military, Naval, and Air Force Intelligence Services may have no apparent direct investigative interest.

(f) Should differences of opinion of a minor nature occur, the directors of the four intelligence agencies feel that with proper personal liaison, such differences can be satisfactorily adjusted locally by the officials in charge of the various divisional organizations.

(Approved by I.I.C. June 2, 1949)

Supplemental Agreement No. III
to the Delimitations Agreement
(As Amended June 8, 1950)

Investigative Jurisdiction on
Vessels of Military Sea Transportation Service

1. The investigative jurisdiction of all activities under the categories of espionage, counterespionage, subversion and sabotage on vessels of the Military Sea Transportation Service is as follows:

a. Investigative jurisdiction on vessels purchased by the Navy will be the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

b. Vessels obtained by the Navy through a "bare boat charter" will be under the investigative jurisdiction of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

c. Vessels allocated to the Military Sea Transportation Service which are manned and supervised by their private owners are under the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI.

2. When civilian personnel who are subjects of an investigation under a or b above reach a U.S. port or a port where the FBI has a field agency, or prior to reaching such port, if practicable, the Department of the Navy will promptly furnish the FBI all pertinent information concerning the investigation. If personnel who are subjects of an investigation as above remove themselves from the vessel upon arrival of the vessel in port and further surveillance is considered necessary, the Navy will continue surveillance until notified by the FBI at local level that the FBI will make every effort to transfer responsibility upon arrival of the vessel at the port.

3. When the FBI opens an investigation under c above or when an FBI investigation in progress develops or is believed about to develop ramifications under a, b or c above, the FBI will promptly furnish all pertinent information to the Navy and will thereafter coordinate its actions with the Navy whenever and wherever deemed necessary to insure proper pursuit of the case.

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Supplemental Agreement No. IV
to the Delimitations Agreement

Investigation of Private Contractors
of the Armed Forces

It is agreed by the subscribers of the Delimitations Agreement (hereinafter referred to as subscribers) that with reference investigations of civilian employees, applicants for employment, directors and key personnel of privately owned plants and facilities, working or bidding on contracts important to the Army, Navy or Air Force (hereinafter referred to as the Armed Forces) procurement, the following will be followed insofar as practicable. Exceptions thereto will be adjusted by mutual agreement between the subscribers concerned.

a. The Armed Forces will conduct background investigations of such persons unless there is a particular reason for requesting that an investigation be conducted by the FBI or the FBI has a special interest in a particular case and has notified the Armed Forces of such interest.

b. The FBI will conduct complaint investigations of such personnel upon specific request in each case by one or more of the Armed Forces. If one of the Armed Forces has no further need for an investigation requested, but not completed, prompt notification will be made to the FBI.

c. Investigations conducted by the Armed Forces under a above will be terminated and all information passed to the FBI when credible derogatory information of a loyalty nature is uncovered. Upon receipt of such a case, the FBI will proceed as under b above if one of the Armed Forces so requests.

d. When one of the subscribers is aware that another is conducting an investigation on a person or firm identical or closely connected with a person or firm it contemplates investigating, no investigation will be undertaken without the consent of the subscriber which has an investigation in progress. The investigating agency will make available to the other interested agency copies of the reports of the investigation made.

e. Normally, identity of confidential informants will not be communicated from one subscriber to another; however, when such communication occurs, the receiving subscriber will employ the highest possible safeguards to insure that such informants are not compromised. No transmittal of information concerning confidential informants to a third subscriber or to another agency is authorized except by specific consent of the originator.

f. A subscriber who receives a report of investigation from another subscriber may freely transmit copies of such reports to a third subscriber except as provided in e above.

g. A report of complete investigation received by the Armed Forces from the FBI will not be reopened without the approval of the FBI except to obtain additional background information. In such case, the FBI will be furnished copies of all information obtained. Other information required by the Armed Forces will be requested of the FBI.

h. If one of the Armed Forces requests the FBI to conduct an investigation or to conduct additional investigation as provided under g above, and if for any reason the FBI declines or is unable to conduct such investigation or additional investigation, the Armed Force concerned may proceed with the investigation. The FBI will be furnished copies of the results thereof if the FBI so requests or if the Armed Force concerned considers the results to be of FBI interest.

i. Nothing above is to be construed as altering the basic Delimitations Agreement of 1949 or current agreements concerning subversive organizations.

(Approved by I.I.C. June 2, 1949)

Supplemental Agreement No. V
to the Delimitations Agreement

Investigation of Reserve and Civilian
Components of the Armed Services

It is agreed by the subscribers to the Delimitations Agreement that the Army, the Navy and the Air Force may conduct background investigations on members of the inactive reserve and National Guard who are anticipated being called back to active duty, or where an investigation is undertaken for the purpose of determining whether the individual should be disenrolled from his military status, or to determine whether the individual may be granted access to classified military information. The following procedures shall be pursued in each of the above circumstances:

- (1) The Intelligence agencies of the Army, Navy or Air Force before undertaking such background investigation will consult the FBI to determine: (a) if the FBI has an investigation in progress; if so, no investigation will be undertaken by the intelligence agencies except as may be mutually agreeable to the Armed Force concerned and the FBI; (b) if the FBI already has made an investigation; if so, the results will be made available to the other agencies; (c) if the FBI has information on the individual, even though it may not have conducted an investigation.
- (2) If, after consulting the FBI, investigation is undertaken by the other agencies, it will be pursued no further than is necessary to make the determination required by the other agencies, and all information developed pertinent to the four categories will be furnished promptly to the FBI.

(Approved by I.I.C. June 2, 1949)

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Supplemental Agreement No. VI
to the Delimitations Agreement

Investigation in Areas Not Specifically Assigned

It is agreed by the military subscribers to the Delimitations Agreement that the references therein in paragraphs III. 4., IV. 4., and V. 4. to "areas where the Army (Navy, Air Force) Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein" shall be interpreted as referring to areas where the Department of the Army (Navy, Air Force) is responsible for the administrative and logistic support of the Headquarters of Commands established by the Secretary of Defense.

(Approved by I.I.C. November 4, 1959)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

February 7, 1966

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

JFK Act 6 (1) (C)

1-7-0
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/145
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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Central Intelligence Agency
Operations in the United States

JFK Act 6 (1) (C)

- 2 -

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INVESTIGATIVE GUIDELINES
TITLE XI, ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1970
REGULATION OF EXPLOSIVES

1. General

Title XI of the captioned law amends Title 18, United States Code, by adding a new chapter 40 with section numbers 841 through 848 governing the importation, manufacture, distribution and storage of explosive materials and creating certain Federal offenses pertaining to the unlawful use of explosives. Administration of explosives regulation is vested in the Secretary of the Treasury as is investigative jurisdiction over the unlawful acts proscribed in section 842. Under authority contained in section 846 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) have concurrent investigative jurisdiction as to the remainder of chapter 40, i.e., the unlawful acts proscribed in subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h) and (i) of section 844. Although not specified in chapter 40, the Postal Inspection Service shall have jurisdiction to investigate all incidents involving explosive or incendiary devices sent through the mails or directed against U.S. Postal Service property.

Title XI greatly broadens Federal authority pertaining to explosives-connected offenses. At the same time, Congress has expressly disclaimed any intent to occupy the field to the exclusion of state law on the same subject matter. To effect both Congressional purposes and to prevent unnecessary duplication of effort it is essential that the limited Federal investigative resources be carefully allocated, particularly in cases in which both the ATF and the FBI have jurisdiction.

2. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Jurisdiction in General

(a) Effect on prior jurisdiction - This agreement applies only to those incidents as to which the FBI had no investigative jurisdiction prior to the enactment of the captioned law and to incidents previously subject to FBI investigation by reason of chapter 65, Title 18, United States Code (malicious mischief). Investigative procedures in other types of incidents (e.g., train wrecking, damaging aircraft and motor vehicles, racketeering) shall remain unchanged.

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(b) Primary jurisdiction - Subject to the provisions hereof, the FBI will exercise primary jurisdiction over all alleged violations of section 844 which are directed at foreign diplomatic facilities or at activities, such as transportation and tourist offices, operating under the aegis of a foreign government although not in a diplomatic status, over all alleged violations of subsections 844(d) through (i) which are perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals and all other violations of subsections 844(e) through (g) which are not directed at Treasury Department or Postal Service buildings or functions.

(c) Type of Investigation to be Conducted

(1) Offenses perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals - The FBI will immediately initiate a full investigation of all alleged violations of section 844 which appear at the outset to have been perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals as defined in advance by the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice. If ATF or the Postal Inspection Service has properly initiated investigations and information is subsequently developed indicating apparent involvement of terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals, responsibility shall be relinquished to the FBI unless a determination is made by the Department of Justice that a transfer of responsibilities will unduly impair further investigative efforts.

(2) Alleged offenses against Colleges and Universities - The FBI will immediately initiate a full investigation of any alleged violation of section 844 which involves the use or attempted use of explosive (as distinguished from incendiary) materials against the facilities of a college or university. Investigation of alleged violations involving use or attempted use of incendiary materials will be limited initially to the development of background information as prescribed in paragraph 6 below.

(3) Alleged offenses directed against foreign diplomatic facilities and related activities - The FBI will immediately initiate a full investigation of all alleged violations of section 844 which are directed at foreign diplomatic facilities and related activities as described in paragraph 2(b) above.

(4) All other alleged violations of subsection 844(f) -- offenses involving use of explosives against United States property or federally financed organizations, and (g) - offenses involving possession of explosives in buildings owned, leased, used, etc., by the United States - The FBI will immediately initiate a full investigation of all violations of subsection 844(g) over which it has primary jurisdiction hereunder, and those violations of 844(f) which are directed at federal property (e.g., a military facility) or a federal function (e.g., a Selective Service or ROTC facility). In other violations of 844(f) the FBI will develop and disseminate background information as indicated in paragraph 6 below.

3. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division (ATF) Jurisdiction in General

(a) Violations ancillary to firearms laws violations or violation of section 842 - The Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division (ATF) of the Department of the Treasury will exercise investigative jurisdiction over violations of section 844 which are ancillary to its primary jurisdiction over the Federal firearms laws or over section 842 of Title XI.

(b) Violations of subsection 844(d) - interstate transportation of explosives with unlawful intent and subsection 844(i) - offenses against property used in or affecting commerce - Subject to paragraph 2b, above, the ATF will exercise primary investigative jurisdiction over violations of subsection 844(d) and (i) and will conduct a full investigation thereof unless notified by the Criminal Division that pursuant to paragraph 2(c)(1), above, the Department of Justice has requested FBI investigation in a particular matter.

(c) Violations directed at Treasury Department property or functions - The ATF shall have primary jurisdiction to investigate all violations of section 844 which are directed at Treasury Department property or functions and will conduct a full investigation of such violations.

4. Postal Inspection Service Jurisdiction

The Postal Inspection Service shall have primary jurisdiction to investigate all violations of section 844 which are directed at U.S. Postal Service property or functions.

5. Special Considerations

(a) Bomb Threats, false information (section 844(e)) -

The ATF and the Postal Inspection Service shall have jurisdiction over violations of section 844(e) against Treasury Department or Postal Service property or functions, respectively. The FBI shall have jurisdiction over all other violations of section 844(e). Upon receipt of information alleging or suggesting a violation of subsection 844(e), the investigative agency concerned will review available information to determine whether the identity of the offender is known or can be readily ascertained and, if not, whether the evidence suggests a pattern or plan of such offenses by a particular offender or against a particular victim. If such a pattern appears or if the offender is identified, all available information will be disseminated as indicated in paragraph 6 below.

(b) Use/carrying explosive in commission of a felony (section 844(h)) - Violations of 844(h) should be handled as an adjunct of the felony from which they arise and should be discussed with the appropriate United States Attorney or Division of the Department handling prosecution of the underlying felony offense. The agency having jurisdiction over the underlying felony will have investigative jurisdiction over the 844(h) violation (e.g., bank robbery is under FBI jurisdiction).

(c) Violations of 26 U.S.C. 5861 (destructive devices) -

In incidents involving alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. 844 (which may also involve a violation of 26 U.S.C. 5861), ATF shall not exercise its primary jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. 5861 involving destructive devices, but the incident shall be treated in accordance with the provisions of these guidelines. This is in no way a relinquishment by ATF of its investigative jurisdiction under Title II of the Gun Control Act of 1968.

6. Development of Background Information

Some incidents such as those directed against Federal property or functions (paragraph 2(b) above) require immediate full federal investigation. Others require a more circumspect approach and will result in full Federal investigation only after consideration of factors pertinent to the exercise of Federal jurisdiction. Accordingly, in those incidents which these guidelines do not prescribe immediate full investigation, the investigative agency having jurisdiction will develop background information which includes (a) facts bearing on motivation such as involvement of the suspected perpetrators in terrorist/revolutionary activities, organized crime, labor-management disputes, or racial-religious hate activities; (b) the applicability of state and local laws and likelihood of state or local investigative and prosecutive actions; and (c) any other available facts indicating whether or not the offense warrants Federal investigation and prosecution. Such background information will be submitted telephonically (202-739-2745) or by teletype (710-822-0008) to the General Crimes Section of the Criminal Division and to the appropriate United States Attorney. The Criminal Division will advise the investigative agency concerned whether the matter warrants submission to any other Division or Section of the Criminal Division, and when so warranted the Criminal Division will transmit the information to such other Division or Section.

7. Full Investigation

A full investigation will be initiated immediately in those instances wherein such investigation is specified herein. In other instances full investigation will be initiated only upon direction of the Department of Justice after consideration by the Division having cognizance over the matter of the background information developed under paragraph 6 above.

8. Reports

Copies of case reports prepared in matters investigated under these guidelines will be furnished directly to the Department of Justice and the appropriate United States Attorney. All investigative agencies

shall submit initial reports as soon as practicable to the Department of Justice and shall submit progress reports once each 30 days or as soon thereafter as possible. The Criminal Division of the Department of Justice will be informed as soon as possible in each instance wherein an investigative agency initiates an investigation under section 844. Such notification is of critical importance to the avoidance of duplication of investigative activities. Also each agency subscribing to these guidelines shall, upon instituting investigation regarding possible violations of section 844, immediately notify other subscribing agencies having a logical interest therein. Also, a sufficient level of follow-up liaison and dissemination shall be maintained to avoid duplication of investigative effort.

Additionally, each such agency will exchange information on a timely basis and in a manner which will not interfere with ongoing investigations relative to types, sources, movement, and storage of explosives which are the subject of its investigations. Information regarding significant developments in investigations being conducted under these guidelines and information of an intelligence nature developed incidental to investigations which is of logical interest to the Department of Justice shall be furnished promptly to the Criminal Division of that Department which will be responsible for any necessary further dissemination within that Department.

9. Review of Guidelines

These guidelines shall be reviewed on a continuing basis by the parties hereto to determine whether problems exist in their administration which should be alleviated or whether modification of any of the terms of the agreement are needed in the interests of better law enforcement.

10. Summary

<u>Section</u>	<u>Type Violation</u>	<u>Primary Jurisdiction</u>
842	Regulatory provision violations	ATF
844(d)	Interstate transportation (except by mail) of explosives with unlawful intent	ATF

<u>Section</u>	<u>Type Violation</u>	<u>Primary Jurisdiction</u>
844(e)	Bomb threats - false information - Treasury buildings or functions	ATF
	U.S. Postal Service buildings or functions	U.S. Postal Inspection Service
	Other	FBI
844(f)	Offenses against property of the United States or federally financed organizations --	
	Treasury buildings or functions	ATF
	U.S. Postal Service buildings	U.S. Postal Inspection Service
844(g)	Other (including colleges and universities)	FBI
	Possession of explosives in buildings owned, leased, used by the United States --	
	Treasury buildings or functions	ATF
844(h)	U.S. Postal Service buildings or functions	U.S. Postal Inspection Service
	Other	FBI
	Use/carrying explosives in commission of a felony	Agency having jurisdiction over underlying felony

<u>Section</u>	<u>Type Violation</u>	<u>Primary Jurisdiction</u>
844(i)	Offenses against property used in or affecting commerce	ATF
All Sections	All offenses perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals	FBI - Unless another agency has started investigation before receipt of information indicating terrorist/ revolutionary involvement. In this event see para- graph 2c(1) above.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND THE UNITED STATES
SECRET SERVICE CONCERNING PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

"AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND THE UNITED STATES
SECRET SERVICE CONCERNING PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

["I. Purpose of Agreement

"The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) originates, and receives from other sources, large numbers of reports on individuals and organizations. One purpose of this agreement is to define that portion of the information on file with, or received or originated by, the FBI, which the United States Secret Service (USSS) desires to receive in connection with its protective responsibilities.

"The USSS has statutory authority to protect, or to engage in certain activities to protect, the President and certain other persons. (Certain other persons, as used in this agreement, refers to those persons protected by the Secret Service under Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056.) The authority of the USSS to protect the President or certain other persons is construed to authorize it to investigate organizations or individuals and to interview individuals who might constitute a threat to the President or certain other persons. The FBI has statutory authority to investigate assault, killing or kidnaping and attempts or conspiracies to kill or kidnap the President and other designated individuals.

"The FBI will make available to the USSS information it may request or information which by its nature reveals a definite or possible threat to the safety of the President and certain other persons.

"A second purpose of this agreement is to insure the most effective protection for the President and certain other persons by establishing a clear division of responsibility between the FBI and the USSS. Such division will also avoid compromising investigations or sources and needless duplication of effort.

["II. General Responsibilities

"The USSS is charged by Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056, with the responsibility of protecting the person of the President of the United States, the members of his immediate family, the President-elect, the Vice President or other officer in the order of succession to the office of President, and the Vice President-elect; protecting the person of a former President and his wife during his lifetime and the person of a widow of a former President until her death or remarriage, and minor children of a former President until they reach 16 years of age, unless such protection is declined; protecting persons who are determined from time to time by the Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with the Advisory Committee, as being major Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates who should receive such protection (unless the candidate has declined such protection); protecting the person of a visiting head of a foreign state or foreign government and, at the direction of the President, other distinguished foreign visitors to the United States and official representatives of the United States performing special missions abroad (unless such persons decline protection).

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"The Executive Protective Service, under the control of the Director, USSS, is charged by Title 3, U. S. Code, Section 202, with protection of the Executive Mansion and grounds in the District of Columbia; any building in which Presidential offices are located; foreign diplomatic missions located in the metropolitan area of the District of Columbia; and foreign diplomatic missions located in such other areas in the United States, its territories and possessions, as the President, on a case-by-case basis, may direct.

"The FBI is charged under Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751, with investigative jurisdiction over the assault, killing or kidnaping, and attempts or conspiracies to assault, kill or kidnap the President of the United States and other designated individuals.

"The FBI has responsibility for Federal investigations of all violations of Title 18, U. S. Code, Sections 112, 970, 1116-1117 and 1201, relating to the 'Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests in the United States.'

"The FBI has investigative jurisdiction over violations of a wide range of the criminal statutes of the United States including primary jurisdiction over matters affecting the internal security of the United States.

III. Exchange of Information and Coordination of Responsibilities

"The USSS undertakes to identify individuals or groups who because of their propensities or characteristics, may be dangerous to the President of the United States and certain other persons. To assist the USSS in identifying such individuals and groups the FBI agrees to furnish to the USSS, information (other than public source information or information originating with other U. S. agencies) from its files or which may come to its attention which by its nature reveals a danger or possible danger to the President or certain other persons, or which can be construed as falling within the categories of information desired by the USSS as set forth in Section IV of this agreement.

"The FBI will inform the USSS of the identity of individuals or organizations who come to the attention of the FBI as knowingly and willfully advocating, abetting, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the Government of the United States, or the Government of any state, territory, or possession, or political subdivision therein, by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any such government. The FBI will furnish the USSS with reports on such individuals or organizations as requested. During investigation by the FBI of such individuals or organizations, the FBI will be alert and promptly notify the USSS of any information indicating a possible plot against the person of the President and certain other persons.

"The USSS agrees that it will conduct no investigation of individuals or groups identified or suspected of being threats to the internal security of the United States without notifying the FBI. However, when time for

consultation is not available, and an indication of immediate danger exists, the USSS may take such action as is necessary with respect to carrying out its protective responsibilities. Any information obtained by the USSS during such action will be furnished to the FBI as expeditiously as possible.

"The FBI will not conduct investigation of individuals or groups solely for the purpose of establishing whether they constitute a threat to the safety of the President and certain other persons unless there is an indication of a violation of Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751, or other statute over which the FBI has jurisdiction.

"It will be the responsibility of the FBI to advise the USSS when investigation is being initiated under Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751 and thereafter to furnish the USSS with copies of the FBI investigative reports as they are prepared. It will be the responsibility of the USSS to furnish the FBI any information in its possession or which may come to its attention which reasonably indicates that a violation of Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751, has been or is being committed.

"The USSS also agrees to furnish the FBI any information in its possession or which may come to its attention indicating a violation of any other statutes over which the FBI has investigative jurisdiction.

"The FBI, under its responsibility for investigation of violations of Title 18, U. S. Code, Sections 112, 970, 1116-1117, 1201 and 1751 will take cognizance of the protective responsibilities of the Treasury Department under Title 3, U. S. Code, Section 202 and Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056 and thus does not limit or interfere with the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury in the discharge of his statutory protective responsibilities. This is not to be construed as vesting concurrent investigative jurisdiction with the Treasury Department with respect to investigations of individuals or organizations engaged in activities affecting the national security including terrorism, treason, sabotage, espionage, counter-espionage, rebellion or insurrection, sedition, seditious conspiracy, neutrality matters, Foreign Agents Registration Act, or any other Statute or Executive Order relating to national security. Any investigations of such groups or individuals for any reasons other than in connection with protective responsibilities must be closely coordinated with and have the concurrence of the FBI in order to minimize interference with national security responsibilities of the FBI.

"IV. Information to be Furnished to the United States Secret Service by the Federal Bureau of Investigation

"A. When an individual or group is referred by the FBI to the USSS, the following information will be furnished to the extent available:

"Individual - Identification data including name or names, addresses, photograph (or statement as to availability of such), physical description, date and place of birth, employment, and marital status.

"Organization - Name or names, address or addresses, officers, size, purpose or goals of organization, source of financial support, background data and such other relevant information as may be available.

"Reason for Referral - Statement of the class or classes of information described in Section IV B under which the individual or organization belongs.

"Information in FBI Files - A summary, as appropriate, of pertinent portions of any FBI file on an individual or organization referred.

"FBI Identification Records - The USSS will make specific requests in each instance where a check of the FBI identification records is desired.

"B. Types of information to be referred:

- "1. Information concerning attempts, threats, or conspiracies to injure, kill, or kidnap persons protected by the USSS or other U. S. or foreign officials in the U. S. or abroad.
- "2. Information concerning attempts or threats to redress a grievance against any public official by other than legal means, or attempts personally to contact such officials for that purpose.
- "3. Information concerning threatening, irrational, or abusive written or oral statements about U. S. Government or foreign officials.
- "4. Information concerning civil disturbances, anti-U. S. demonstrations or incidents or demonstrations against foreign diplomatic establishments.
- "5. Information concerning illegal bombings or bomb-making; concealment of caches of firearms, explosives, or other implements of war; or other terrorist activity.
- "6. Information concerning persons who defect or indicate a desire to defect from the United States and who demonstrate one or more of the following characteristics:
 - a. Irrational or suicidal behavior or other emotional instability.
 - b. Strong or violent anti-U. S. sentiment.
 - c. A propensity toward violence.

"7. Information concerning persons who may be considered potentially dangerous to individuals protected by the USSS because of their background or activities, including evidence of emotional instability or participation in groups engaging in activities inimical to the United States.

"V. Provision of Federal Bureau of Investigation Personnel to Protect the President and Other Protected Persons

"The USSS may, in accordance with Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056 request FBI Agents be detailed to the USSS in order to augment the capacity of the USSS to perform its protective duties. Such requests should be addressed to the Director of the FBI.

"FBI Agents detailed to the USSS are under the direction and exclusive operational control of the Director of the USSS for the period of their assignment. The FBI Agents so detailed may perform an armed or other protective function.

"VI. Implementation of Agreement

"In order to erect the best possible security of the President and certain other persons and places whose protection is the responsibility of the USSS, the FBI and the USSS will construe the terms of this agreement liberally and will take such steps as are necessary to insure the proper exchange and coordination of information.

"The agreement shall be reviewed annually by representatives of the FBI and the USSS, or at such other times as the FBI or the USSS may request, to insure that the agreement is both practical and productive. Revisions may be made on the authority of the Director of the FBI and the Director of the USSS.

"This agreement supersedes all prior agreements between the FBI and the USSS.

July 16, 1973
Date

BY /s/ Clarence M. Kelley
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

July 30, 1973
Date

BY /s/ James J. Rowley
Director
United States Secret Service"

#FDR/6
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April 9, 1975

REC-106

1.2-116393-64 BY LIAISON

Mrs. Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C.

1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Flemister
1-Mr. Rachner

Dear Mrs. Davis:

In connection with a request of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, it is requested that the following documents, which were originated or received by representatives of the National Security Council, be cleared for transmittal to the Senate Select Committee:

Memorandum dated November 6, 1950, from J. Patrick Coyne, National Security Council Representative on Internal Security, to Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and Mr. Raymond P. Whearty, Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

DELIVERED BY LIAISON Letter dated November 8, 1950, from ON 4/17/15 Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, to Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, National Security Council, which encloses a report captioned "Report by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference to the National Security Council Regarding the Recent Outbreak of Violence by Puerto Rican Nationalists"

Letter dated July 25, 1961, from Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference,

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Data Sys. _____
NW 53418 DocId:32989628

TELETYPE UNIT
PAGE 232

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO.

Mrs. Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary
National Security Council

to Honorable McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, which encloses a memorandum concerning United States internal security programs under the control of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee

Inasmuch as the Senate Select Committee requested the above documents by close of business April 7, 1975, your prompt attention to this matter would be appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

NOTE:

In view of the urgency of the Senate Select Committee request, the above documents were hand carried to the NSC Staff on 4/4/75, by Liaison Agent B. C. Rachner. This letter constitutes a formal request which as in the past has been requested by the National Security Council Staff.

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April 7, 1975

Mr. Wannall

S-15/14 - '75

The statement in the attached of the ~~Third Agency~~ rule is accurate and does not present legal problems.

As an observation paragraph number 7 of the document titled "Handling of Third Agency Matters in Response to Congressional Select Committee" dated March 28, 1975, (attached) appears to be subject to various interpretations. This paragraph and in particular the second sentence of the paragraph appears to allow the agency receiving the Committee's request to respond in instances where a Third Agency is indirectly involved and the material is sensitive without first contacting the Third Agency. Any notification of the Third Agency in this instance of the furnishing of such information to the Committee would be after the fact. The term indirectly is not defined. Additionally, this paragraph allows the Agency receiving the Committee's request to respond in instances where a Third Agency is directly involved and the material is nonsensitive without checking with the Third Agency involved. It would appear the language in paragraph number 7 should be tightened up and the appropriate terms defined.

REC-106

62-116375-64

Legal Counsel Division

6 APR 15 1975

ENCLOSURE

Enclosure

4/9/75

ABOVE WAS BROUGHT TO
THE ATT'D OF JOHN WARNER,
GENERAL COUNSEL, CIA, WHO
ADVISED THAT HE AGREED WITH
BELL'S OBSERVATIONS AND WOULD ADDRESS THIS PROBLEM
IN NEW PAPER BEING PREPARED.

PPD:dkg (4)

RFB

62-116395

J-LFS

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

28 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Group

SUBJECT: Handling of Third Agency |Matters in Response
to Congressional Select Committees

#MOR16
ALL THE INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-8-01 BY SP-2ALM 131G

1. As you are aware, Senator Church already has submitted to me a long list of materials which he requests be provided to his Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. He has submitted other lists to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the White House. It is expected that other elements of the Intelligence Community will be hearing from Senator Church.

2. The scope of the investigation necessarily is going to involve Third Agency |relationships to a considerable degree.

3. In the implementation of Executive Order 11652, "Classification and Declassification of National Security Information and Material," the President directed the following:

"D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any other Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating department."

4. As regards Section 102 of the 1947 Act, the following quotes 102 (e) in full:

"(3) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security,

ENCLOSURE

63-1163 - 64

shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation and dissemination: Provided, however, that upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation and dissemination as may be essential to the national security."

* 5. If I am requested to provide certain materials and investigation indicates that the material asked for involves a document which originated within an organization other than the Intelligence Community Staff or the Central Intelligence Agency, the requestor will be asked to redirect his inquiry to the office of origin.


6. It already is apparent, however, that the documentation being requested inevitably is going to include references to inter-relationships among various of the elements of the intelligence community. Clearing each and every such reference with every agency mentioned could manifestly be extremely consuming of time and manpower.

* 7. I propose the Ad Hoc Group agree on the following procedure. Where it appears that truly sensitive matters are involved, the material will be sanitized by the agency concerned and a check will be made with the appropriate Third Agency organizations before release. Where the reference concerns a Third Agency indirectly or is not considered sensitive and does not pose policy concerns, the agency concerned may forward the material to the requesting Select Committee without an item-by-item, mention-by-mention clearance with Third Agencies. However, in all cases notification that such material has been forwarded will be made to the central index and

1. Agency document, ^{initials} _{initials}
2. ^{initials} _{initials}
3. ^{initials} _{initials}

all agencies alerted through that mechanism. Agencies will designate on their submissions to the central index, the name and telephone number of the releasing party.

8. Ad hoc members should be prepared to discuss and come to some agreement on this matter at the next meeting.



John M. Clarke
AD/DCI/IC

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

28 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Group

SUBJECT: Handling of Third Agency Matters in Response
to Congressional Select Committees

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/HJG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-64

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
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1. Agency, discretion, indirect
2. U-U
3. discretionary order
U-U

all agencies alerted through that mechanism. Agencies will designate on their submissions to the central index, the name and telephone number of the releasing party.

8. Ad hoc members should be prepared to discuss and come to some agreement on this matter at the next meeting.



John M. Clarke
AD/DCI/IC

The Third Agency Rule

1. As early as November 1953, the third agency rule was included in Executive Order 10501, which has now been revoked. Section 7(c) prohibited the dissemination of "classified defense information originating in another Department or agency" to an agency "outside the receiving Department or agency without the consent of the originating Department or agency". The only exception to this rule is that dissemination may be made under the authority of Section 102 of the National Security Act. This section authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using, where appropriate, existing agencies and facilities".

2. Historically, the responsibility of the DCI to disseminate intelligence has referred to "finished intelligence". This product is the end result of contributions from members of the Intelligence Community. Therefore, in this situation the finished product is a homogenous product and therefore the approval for further dissemination beyond the receiving agency must come from the Central Intelligence Agency.

3. Executive Order 10501 was superseded by Executive Order 11652 which became effective 1 June 1972. This Executive order did not specifically cover the third agency rule. However, it does provide the following controls: Sec. 9. Special Departmental Arrangements. The originating Department or other appropriate authority may impose, in conformity with the provisions of this order, special requirements with respect to access, distribution and protection of classified information and material, including those which presently relate to communications intelligence, intelligence sources and methods and cryptography.

4. In anticipation of the implementation of Executive Order 11652, a directive was issued on May 17, 1972 entitled "National Security Council Directive Governing the Classification, Downgrading, Declassification and Safeguarding of National Security Information". This directive does not contain the term "third agency rule" but does have four subsections which relate to procedures which are similar to what historically had been called the third agency rule. These sections are:

A. (2) Determination of Need-to-Know. In addition to a security clearance, a person must have a need for access to the particular classified information or material sought in connection with the performance of his official duties or

ENCLOSURE

62-116375-64

[redacted] contractual obligations. The determination of that need shall be made by officials having responsibility for the classified information or material.

D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any other Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating Department.

E. Dissemination of Sensitive Intelligence Information. Information or material bearing the notation "WARNING NOTICE -- SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED" shall not be disseminated in any manner outside authorized channels without the permission of the originating Department and an assessment by the senior intelligence official in the disseminating Department as to the potential risk to the national security and to the intelligence sources and methods involved.

F. Restraint on Special Access Requirements. The establishment of special rules limiting access to, distribution and protection of classified information and material under Section 9 of the Order requires the specific prior approval of the head of a Department or his designee.

5. Examples of the application of the Third Agency Rule are:

- (a) In a national security estimate, contributions are received from all members of the Intelligence Community and then disseminated to members of the community under the authority of the DCI;
- (b) A CIA intelligence report disseminated to the State Department may not be sent by the State Department to the Department of Commerce without the permission of the CIA;
- (c) Information which the CIA furnishes the President's Commission may not be disseminated to other agencies or to the Congress without the concurrences of CIA. Thus, a request from the Congress to the Commission for CIA information should be referred to CIA for action so that the necessary protection of the information can be insured.

(4) If the Navy Department discusses one of its operations with CIA, CIA may not include information about that operation in papers it disseminates to other agencies unless it has received the permission of the Navy Department. The distinction here is that a Navy operation would not be considered part of the finished intelligence mechanism and therefore would not fall within the statutory authority of CIA to disseminate intelligence.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Cleveland

DATE: 4-3-75

FROM : G. R. Steel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (HSC)

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
Compt. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
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Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

By agreement, the FBI is currently conducting full field investigations regarding SSC staff personnel. These have extremely short (2 week) deadlines which are identical to those afforded Presidential appointments and are, therefore, given preferential treatment in opening, assigning, and following field progress. The Special Inquiry Unit of the Employees Security and Special Inquiry Section, which has about twice its normal case load, is handling these requests. Senator Church, Chairman, SSC, originally estimated that between 35 and 40 staff members would be submitted for investigation. As of today, 4-3-75, we have received requests for 65 such investigations from the SSC and the end does not appear to be in sight. They are received in bunches as many as 6 at a time, which is not the even flow expected and presents an additional burden.

In addition it is expected that similar requests will be forthcoming in the near future from the HSC since we have a similar agreement with it. Congressman Nedzi, Chairman of the HSC, has estimated "probably no more than about 25 staff members will be hired." It remains to be seen if this estimate also falls short of actual receipts.

Since there is no charge for these full field investigations they will have to be considered in the budget. It is noted the current charge for a full field investigation, where applicable, is \$2028.

EX 104

MCT

pc REG 62-116395-63

ACTION: For information. Since it appears the nucleus of the Committee has been formed, it is suggested Senator Church be contacted and queried regarding a more realistic (30 day) deadline on the remaining investigations concerning future staff members and their replacements.

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Walsh

1 - Mr. Mintz - (Legal Analysis Office)
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Steel

GRS:dc
-6-

Discussed with Wm. M. L. 4-4-75. He agreed to 30-day deadline on CPS future investigations except areas which he will indicate still need in 2 weeks. RGS

XEROX

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Hmk/cg

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18-01 BY SP2 ALM/HMS

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 3/3/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75.

- 1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
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Training _____
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Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

This memorandum recommends that the attached draft of a paper prepared by CIA entitled, "Ambiguities and the Law," be reviewed by the Legal Counsel Division for comment and that a member of the Division be named to represent the FBI in future meetings with legal representatives from other U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB) agencies and departments. The purpose of such a group is to develop recommendations for changes in existing laws or the proposal of new legislation which Mr. Colby as the Director of Central Intelligence can offer to the Senate Select Committee for their consideration.

At a meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community 2/27/75, a draft paper entitled, "Ambiguities and the Law," was distributed to all members. This paper was drafted by Mr. Marvin Smith of CIA. It is considered a starting point for the Intelligence Community to identify areas in existing statutes that should be changed, as well as to recommend new legislation deemed necessary to clarify for the Congress and the American people the authorities, the limitations and missions of various member agencies or departments of the Intelligence Community.

In furnishing copies of this paper to members, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, Mr. John Clarke, acknowledged the paper presents a starting point and in no way should be considered a final draft. He suggested that Legal Counsel representatives of each agency or department of USIB review the document and submit their comments directly to Mr. Marvin Smith, on Agency code 143, extension 4055. Following the receipt of such comments from the legal offices of member agencies and departments, it was proposed that a meeting would be called in an effort to begin drafting a paper representative of the Intelligence Community which would reflect recommended changes in existing statutes or proposals for new legislation.

Enclosure
62-116395

WOC:dln/ebc

(5)

ENCLOSURE

REC-10 62-116395-62
SEE ADDENDUM, APP. 1, 11-1075
LEGAL COUNSEL
DIVISION, PAGE 3

CONTINUED OVER

3/21/1975

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

The Department of Justice is represented on the Ad Hoc Group by Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Deputy Attorney General, and there will be Departmental participation in this matter.

ACTION:

(1) That the attached CIA paper entitled, "Ambiguities and the Law," be reviewed by the Legal Counsel Division for comment in concert with representatives of the Intelligence Division.

(2) That the Legal Counsel Division designate a representative to participate in the drafting of a paper to be furnished by Mr. Colby to the Senate Select Committee for their consideration.

Tul

info

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Wannall dtd 3/3/75
Re: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

ADDENDUM, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION, 3/5/75, JH:msl

In view of the direct impact on operations of the Intelligence Division, we feel that representatives of that Division should participate in and coordinate these matters. Legal Counsel will review attached CIA paper and will furnish representative to assist the Intelligence Division regarding proposals and legislative language.

jcf

jma


jw

jmw

AMBIGUITIES AND THE LAW

CIA, NSA, DIA, FBI and, to some extent, several other Federal Agencies, collect information and produce intelligence, but of different kinds and for different purposes. This is recognized in practice but is not as clearly established in the law. Given some lack of clarity in the law and some uncertainty regarding limits placed on intelligence activities, misunderstanding and fear of abuse of power easily thrives. In reality, however, in the implementation of mission and charters and in direction and control, there are not as many unresolved ambiguities as the uninformed may suppose.

The experience following the National Security Act of 1947 is such that it is now possible to eliminate some of the vagueness of the language of the Act. The certainty and public confidence that should result from clarifications in the law should far outweigh any disadvantages. A number of possible amendments or additions to current laws have already been mentioned, and proposed legislation has already been submitted for some. These ideas and others are suggested, below.



ENCLOSURE

62-116395-162

- 1) Clarify CIA's mission and charter by amending the National Security Act of 1947 to reflect:
 - that included in the proper functions of the Agency are (a) collection of foreign intelligence information; (b) conduct of activities to carry out CIA's counter-intelligence responsibilities overseas; and (c) conduct of covert action operations overseas when authorized by the President;
 - that CIA's responsibility to produce intelligence relates only to foreign intelligence;
 - that it is a duty of the Agency to develop advanced technical equipment to improve the collection and processing of foreign intelligence information; and

--that the conduct of any counterintelligence operation or other activity overseas directed specifically at U.S. citizens (other than CIA employees) will be undertaken in coordination with the FBI or as requested by the FBI or by other USG agencies in coordination with the FBI.

2) Establish the authority for those agencies engaged in the collection and production of foreign intelligence to carry on certain specified activities within the United States, such as:

--protection of classified information and their own installations against penetration and compromise;

--investigation of employees, applicants, and those persons who could assist the U.S. foreign intelligence effort;

--investigation of employees and other individuals to be granted access to sensitive information;

--collection of foreign intelligence information from foreign nationals and from cooperating U.S. citizens;

--establishment of mechanisms in support of foreign intelligence activities; and

--cooperation with the FBI in investigations relating to the unauthorized disclosure of foreign intelligence.

3) Remove uncertainty regarding responsibility for internal security matters by modifying appropriate laws to establish clearly:

--that the collection of counterintelligence information in the United States and the collection of information related to internal security are functions of the FBI;

--that the responsibility for the production of intelligence related to internal security rests with the FBI; and

--that with due regard to assessed reliability of the information and responsibilities for protecting sources and methods, those agencies engaged in foreign intelligence activities will make available to the FBI and other Federal agencies, as appropriate, the security and counterintelligence information relating to foreign nationals in the United States and to U.S. citizens which is derived as a by-product of foreign intelligence activities.

- 4) Recognize international terrorism and international illegal drug activities as threats to U.S. national security and proper targets for U.S. foreign intelligence efforts, as well as for internal security operations.

- 5) Provide protection against the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods by:
 - providing for the protection of intelligence sources and methods on a statutory basis independent of Executive Order 11652;
 - clarifying that the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods related to foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence;
 - assigning to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation the duty of protecting intelligence sources and methods related to internal security and to counterintelligence within the United States;
 - imposing specific burdens, upon officers and employees of all branches of the government and others granted official access, not to disclose such information without authorization,

and providing criminal sanctions for unauthorized disclosures;

--establishing effective injunctive recourse, through the Attorney General, for protection of all intelligence sources and methods;

--providing for in camera judicial review of material revealing intelligence sources and methods when relevant and necessary to criminal and civil proceedings;

--delineating authorities and responsibilities for investigating suspected or discovered unauthorized disclosures by (a) U.S. citizens overseas and (b) all persons within the United States.

- 6) Delineate areas of interagency assistance that facilitate performance of authorized missions, promote economy of resources, and as a matter of policy are desirable, for example:

--cooperation in research and development
of technical collection and information pro-
cessing equipment, methods and techniques;

--loan or supply of equipment, methods and
techniques;

--provision of training in special skills and
techniques;

--passage of information derived as a by-
product of foreign intelligence activities to
those agencies responsible for the matters
involved.

A few changes in the procedures for reviewing intelligence
activities might add considerable understanding and confidence. Of
paramount importance is a form of congressional oversight that permits
the provision to Congress of the necessary information in a timely,
efficient and controlled manner. It is recognized that a number of
Committees in both the Senate and House must be informed of sub-
stantive intelligence, operational matters and fiscal details in varying
degrees. Just as in the executive branch, the test of access should be

"need-to-know." To apply this test and to control and protect sensitive information provided to Congress, a focal point within Congress would be extremely helpful. Whether a joint committee or not, such a focal point would also be valuable in facilitating changes in laws affecting intelligence activities. Congress might find that a more uniform approach to budget presentation and review would provide better insight and understanding.

The foregoing suggestions are by no means definitive. They do, however, present areas that in the experience of the intelligence community deserve careful attention.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Legal Counsel Division

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE MATERIAL;
AUTORIZATION TO RELEASE EXHIBITS IN
"INTELLIGENCE DIVISION POSITION PAPER
ON JURISDICTION" DATED 2/13/75

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
DATE: 4/7/75
1 - Mr. A. L. Lacey, Jr.

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
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Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that on 4/7/75, Mr. James Wilderotter, Executive Office Building, Washington, personally reviewed and approved each of the following exhibits from the captioned paper for release to the Select Committee:

- 1) Exhibit A - Historical Highlights.
- 2) Exhibit B - Confidential Memoranda: John Edgar Hoover, 8/24/36; 8/25/36; and, 9/10/36.
- 3) Exhibit C - Presidential Directives: 6/26/39; 9/6/39; 1/8/43; 7/24/50; 12/15/53; and, 10/30/47.
- 4) Exhibit D - The Delimitations Agreement of 2/23/49, as amended.
- 5) Exhibit E - National Security Council Charters of the IIC and the ICIS.
- 6) Exhibit F - National Security Action Memorandum 161, 6/9/62.
- 7) Exhibit G - Department of Justice Memorandum dated 3/5/64, setting forth new Charter for the IIC under supervision of the Attorney General.
- 8) Exhibit H - Preamble and Section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947.
- 9) Exhibit I - Excerpt from former FBI Director Hoover's briefing of the National Security Council on 11/6/58.

5 APR 10 1975

ALL:vb

(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Legal Counsel Division

Re: U. S. Senate Select Committee Material; Authorization to Release Exhibits
in "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction" dated 2/13/75

- 10) Exhibit N - Background information concerning the emergency detention provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950.
- 11) Exhibit O - Memorandum by former FBI Director Hoover, dated 5/11/61, concerning Cuban individuals and groups.
- 12) Exhibit Q - Memorandum of former Attorney General Ramsey Clark dated 9/14/67, concerning urban riot activities.
- 13) Exhibit R - Departmental Memorandum dated 2/18/69, concerning instructions on campus disorders.
- 14) Exhibit S - Excerpts from testimony of former Director Hoover.
- 15) Section of paper on "Statutes."

It was explained to Mr. Wilderotter that the extracted exhibits were letters and reports to and from The White House and/or National Security Council with which there are "Third Agency Rule" problems. As soon as cleared, it was planned to forward these to the Committee. He requested to review these exhibits prior to forwarding.

ACTION:

Upon "Third Agency Rule" approval regarding other exhibits, have same reviewed by Mr. Wilderotter. INTD will insure exhibits are made available for Mr. Wilderotter's review.

AW *CF* *wrw*
WJP

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall *JW*

FROM : W. O. Cregar *WOB*

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. J. J. McDermott
(Attention: Mr. J. W. Awe
Room 5644, JEH)

DATE: 4/11/75

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
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Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

Project Senstudy 75, established within the Intelligence Division, for the purpose of developing a capability of implementing requests received from the Select Committees of the Congress. Bureau file 62-116395 has been opened for this Project.

Because of the unusual factors relating to this entire Project, such as the sensitive nature of much of the material involved, urgency for handling, necessity for having the file very readily available to the working staff at all times, and similar other reasons, it is essential that the file be maintained in the work area of the Project which, effective 4/14/75, will be in room 4063, JEH. The purpose of this memorandum, therefore, is to have Files and Communications Division take necessary steps to arrange for the maintenance of the file in the designated room rather than in the usual manner.

There has already been much publicity about the Select Committees and we anticipate much more. This involves many newspaper stories. It is, therefore, believed very desirable that a Sub A file to the main file be opened as the standardized repository for newspaper articles. As a first step, it will be necessary that a few articles already in the main file be extracted and placed in the new Sub A file in the usual chronological order.

The foregoing matters have been already discussed with Mr. J. W. Awe, Unit Chief, of the Files and Communications Division.

RECOMMENDATION:

6 APR 15 1975

This memorandum to be referred to the Files and Communications Division for appropriate action as above.

62-116395

SFP:jvl
(6)

APR 25 1975

84 APR 25 1975

Handled by
Special File Room
4/25/75

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall *WRC*

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt
1 - Mr. H. E. Helgeson

DATE: 4/9/75

- 1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. H. C. Flemister
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 4/8/01 BY SP2 AM/ATG

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
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Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

This memorandum provides for the record the temporary reassignment of Bureau Supervisors in the Intelligence Division.

Project Senstudy 75 has been established within the Intelligence Division, effective 4/4/75. Its purpose is to develop a capability of implementing requests received from the Select Committees of the Congress in a comprehensive and timely fashion but yet allow the Bureau to continue to conduct its day-to-day business in as normal a manner as possible.

Pursuant to the establishment of Project Senstudy 75, certain Bureau Supervisors in the Intelligence Division have been relieved of substantive assignments. They are as follows:

Section Chief William O. Cregar, effective 4/4/75, has assumed the responsibilities of administering the Project.

Unit Chief Elmer W. Larson, effective the same date, will function as Cregar's Number One Man.

Liaison Supervisor Leon M. Schwartz has been relieved of his regular liaison duties and will function as the Liaison Officer in contact with the intelligence community for Project Senstudy 75.

REC-62-116375-59
APR 10 1975

Unit Chief Seymour F. Phillips, effective 4/8/75, was assigned to the Project and will function as the Review Coordinator.

- 1 - Personnel file of W. O. Cregar
1 - Personnel file of E. W. Larson
1 - Personnel file of L. F. Schwartz
1 - Personnel file of S. F. Phillips

WOC:lmh l mh

(12)

54 APR 16 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75

At this time the length of the temporary assignment is indefinite. Upon the termination of Project Senstudy 75, the Bureau Supervisors mentioned above will revert back to their substantive assignments and an appropriate memorandum for the record will be prepared.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

when

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

DATE: 3-12-75

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Admin. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

In attached W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall memorandum of 3-6-75, captioned as above, it is recommended that the Legal Counsel Division coordinate and assign responsibilities to appropriate Divisions for the collection and preparation of certain materials we can anticipate the Senate Select Committee (SSC) will soon request from the FBI.

In this regard, it is suggested that all Divisions receiving requests for information in connection with testimony before this Committee respond in the same commendable and expeditious manner that they responded in connection with the preparation of the Director's Brief on his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights. The format of this information should generally be as follows:

1 - Heading in all caps, centered, brief description of contents;

2 - White, watermarked bond paper, 8 x 10 1/2";

3 - At least a 2" left margin. This is essential since material will be inserted into a folder;

4 - Double spaced;

5 - Do not number pages;

6 - Each Division will be responsible for the accuracy and completeness of the information furnished in final form. This will also include up-dating any information previously furnished;

7 - Use "Mag" card typewriter (courier ball); identifying caption on the card folder should be adequate to readily identify it with the corresponding paper. In addition to the caption, card folder should also have the name of the originating Division.

8 - Furnish all "Mag" cards to the Legislative Matters Section, Legal Counsel Division, along with the write-up. Enc.

1 - Mr. Callahan - Enc.

1 - Mr. Adams - Enc.

1 - Mr. Jenkins - Enc.

1 - Each Assistant Director - Enc.

56 APR 18 1975 /1
JCF Law

CONTINUED - OVER

Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams memo
Re: Senstudy 75

All mail should be routed through and coordinated with the Legislative Matters Section, Legal Counsel Division, and all contacts with the Senate and House committees will be handled by representatives of the Legal Analysis Office, Legislative Matters Section, Legal Counsel Division.

Each Division should advise the Legislative Matters Section the identity of individual who will be the contact and coordinator of that Division's responsibilities along with his phone extension.

The Intelligence Division will be responsible for representing the Bureau on the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group and the identity of such individual should be made known to the Legislative Matters Section. In addition, the Intelligence Division should accumulate the data identified in paragraphs 1 and 2, as they pertain to the FBI, in Mr. John M. Clarke's memorandum to all members of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group and submit this in the form suggested above.

The Administrative Division is requested to obtain the information set forth in paragraph 3 of Mr. Clarke's memorandum, also furnishing this data in narrative form as explained above.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

JCF

gw

wn

John

gma

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall *W.R.W.*

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams

DATE: 3/6/75

1 - Each Assistant Director

1 - Mr. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Secy. _____

This memorandum recommends that the Legal Counsel Division coordinate and assign responsibilities to appropriate Divisions for the collection and preparation of certain materials we anticipate the Senate Select Committee (SSC) will soon request from the FBI.

Memorandum W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall, dated 3/5/75, reported the results of a meeting between Senator Church and Mr. Colby wherein Senator Church advised he anticipated asking all agencies and departments of the Intelligence Community for (1) Organizational charts broken down to a branch level going back to 1947, (2) Copies of all budgets since 1947 and (3) Documents reflecting all cash flows since 1947.

Attached is a copy of a short letter from Mr. John Clarke, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community to Mr. William G. Miller, Staff Director, SSC. Also attached is a copy of a memorandum from Mr. Clarke to all members of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community. This memorandum sets out in more detail what information the SSC will be seeking from all agencies making up the Intelligence Community. It should be noted that on page two of Mr. Clarke's memorandum he notes a formal request from Senator Church to all agencies can be expected.

The Intelligence Division believes considerable time and effort will be required from several Divisions to pull this information together. It is believed we should begin now to assemble the data in anticipation of a request.

EX 104 **ENCLOSURE** **REC-23 62-16385-58**
ACTION: If you agree, the Legal Counsel Division will coordinate this matter and assign responsibilities to appropriate Division for the collection and preparation of the material we anticipate the SSC will request from the FBI.

Enclosures

TUL
LEGAL COUNSEL TO
MR. ADAMS MARCH
3/5/75 JCF/LAW

WOC:ebc

(16) *bc*

APR 10 1975

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

4 March 1975

Mr. William G. Miller

Staff Director

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities

United States Senate


Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Miller:

Pursuant to your request, I have advised all members of the Ad Hoc Group of the United States Intelligence Board and Mr. Thomas K. Latimer, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, of Senator Church's request to provide legal authority and organization charts of USIB entities from their inception. I also have alerted them to the Committee's desire for comprehensive historical data on personnel, budgets, and cash flow for the same periods. They will expect to hear more directly from Senator Church on these matters.

By early next week, we will begin providing you the CIA data in response to the Chairman's request. The first set of annexes developed under the auspices of the USIB Ad Hoc Group is ready and I am having five copies of each run off for your use. Please advise if more copies are desired.

Sincerely,


John M. Clarke

Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachment:

Memo to Ad Hoc Group

62-116395-58
ENCLOSURE

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

#MDR/6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP/SP/AM/JTG

4 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Principals of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review

SUBJECT: Information Requested by Senate Select Committee Staff Director

1. Senator Church has asked the Director to provide to the Senate Select Committee copies of CIA legal authorities and organization charts to branch levels, 1947-1975. He also indicated he wants similar authorities and charts for all USIB entities from their inceptions. In the case of CIA this will be from 1947; NSA from 1952; DIA from 1961; etc.

2. The Committee is seeking a comprehensive historical base line for each U.S. intelligence organization--its structure and the people involved over time. Therefore, Senator Church has asked that the names of all incumbents who have held supervisory responsibilities over the period, down through the branch level, also be provided. The Staff Director has been made aware of the difficulties involved in tracing personnel assignments too far back but asks that every effort be made to meet the request. CIA is proceeding accordingly.


3. Senator Church has also asked for budget and cash flow data on all U. S. intelligence organizations from their inceptions. The CIA finds that the source and uses tables, employed in annual financial reports, provides the historical profile desired. Supplemental data on specific programs can follow if requested. Senator Church wants data which will show specific patterns of expenditures

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-58

as distinct from budgets and appropriations. A formal request from the Chairman to all agencies on this matter can be expected.

4. The Senate Select Committee will be ready to receive classified material this week. It is suggested that Ad Hoc Group members begin assembling the legal, organizational, personnel, and budgetary data for early submission. I have provided Mr. Miller, Staff Director, with a list of Ad Hoc Principals, phone numbers, titles, etc. He understands that the central point for DOD is Mr. Thomas K. Latimer and for Treasury, Mr. Edward C. Schmults, Assistant Secretary for Enforcement.



John M. Clarke

Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1-Mr. Callahan
1-Mr. Adams
1-Mr. Jenkins

DATE: 3/21/75
1-Each Assistant Director
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Farrington
1-Mr. Fulton

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Invest. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

By memorandum Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams dated 3/12/75, the Legal Counsel Division indicated that its Legislative Matters Section would coordinate and assign responsibilities within the Bureau for the collection and preparation of material for the Senate Select Committee.

This memorandum instructed Intelligence Division to accumulate data which was identified in a memorandum from Mr. John M. Clarke from the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group of the Intelligence Committee. Clarke's memorandum was attached to W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall memorandum dated 3/6/75.

The identified data to be collected outlined in Clarke's memorandum was proposed-type data that the Senate Select Committee has indicated an interest in.

In view of 3/19/75 letter subsequently received from Senator Frank Church (Democrat, Idaho), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee, to the Attorney General outlining a request for specific FBI documents they are interested in receiving, the Intelligence Division has begun accumulating this specific data. In view of this request for specific data, the Intelligence Division will not accumulate the data outlined in the Clarke memorandum since it was only in the nature of proposed data and differs from the specific data to be collected which is extensive in nature.

ACTION:

EX 104

APR 10 1975

For information.

ABF:enm
(19)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/mgs

70 APR 15 1975

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Groover *[Signature]*

DATE: 4/8/75

FROM : J. J. Clynick *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

In order to respond to item III-C of Senator Church's letter dated 3/19/75, it was necessary to survey all field offices. This was done, the response summarized and forwarded to Legal Counsel Division by memo dated 4/3.

Attached hereto are the file copies of the teletypes from the field used to compile our response. It is believed these should be filed as one item as an EBF. *[Handwritten mark]*

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached be filed as an EBF.

Enclosure

JJC:jmb

ENCLOSURE

REC-11

ST-112

APR 10 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/01 BY SP-3 ALM 1786

3 - JC

70 APR 16 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM-1966
IS UNCLASSIFIED

C2-116395-50

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR004 AL CODE

4:09 PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 CHP

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, ALBANY
ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. _____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

Budget & Accts;
6/18/75 JTG

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS SET FORTH IN REFERENCED
BUREAU TELETYPE, THE FOLLOWING IS ALBANY DIVISION'S RESPONSE:

1 FIELD SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS
AND SPENDS 40 PERCENT OF SUPERVISORY TIME. 23 AGENTS ASSIGNED
ON PART-TIME BASIS TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND THE PERCENTAGE
OF TIME SPENT IS AS FOLLOWS:

8 AGENTS AT 5 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 10 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT
15 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 20 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 30 PERCENT; 1
AGENT AT 35 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 45 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 50 PERCENT;
1 AGENT AT 60 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 75 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT
85 PERCENT.

1 FIELD SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
MATTERS AND SPENDS 40 PERCENT OF SUPERVISORY TIME. 23 AGENTS
ASSIGNED ON A PART-TIME BASIS TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND
THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY THESE AGENTS ON

3/1

PAGE 2

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IS AS FOLLOWS:

6 AGENTS AT 5 PERCENT; 5 AGENTS AT 10 PERCENT;
4 AGENTS AT 15 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 30 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS
AT 35 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 45 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 60 PERCENT;
1 AGENT AT 85 PERCENT.

END.

NR001 AQ CODE

10:55AM URGENT 3-36-75 PD

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

TO: DIRECTOR
FROM: ALBUQUERQUE

MAR 26 1975

Tele
TELETYPE

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL. MARCH 24, 1975.

ALBUQUERQUE HAS ONE SUPERVISOR WHO SPENDS
25 PER CENT OF HIS TIME IN THE SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL
SECURITY MATTERS AND THREE AGENTS WHO WORK THESE MATTERS
ON A PART-TIME BASIS WITH 20 PER CENT, 40 PER CENT AND 40
PER CENT OF THEIR TIME DEVOTED TO THESE MATTERS.

ONE OF THE ABOVE AGENTS SPENDS TEN PER CENT OF
HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

THERE ARE 15 RESIDENT AGENTS EACH OF WHO WORK APPROXIMATELY FIVE PERSENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.

FND

JTG FBIHQ CLR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALN/AS

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

Doc
TELETYPE
R-10028

NR006 AX CODE

6:20PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 VAN

TO: BUREAU (ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTIONS)
FROM: ALEXANDRIA (80-131)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

ALEXANDRIA, HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS.
APPROXIMATELY SIXTY PERCENT OF HIS TIME IS SPENT ON IS MATTERS AND FIVE PERCENT ON CI MATTERS.

ALEXANDRIA AGENTS PERFORMING IS WORK AND PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT IS AS FOLLOWS:

3 SPECIAL AGENTS	NINETY PERCENT
2 SPECIAL AGENTS	SIXTY-FIVE PERCENT
4 SPECIAL AGENTS	FIFTEEN PERCENT
5 SPECIAL AGENTS	TEN PERCENT

ALEXANDRIA HAS THREE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO CI WORK AS FOLLOWS:

1 SPECIAL AGENT	TEN PERCENT
2 SPECIAL AGENTS	FIVE PERCENT

END.

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Int'l.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/06 BY SP/FAW/M/116

3/CR

4

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR001 AN CODE

MAR 25 1975

5:45 PM 3-25-75 NITEL MAB

Dan
TELETYPE

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)
FROM: SAC, ANCHORAGE

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Int. Inv.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL OFFICES DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

ANCHORAGE INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS ARE SUPERVISED BY THE SAC, WHO SPENDS 15 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON THE FORMER AND 5 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON THE LATTER CATEGORY.

THERE ARE 3 AGENTS WORKING INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. THEY SPEND 40 PERCENT, 5 PERCENT, AND 2 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME, RESPECTIVELY, ON THIS CATEGORY. ONE OF THE 3 AGENTS SPENDS 10 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

TJT FBI WASH DC HOLD

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2 22W/ZT/KB/1216

3/PJZ

5

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR008 AT CODED

5:44 PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 LAP

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: ATLANTA (100-0)

MAR 26 1975

Dan
TELETYPE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING IS BREAKDOWN OF ATLANTA AGENT PERSONNEL PRESENTLY WORKING ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS ALSO INCLUDING IN THIS AREA ALL OF CLASSIFICATIONS GENERALLY REGARDED AS SECURITY WORK AND EXTREMIST WORK, AS WELL AS THOSE RELATING TO EXPLOSIVES AND INCENDIARY DEVICES:

POSITION	PER CENT OF TIME
1 SAC WORKING	5
1 AS AC "	3
1 SUPERVISOR "	75
1 SUPERVISOR "	3
3 HEADQUARTERS CITY AGENTS WORKING	100
4 " " " "	90
2 " " " "	80
1 " " " "	50
1 " " " "	40
2 " " " "	20

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP/RL/MW/PL

3/10/75

Note: Supervisor Charlie Hopkins, Atlanta, telephonically contacted 3rd, 3/27/75. He will send initial 3/27 breaking above out by IS & CI matters separately.
D.S.

PAGE TWO AT 100-0

POSITION	WORKING	PER CENT OF TIME
3 HEADQUARTERS CITY AGENTS	"	10
3 RESIDENT AGENTS	"	10
4 RESIDENT AGENTS	"	6
1 " "	"	3
1 " "	"	2

THE FOLLOWING CLASSIFICATIONS WERE INCLUDED IN ARRIVING AT THE
ABOVE COMPUTATION:

2, 3, 14, 61, 64, 65, 97, 98, 100, 102, 105, 108, 109, 110, 111,
112, 113, 117, 134, 135, 157, 163, 170, 174, 176, AND 185.

E N D

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR 007 AT CODE

MAR 27 1975

9:46 PM NITEL MARCH 27, 1975 SSE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: ATLANTA (100-0)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE ATLANTA TELETYPE TO DIRECTOR, MARCH 26, 1975.

UNDER PER CENT OF TIME COLUMN, "IS" STANDS FOR INTERNAL SECURITY
AND "CI" STANDS FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

POSITION	WORKING	IS	CI
1 SAC	"	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>
1 ASAC	"	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>
1 SUPERVISOR	"	45	30
1 SUPERVISOR	"	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>
1 HEADQUARTERS CITY AGENT	"	100	0
1 "	" "	85	15
1 "	" "	80	20
1 "	" "	90	0
1 "	" "	0	90
1 "	" "	85	5
1 "	" "	75	45
1 "	" "	60	20

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/JFG

3/1/18

PAGE TWO AT 100-0

POSITION	PER CENT OF TIME	IS	CI
1 HEADQUARTERS CITY AGENT WORKING		80	20
1 " " " "		20	40
1 " " " "		0	40
1 " " " "		5	15
1 " " " "		20	0
1 " " " "		10	0
1 " " " "		5	5
1 " " " "		5	5
1 RESIDENT AGENT "		10	X0
1 " "		10	0
1 " "		10	X0
1 " "		3	3
1 " "		6	X0
1 " "		0	6
1 " "		6	X0
1 " "		3	X0
1 " "		0	X2

PAGE THREE AT 100-0

IN CONSIDERING ABOVE COMPUTATIONS, THE FOLLOWING CLASSIFICATIONS WERE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION UNDER INTERNAL SECURITY HEADING: 3, 14, 61, 98, 100, 117, 134 (INFORMANTS) 157, 163, 170, 176, 185. THE FOLLOWING CLASSIFICATIONS WERE CONSIDERED UNDER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE HEADING: 2, 64, 65, 97, 102, 105, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 134 (ASSETS).

E N D

HOLD FOR 5 MORE

NR 41 9:53 PM '75

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

602-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR 014 BA CODE

10:14PM NITEL 3/25/75 JAN

MAR 25 1975

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTIONS)
FROM BALTIMORE 66-NEW

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL OFFICES DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

BALTIMORE HAS TWO SUPERVISORS AND 33 AGENTS DEVOTED FULL TIME
TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY (IS). TWENTY AGENTS
DEVOTE 100 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME TO IS MATTERS. THIRTEEN AGENTS
DEVOTE 75 PER CENT TO CI MATTERS AND 25 PER CENT TO IS MATTERS.
THE SAC'S OVERALL SUPERVISION INCLUDES 20 PER CENT OVER IS AND CI
MATTERS.

END

Asst. Dir.	_____
Dep. of Dir.	_____
Dep. of Admin.	_____
Admin.	_____
C. M.	_____
Ex. A.	_____
FBI	_____
G.	_____
I. C.	_____
I.	_____
I.	_____
P. : RL	_____
S. : RL	_____
T. : RL	_____

Less 1
Telephone Km.
Director Sec'y

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM JTG
#MDR/6
3/17/01

CONFIDENTIAL
REF ID: A980000000000000

08-4824W

100-AN-AE

THE CAVANE JETT 0618 1

COMM 398734ZT 0618 1
CITY 398734ZT 0618 1

100-30 100-30 100-30

200-30 200-30 200-30

200-30 200-30 200-30

200-30 200-30 200-30

200-30 200-30 200-30
200-30 200-30 200-30
200-30 200-30 200-30
200-30 200-30 200-30
200-30 200-30 200-30
200-30 200-30 200-30

200-30

RECEIVED
RELETYPE UNIT

08-4824W
045 PM 07/15

PM

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

7
MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR 002 BH CODE

241 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 DGS

TO: DIRECTOR
FROM: BIRMINGHAM (66-2204)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm.
C-e-p. Svst.
Ext. Affairs
FBI & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Int. Inv.
Int. Inv.
Int. Inv.
Legal Cun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

Budger [Signature]
✓ pm 6/3/75 [Signature]

REBUTEL, 3/24/74, REGARDING PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS.

BIRMINGHAM HAS NO AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED FULL-TIME TO THESE MATTERS. FOLLOWING REPRESENT PERCENTAGES OF AGENT TIME:

AGENT	IS PERCENTAGE	CI PERCENTAGE
A	95	0
B	50	40
C	80	0
D	40	10
E	60	0
F	35	15
G	5	10
H	0	25
I	30	30
J	25	0
K (SUPERVISOR)	40	20

END

*ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/2/04 BY SP2 RENALD JTG*

MAP 25 5 CDP II 75
REED IMPERFATOR

SECRET INFORMATION

NW 55118 DocId:32989628 Page 286

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR017 BS CODE

MAR 25 1975

6:58 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 MCC

TO DIRECTOR
FROM BOSTON (66-82)

ATTN/ BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUNITEL 3/24/75.

BOSTON HAS TWO SUPERVISORS AND TWENTY-ONE AGENTS, ALL ASSIGNED FULL TIME, TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. IN ADDITION, TWELVE RESIDENT AGENTS ARE WORKING THE EQUIVALENT OF THREE AND ONE-HALF AGENTS FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.

BOSTON HAS ONE SUPERVISOR AND TEN AGENTS ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS FULL TIME. IN ADDITION, ELEVEN RESIDENT AGENTS ARE WORKING THE EQUIVALENT OF ONE AND ONE-HALF AGENTS FULL TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

BUREAU SHOULD NOTE THAT THE SAME RESIDENT AGENTS, WITH ONE EXCEPTION, WHO ARE ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, ARE ALSO ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Cmp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
File & Com.	_____
Gen. L.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/JAK

3/24/75

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جامعة الملك عبد الله

نحوه ملکیتی این سایر اراضی را که در این محدوده قرار دارند، از این طبقه می‌باشند.

•-} V. a \t{ J u l i o s .

19 - 471-104-111-811 this would be 100 and then multiply

وَالْمُؤْمِنُونَ الْمُؤْمِنَاتُ وَالْمُؤْمِنُونَ الْمُؤْمِنَاتُ

وَالْمُؤْمِنُونَ الْمُؤْمِنَاتُ وَالْمُؤْمِنُونَ الْمُؤْمِنَاتُ

Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol. 35, No. 4, December 2010
DOI 10.1215/03616878-35-4 © 2010 by The University of Chicago

10. The following table shows the number of hours worked by each employee.

100 FT. 100 FT.

EPIVYE

PM MITTEN

25

192. East Siberian Coast, 1921-22. 300.

وَالْمُؤْمِنُونَ الْمُؤْمِنَاتُ لِلرَّحْمَةِ وَالرَّحِيمِ

Journal of Clinical Endocrinology and Metabolism, Vol. 130, No. 10, October 1995, pp. 3033–3037.

10. The following table gives the number of hours worked by each of the 1000 workers.

the first time, and the author has been unable to find any reference to it.

10. The following table gives the number of hours worked by each of the 100 workers.

10. The following table shows the number of hours worked by each employee.

10. The following table shows the number of hours worked by each employee.

10. The following table gives the number of hours worked by each of the 100 workers.

10. The following table shows the number of hours worked by each employee.

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR001 BU CODE

4:04 PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 TRR

TO DIRECTOR

FROM BUFFALO KYYXXX(66- NEW)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

BUFFALO DIVISION HAS TWO SUPERVISORS AND 28 SPECIAL AGENTS
ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS BUT
NOT NECESSARILY ON A FULL TIME BASIS.

FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED
TO THESE AREAS ON FULL TIME BASIS:

INTERNAL

SECURITY

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

SAC	0	0
ASAC	0	0
SUPERVISORS	0	0
SPECIAL AGENTS	6	0

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-12-01 BY SP2 Amt/MS

3/6
M/W

PAGE TWO BU 66-NEW

IN ADDITION TO ABOVE, COMPUTATION OF ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE
OF TIME SPENT BY OTHER AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED THESE MATTERS
WOULD REPRESENT EQUIVALENT OF FOLLOWING NUMBER OF FULL TIME
PERSONNEL:

	INTERNAL	
	SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
SUPERVISORS	1	1/2
SPECIAL AGENTS	7 1/2	5
GRAND TOTALS:		
SUPERVISORS	1	1/2
SPECIAL AGENTS	13 1/2	5
END		

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RECEIVED
FELTYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

10
TELETYPE

QNR 006 BT PLAIN

9-13 QP PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 TDS

TO DIRECTOR

FROM BUTTE

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUNTEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

SECURITY MATTERS SUPERVISED BY ASAC FIVE PERCENT OF HIS TIME.
ONE HEADQUARTERS AGENT HANDLES FIFTY PERCENT OF HIS TIME AND ONE
RA TEN PERCENT OF HIS TIME. NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WORK BUTTE
DIVISION.

END 1

V

FBIHQ FLC FR THREE TELS TKS AND CUL.

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Svst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
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Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

THIS COMMUNICATION # MDR/6
CONTAINS INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/JGS

3/00

11. MARCH 1975
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COMPTON, CALIFORNIA

RECORDED BY TELETYPE UNIT 11
MARCH 25, 1975
TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMATION
REF ID: A62-116395-56

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Cmp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Fike & Com.
Com. Inv.
Int. Inv.
Int. Plan.
Int. Sec.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 009 CE CODED

5:33 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 KCL

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

11
11-27-75

Budget
6038

TO DIRECTOR
FROM CHARLOTTE (100-00)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBULET MARCH 24, 1975.

CHARLOTTE DIVISION HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO SECURITY MATTERS, NO OTHER SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL HANDLE SECURITY. THERE ARE 3 HEADQUARTERS AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME SECURITY MATTERS AND ONE ADDITIONAL HEADQUARTERS AGENT ASSIGNED 75 PER CENT TO SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS. ONE RESIDENT AGENT IS ASSIGNED 75 PER CENT TO SECURITY MATTERS, 4 ADDITIONAL RESIDENT AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED 50 PER CENT TO SECURITY MATTERS, AND 9 ADDITIONAL RESIDENT AGENTS ASSIGNED FROM 5 TO 15 PER CENT OF THEIR WORK IN SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS.

NO SUPERVISORY OR AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM WHICH WAS DISCONTINUED PER BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS IN 1971.

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM JKS #MOR16

Note: Charlotte security supervisor telephonically contacted 2pm, 3/27/75 and the difference between counterintelligence program, and C.I. matters explained to him. He will send corrected Nitel 3/27.

DIA

3/27

COPIE DE LA LETTRE

DU 10 JUIN 1941 DE M. LE GOUVERNEMENT

62-116395-56

*Revised
11*

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 27 1975

NR 005 CE CODE

5:26 PMNITEL MARCH 27, 1975 KCL

TO DIRECTOR
FROM CHARLOTTE (100-00)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL MARCH 24, 1975, AND CHARLOTTE TEL MARCH 25, 1975.

CHARLOTTE OFFICE HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO BOTH SECURITY AND COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONE HEADQUARTERS AGENT IS ASSIGNED 50 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, AND A SECOND HEADQUARTERS AGENT DEVOTES 25 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. TWO RESIDENT AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED 25 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND TWO ADDITIONAL RESIDENT AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED BETWEEN 5 TO 10 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. OTHER RESIDENT AGENTS ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS WHEN NEED ARISES, HOWEVER, NO EXACT PERCENTAGE AVAILABLE SINCE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS GREATLY FLUCTUATE.

END

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

Rudolf J. Peierls
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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/jg

3/10

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MAY 31 PM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR026 CG CODE

610PM NITEL 3-25-75 RWR

TO DIRECTOR

FROM CHICAGO

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

MAR 15 1975
Dew

*✓R-6923
JL*

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspect.	_____
Int'l.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

REBUTEL, MARCH 24, 1975, TO ALL SAC'S.

THE FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF AGENT TIME IN THE CHICAGO DIVISION SPENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS:

SAC: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, 20 PERCENT; INTERNAL SECURITY, 10 PERCENT.

ASAC: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, 25 PERCENT; INTERNAL SECURITY, 20 PERCENT.

SUPERVISORS: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, FOUR, FULL TIME; INTERNAL SECURITY, ONE, FULL TIME, ONE, 50 PERCENT. (THE OTHER FIFTY PERCENT OF ONE SUPERVISOR'S TIME IS SPENT ON EXTREMIST MATTERS.)

AGENTS: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, 76, FULL TIME (INCLUDES 10 AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE);

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALAN JATG

3/19

PAGE TWO

INTERNAL SECURITY, 28, FULL TIME.

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, 10 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO EXTREMIST MATTERS.

THIS REPRESENTS A TOTLE OF 114 SA'S ASSIGNED SECURITY WORK EXCLUSIVE OF SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL.

END.

PLS ACK FOR TWELVE

~~NEED A RERUN OF UR NRTG HAVE AN OVERLINE~~

PAGE TWO

INTERIOR SECURITY. 35. NOT TIME.

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, I REQUEST AREA VERSIONS OF THE
LINE OF EXTENSIVE MATTER.

THIS REPRESENTS A TOTAL OF 114 SECS. CLASSIFIED SECURITY
AREA EQUivalent OF SUPERVISORY PREFERENCE.

PLS. SEE RECD. REC'D.
25 7 1984

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

13

NR 004 CI CODE

MAR 25 1975

748PM NITEL 3/25/75 KOD

TELETYPE

TO DIRECTOR

FROM CINCINNATI (105-7038)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

✓ Rm. 1088
JCH

REBUNITEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING IS BREAKDOWN OF AGENT PERSONNEL TIME BEING EXPENDED IN
CINCINNATI DIVISION ON INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
MATTERS (CIM):

SAC AND ASAC - NONE

	IS	CIM
ONE SUPERVISOR	65 PERCENT	0 PERCENT
ONE SUPERVISOR	<u>53 PERCENT</u>	36 PERCENT
SIX AGENTS	100 PERCENT	0 PERCENT
TWO AGENTS	80 PERCENT	0 PERCENT
FOUR AGENTS	60 PERCENT	40 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	27 PERCENT	73 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	45 PERCENT	55 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	50 PERCENT	50 PERCENT
TWO AGENTS	50 PERCENT	0 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	73 PERCENT	27 PERCENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/01 BY SP-2 PRM/JCH

3/18

Asstc Dir.	_____
Dep-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst Inv.:	_____
Adm'n.	_____
Corr Svst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Fils & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ide.t.	_____
Inspection	_____
Int'	_____
Law Encty	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Tr in ng	_____
Legal Cncl.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

PAGE TWO CI 105-7038

	IS	CIM
ONE AGENT	30 PERCENT	50 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	40 PERCENT	20 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	25 PERCENT	25 PERCENT
THREE AGENTS	10 PERCENT	0 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	10 PERCENT	25 PERCENT
SIX AGENTS	5 PERCENT	5 PERCENT
TWO AGENTS	2 PERCENT	8 PERCENT
FOUR AGENTS	5 PERCENT	0 PERCENT.

END

REC 4 DBS FBIHQ CLR

CHARTER OF THE STATE

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7-23 PM

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62-116395-56

NR 005 CV CODE

8:25PM NITEL 3/25/75 RJB

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: CLEVELAND (66-5641)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

MAR 25 1975

~~TELETYPE~~

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

CLEVELAND HAS THE FOLLOWING NUMBER OF AGENTS ASSIGNED
TO INTERNAL SECURITY WORK: SAC NONE, ASAC NONE, SUPERVISORS
TWO, AGENTS 20. THE FOLLOWING NUMBER ARE ASSIGNED TO COUNTER-
INTELLIGENCE WORK: SAC NONE, ASAC NONE, SUPERVISORS ONE,
AGENTS 16. THE THREE SUPERVISORS HANDLE SECURITY-TYPE
MATTERS EXCLUSIVELY.

CLEVELAND HAS UTILIZED PERCENTAGES OF AGENT'S TIME SPENT
IN THESE CATEGORIES WHERE APPLICABLE, ESPECIALLY IN THE
RESIDENT AGENCIES.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 6020, XGDS CATEGORY 2, INDEFINITE.~~

END

HOLD FOR ONE

TJT FBI WASH D

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
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Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Serv.	_____

Budget *Revised* *3/28/75*
Ken

Ames
DEPT ASSISTED BY SP-2 ALM 1716
ON 1-17-01

3
RAJ

CLERKING HAS UTILIZED PRECEDENCE FORMS IN THIS APPENDIX
IN THESE CATEGORIES CHEESE APPARATE, ESPECIALLY IN THE
DIRECT READING.

CLASSIFIED BY SOURCE, MODE, CATEGORY & LIMITS.

END

NOTE FOR FILE

JUL 1951, PBN D

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

15

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR005 CO CODE

7:00PM EDT NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 WCA

TO DIRECTOR, FBI

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM COLUMBIA (105-NEW)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

COLUMBIA PRESENTLY HAS ZERO AGENTS ASSIGNED COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. IN INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS COLUMBIA HAS THE FOLLOWING NUMBER OF AGENTS AND SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED THE FOLLOWING PERCENTAGES OF TIME:

AGENTS 1 - 75, 1 - 30, 3 - 20, 1 - 10,

3 - 5 OR LESS

SUPERVISORS 1 - 20

END.

DBS FBIHQ

CLR

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Nat. Affairs	_____
Funct. & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Intell. Inv.	_____
Int. Rel.	_____
Inventory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

Budget of C.I.U. Unit
601-101-101

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP2 PENTAGON

3/0/A

628 - Page 62 - 116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR008 DL CODE

MAR 26 1975

5:44 PM NITEL 3/26/75 DRH

TELETYPE

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: DALLAS (105-NEW)

ATTN: INTD SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE, MARCH 24, 1975.

IN REPLY TO BUREAU REQUEST, THE DALLAS OFFICE HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO WORK ON INTERNAL SECURITY (IS), COUNTER INTELLIGENCE (CI), APPLICANT AND RELATED MATTERS. FIFTY-FOUR PERCENT OF HIS TIME IS SPENT ON IS MATTERS AND THIRTY-FIVE PERCENT ON CI MATTERS. THERE ARE SIX HEADQUARTERS AGENTS HANDLING IS AND/OR CI MATTERS, THREE RESIDENT AGENTS WORKING THE MAJORITY OF THEIR TIME ON BOTH IS AND CI MATTERS AND EIGHT RESIDENT AGENTS WORKING A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THEIR TIME IN THE IS AND CI FIELDS. DATA FOR SURVEY WAS OBTAINED FROM THE FEBRUARY, 1975, CASE LOAD. THE NUMBER OF DALLAS AGENTS WORKING IS, CI OR BOTH AND THE PERCENTAGE OF THEIR TIME SPENT IN THESE FIELDS IS SET OUT BELOW:

Assoc Dir	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm	_____
Dep.-A D.-Inv.	_____
Asst Dir	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp Syst	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
File & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Int'l.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

more 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-242 NM/1875

3/10

PAGE TWO DL 105-NEW

SAS	3X	1X	1X	1X	1X	1X	1X	2	2
IS PERCENT	100		34	63	62	24	30	16	5
CI PERCENT		100	66	11	38	76	16		

SAS	1	1	1	1
IS PERCENT	13	6		2
CI PERCENT		8		

X RA AND HEADQUARTERS AGENTS ASSIGNED TO IS AND CI SQUAD.

END.

MA 26 6 48 PM 75

TELETYPE UNIT
S-2 LINE 6

X LA 610 HEDDINGHAM TELETYPE MESSAGE NUMBER 36 IS END OF BULLETIN.

602-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR 007 DN PLAIN

17

535 PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 JSG MAR 26 1975

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

TELETYPE

(ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM: DENVER (66-DEAD)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TEL TO ALL OFFICES, MARCH 24, 1975.

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTER-

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS (CI):

SAC - 0

ASAC-0

SUPERVISOR - ONE FULL TIME, 3/4 OF TIME OF IS, 1/4 TO CI

AGENTS - 12 AND 1/2, 3/4 TIME TO IS, 1/4 TIME TO CI.

IN DENVER OFFICE, IS AND CI MATTERS ARE HANDLED BY FIELD SUPERVISOR ON FULL TIME BASIS. DESERTER FUGITIVE CASES ALSO HANDLED ON SQUAD BUT ONLY FRACTION OF SUPERVISOR'S AND SQUAD TIME IS USED ON THESE CASES. SAC AND ASAC ARE KEPT ABREAST OF IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS AND, OF COURSE, HAVE ULTIMATE AUTHORITY BUT HAVE NO IS OR CI MATTERS ASSIGNED TO THEM. BESIDES SUPERVISOR, THERE ARE 8 SPECIAL AGENTS (SA) IN HEADQUARTERS CITY ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO IS AND CI MATTERS WITH ONLY A SMALL FRACTION OF THIS TIME GIVEN TO DESERTER FUGITIVE CASES. ALL BOMBING MATTERS

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Rec.	_____
Gen. Info.	_____
Id.	_____
Ir.	_____
Int.	_____
L.	_____
Pls.	cl
Sp.	_____
Tel.	_____
Leg. & R.	_____
Tele. Op.	_____
Director's Sec'y	_____

#MDE16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP-2 ALMG/JTG
3/12/02

PAGE TWO (DN 66-DEAD)

(174 CLASSIFICATION) ARE CONSIDERED A PART OF IS INVESTIGATIONS.
TWO OF EIGHT SAS FULL TIME AND ONE SA HALF TIME HANDLE CI MATTERS,
REMAINDER HANDLE IS.

IN RESIDENT AGENCIES (RA) FOLLOWING SITUATION EXISTS:

ONE AGENT IN COLORADO SPRINGS SPENDS 50 0/0 AND ANOTHER AGENT
SPENDS 25 0/0 OF THEIR TIME ON IS AND CI MATTERS. IN BOULDER RA
ONE FULL TIME AGENT AND ONE AGENT SPENDING 60 0/0 OF HIS TIME HANDLE
IS AND CI MATTERS. IN FORT COLLINS RA ONE AGENT SPENDS 50 0/0
AND THE OTHER 40 0/0 OF THEIR TIME ON THESE MATTERS. IN CHEYENNE RA
ONE AGENT SPENDS 25 0/0 OF HIS TIME ONE THESE MATTERS. IN THE OTHER
RAS ONLY A MINOR FRACTION OF THE TIME OF EACH RA IS DEVOTED TO
IS AND CI MATTERS. TOTAL TIME WOULD POSSIBLY EQUAL THAT OF ONE
SA FULL TIME. IN ALL INSTANCES, ABOUT 3/4 OF TIME SPENT ON
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS IS ON IS MATTERS WITH REMAINING 1/4 ON
CI MATTERS.

END

MAH FBIHQ ACK FOR FOUR

WA CLR

(1.3-1.4-3) 12 33T 5084

THE COORDINATE SYSTEM IS DEFINED AS FOLLOWS: THE X-AXIS IS ALIGNED WITH THE HORIZONTAL DIRECTION OF MOTION, AND THE Y-AXIS IS PERPENDICULAR TO THE X-AXIS.

• STYLAR REGISTERS

THE END OF THE RACE

100

62-11439S-S6

NR032 DE CODE

5:42 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 WGM

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

TO: DIRECTOR
FROM: DETROIT

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUTEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

DETROIT DIVISION CURRENTLY HAS ONE SUPERVISOR AND FOURTEEN AGENTS ASSIGNED 100 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS. ADDITIONALLY, ONE ASAC IS ASSIGNED FIVE PERCENT, ONE SA TWENTY PERCENT, THREE SAs FIFTEEN PERCENT, ONE SA TEN PERCENT, ONE SA FIVE PERCENT.

DETROIT DIVISION ALSO HAS ASSIGNED ONE SUPERVISOR AND ELEVEN SAs SPENDING 100 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. IN ADDITION, ONE ASAC FIVE PERCENT, THREE SAs 75 PERCENT, ONE SA 50 PERCENT, ONE SA TWENTY PERCENT AND ONE SA TEN PERCENT. ONE SAC HAS FIVE PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND FIVE PERCENT OF TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

HOLD PLS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG
more 16

PDA

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
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Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

—~~1999~~ — 2000

CONTENTS

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62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dir. A.D.-Adm. _____
A.D.-Inv. _____

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR 002 EP CODE

6:28 PM NITEL 3-25-75 MJT

TO : DIRECTOR

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM: EL PASO (66-NEW) //1P//

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL MARCH 24, 1975.

SAC, EL PASO CURRENTLY SPENDS 3 PERCENT OF TIME SUPERVISING INTERNAL SECURITY, 2 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; ASAC HANDLES NO SECURITY MATTERS; SUPERVISOR NUMBER THREE DESK DEVOTES 15 PER CENT OF TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, 5 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

FOUR AGENTS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED SECURITY MATTERS, WITH ONE AGENT DEVOTING 60 PER CENT OF TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY, 0 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; SECOND AGENT SPENDS 10 PER CENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, 75 PER CENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; THIRD AGENT 50 PER CENT INTERNAL SECURITY, 10 PER CENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; FOURTH AGENT, WHO IS RELIEF SUPERVISOR, DEVOTES 10 PER CENT OF TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, 65 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 17/01 BY SP2 ALM/134G

3/PA

1. COMMUNICATED BY TELETYPE
2. DATE OF COMMUNICATION

1968-08-06

TELETYPE

6000 8:00 AM 1968

68-2474 MINT 5-28-68

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: DIRECTOR OF SECURITY SERVICES

1119111 487-322 (22) 0240 LP FORM 8

STATEMENT OF IMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTTED NOV 1968.
ACCURACY OF INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY THIS IMMITTEE
INTERVIEWED BY SECURITY COUNSELOR: COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL SECURITY
TO DATE, THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THIS IMMITTEE
IS FALSE OR MISLEADING; HOWEVER, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER
THIS IMMITTEE IS GENUINE OR NOT, AS HE REFUSED TO IDENTIFY HIMSELF.
BOTH AGENTS CURRENTLY ASSISTING SECURITY MATTER, WITH ONE AGENT
ESTIMATING 60 PER CENT OF TIME OF INTERNAL SECURITY, AND THE OTHER
COMMITTEE INTELLIGENCE; SOURCE ACCORDINGLY BELIEVES HE IS A MEMBER OF INTERNAL
SECURITY MATTER. IT IS NOT CONSIDERED NECESSARY; HOWEVER,
HE IS A MEMBER OF INTERNAL SECURITY. IN HIS OWN STATEMENT, HE STATED HE IS
NOT A MEMBER OF INTERNAL SECURITY, BUT IS A MEMBER OF INTERNAL SECURITY; HOWEVER,
IT IS RELEASER'S POSITION THAT HE IS A MEMBER OF INTERNAL SECURITY.

END

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR 001 HN CODE

5:08 PM HST NTEL MARCH 25, 1975 JVS

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: HONOLULU (66-) 1P

ATTENTION BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NTEL TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

HONOLULU CURRENTLY HAS FOUR SPECIAL AGENTS ASSIGNED PRIMARILY SECURITY MATTERS BROKEN DOWN BY PERCENTAGE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY AS FOLLOWS: 2 AGENTS 90 PER CENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND 10 PER CENT EACH OTHER MATTERS; 1 AGENT 75 PER CENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, 25 PER CENT INTERNAL SECURITY; 1 AGENT 30 PER CENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, 40 PER CENT INTERNAL SECURITY, 30 PER CENT OTHER MATTERS. 3 ADDITIONAL AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 15 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY.

ASAC, SUPERVISES SECURITY MATTER, SPENDS 35 PER CENT OF TIME ON SECURITY BROKEN DOWN AS: 25 PER CENT COUNTER INTELLIGENCE AND 10 PER CENT INTERNAL SECURITY.

END.

HOLD

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
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Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP&ADM/JTG

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51 (१९२३) HISTORICAL १०८

MATERIALS AND METHODS

• 354TH SECT GOLF COMMITTEE O. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

THE BURGESS MILEN TO VLT 2422, MARCH 24, 1932.

HONORIFICO CHIAROGLIO HA 8000 SPETTATORI IN CIELO, 12 VASSICHEE PRIMAVERA

2025 RELEASE UNDER E.O. 14176

THE COUNCIL OF THE CONFEDERATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

¹ See, e.g., *United States v. Gandy*, 453 U.S. 39, 43 (1981) ("[T]he Constitution does not require that every criminal trial be conducted before a jury."); *Id.* at 44 ("[T]he right to a trial by jury is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable regulation by Congress.").

THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, A PETITIONER, APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH DAKOTA, JEFFERSON COUNTY, WHICH DENIED ITS PETITION FOR A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT.

• VITIQUETTE L'ARTISANATE DE THIERS EST UN GROUPE SPP

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Digitized by srujanika@gmail.com

• YTL:W032 JAKARTA 1982 3/3 81 TUA EDUKASI

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR008 HO CODE

5:55 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 BNG

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: HOUSTON

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

SET FORTH BELOW ARE SAC, SUPERVISOR AND AGENTS CURRENTLY
WORKING INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AS
REQUESTED IN REFERENCED TEL:

	INTERNAL SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
AGENTS	2.05	2.70
SUPERVISOR	.30	.40
SAC	.02	.04

END

HOLD

Assoc. Dir.	—
Dep. A.D.-Adm.	—
Dep. A.D.-Int.	—
Asst. Dir.	—
Adm. —	
Ch. of Pol. —	
Ext. Affairs —	
Fin. & Com. —	
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Ident. —	
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Int. —	
Laboratory —	
Plan. & Eval. —	
Spec. Inv. —	
Training —	
Legal Coun. —	
Telephone Rm. —	
Director Sec'y —	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP2/FM/116

3/EV

CODE

HOLD

ATTENTION: BUREAU AND ACCOMPLISHMENT.
RE DRAFTED LETTER TO ALL SECURITIES, MARCH 24, 1973.
ORGANIZATION SECURITY AND CONTRACTUAL INFORMATION LETTER AS
SET FORTH IN DRAFTED LETTERS ARE SEPARATELY SUBMITTED AND VERIFIED.
SUBMISSIONS ARE FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY.
SUBMISSIONS ARE FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY.
SUBMISSIONS ARE FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY.

RE BUREAU AND ACCOMPLISHMENT.
TO: DIRECTOR
FROM: HUSTON
SUBJECT: BUREAU AND ACCOMPLISHMENT.

BUREAU AND ACCOMPLISHMENT.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

22
MAR 25 1975

NRO05 IP CODE

5:39 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 RXH-
TELETYPE

TO DIRECTOR

FROM INDIANAPOLIS

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

AS REQUESTED IN REFERENCED TEL, FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS BEING
FURNISHED CONCERNING INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO
INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS:

SAC NONE

ASAC NONE

SUPERVISORS .30 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND .40
INTERNAL SECURITY

SPECIAL AGENTS 6.25 ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND
9.50 ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY.

END

HOLD FOR FIVE MORE

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm.	_____
Cntr. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
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Intell.	_____
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Int. Sec'y	_____
Legal Sec'y	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-12-01 BY SP-2/AL/AT/MS

Mar 25 1963 PH 75

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YTL WORKS INTEGRITY

23

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

Dan
TELETYPE

NR003 CODE JN

4:07PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 JWD

TO DIRECTOR, ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
FROM JACKSON (100-0)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL MARCH 24, 1975.

SAC AND ASAC, JACKSON OFFICE, HAVE NO CASES ASSIGNED IN INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD. TWO SUPERVISORS HAVE CASES ASSIGNED AND THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME IS EQUIVALENT TO FORTY PERCENT OF ONE SUPERVISOR IN INTERNAL SECURITY AND FIFTEEN PERCENT OF ONE SUPERVISOR IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. THERE ARE FIFTY FIVE SPECIAL AGENTS WHO CONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS IN THE INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD. THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME IS EQUIVALENT TO THREE POINT SIX TENTHS AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND ONE POINT ONE TENTH AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

DBS FBIHQ CLR

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.A D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Cust. Syst.	_____
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Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Tr. Inv.	_____
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Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/12/01 BY SP-2 ADM/MS/16

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62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

NRO03 JK CODE

TELETYPE

7:45 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 GLB

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
FROM JACKSONVILLE (100-NEW) (RUC)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL, DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING IS SUBMITTED IN RESPONSE TO REFERENCED NITEL
FOR JACKSONVILLE DIVISION:

ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED FIFTY PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY
AND TEN PERCENT INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

PERCENTAGES OF AN AGENT'S TIME, NONE ASSIGNED FULL TIME
TO THESE ACTIVITIES, ACCUMULATED TO REPRESENT FOUR AGENTS
ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND ONE AGENT ASSIGNED
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
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Telephone Rm.	_____
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-1 ALM 196

B/PB

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE UNIT

RECEIVED BY TELETYPE UNIT OF THE COMMERCIAL TELETYPE

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AIR FORCE COMMUNICATIONS CENTER
COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS GROUP
TELETYPE SECTION
TELETYPE UNIT
COMMERCIAL TELETYPE UNIT

RECORDED ON 35MM FILM BY TELETYPE UNIT

NR 003 KC CODE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

6:15 PM 3/25/75 NITEL JAW

TO: DIRECTOR

(ATTN:BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM: KANSAS CITY (100-0)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUNITEL 3/24/75.

KANSAS CITY DIVISION HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO HANDLE INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. TIME SPENT IS 50 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND 40 PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY.

TWO AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND NO AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY.

KANSAS CITY HAS THIRTEEN ADDITIONAL AGENTS HANDLING BOTH COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, BROKEN DOWN AS FOLLOWS: FIVE AGENTS, 90 PERCENT, INTERNAL SECURITY AND ONE AGENT, 90 PERCENT, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE: TWO AGENTS, 30 PERCENT ON EACH; FOUR AGENTS, 10 PERCENT ON EACH, AND ONE AGENT 50 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY.

END

HOLD

25

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
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Director Sec'y	_____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2/EMM/BS

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1945 10 20 10:00 AM

FINAL LETTER SIGNED BY SIEBEL

RECORDED IN TELETYPE

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OR A TELTYPE

RECEIVED
UNITED STATES
ARMED FORCES
TELETYPE
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15

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NRO04 KX CODE

2-6
MAR 28 1975
DCH

8:10 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 WEH TELETYPE

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (ATN: BUDGET & ACCOUNTING SECTION)
FROM: SAC, KNOXVILLE (100-00)
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE DATED MARCH 24, 1975, CAP-
TIONED AS ABOVE.

INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS ARE SUPERVISED EXCLUSIVELY ON THE ASAC'S DESK IN THE KNOXVILLE DIVISION. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE ASAC SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON SUCH MATTERS, DIVIDED 15 PERCENT TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND 10 PERCENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

IN ADDITION, THERE ARE FIVE AGENTS WITHIN THE DIVISION WORKING PRIMARILY ON SECURITY MATTERS. TWO OF THESE AGENTS SPEND 80 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY WORK AND 5 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; ONE AGENT SPENDS 75 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 20 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; ONE AGENT SPENDS 60 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 35 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; AND ONE AGENT SPENDS 20 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 75 PERCENT ON

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep. Ass. Adm.	_____
Dep. A.D. Inv.	_____
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Director Sec'y	_____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/01 BY SP-2 ALM/BS
#mDe16

3/10/

PAGE TWO KX 100-00

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

SECURITY ITEMS REQUIRING THE PERSONAL ATTENTION
OF THE SAC UTILIZE ABOUT 5 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON EACH
CATEGORY.

END.

DBS FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE AND CLR

92-202-00
KX 100-00

COT 7007

CONFIDENTIALITY ATTACHED.

CONFIDENTIALITY ATTACHED.
THE SECURITY INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-12-2012 BY SP/OLB/ATL
CLASSIFICATION

THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

TELETYPE UNIT
FBI - WILMINGTON

MAR 25 7 47 PM '75

62-116395-56

27

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
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Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MR 011 LV CODE

838 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 MLP

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

TO DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM LAS VEGAS (100-00)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE, MARCH 24, 1975.

LAS VEGAS SAC AND ASAC DO NOT SUPERVISE INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. LAS VEGAS HAS NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ①

LAS VEGAS HAS ONE FIELD SUPERVISOR WHO SUPERVISES INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AMONG MANY OTHER CATEGORIES. IT IS ESTIMATED THIS SUPERVISOR SPENDS TEN PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON MATTERS OF AN INTERNAL SECURITY NATURE.

LAS VEGAS HAS FIVE SPECIAL AGENTS WHO ARE NORMALLY ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT TWO OF THESE AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 95 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME ON THESE MATTERS. ONE OTHER SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 30 PER CENT, AND THE OTHER TWO, APPROXIMATELY 20 PER CENT.

END

TJT FBI WASH DC CLR

① Supervisor Don Smith contacted and advises Counterintelligence matters should be as follows: No supervisory time.

3/27/75
5:45 pm / J

2 agents involved, one about 3%
of his time & one about 2%

D.J.

3/DA

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/tmg

2. 011 LA CODE

3. 06 MILE MACH 65, 1035 MPH

TO DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM LA AGENT CIC-400

ATT: SUPERVISOR AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

STATE DIRECTORIAL COMMITTEE OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE FURNISH TEL TYPE, MARCH 21, 1952.

LA AGENT SAW AND ASK DO LOT SUB-LIBRARY, INTERNAL SECURITY

MATTER. LA AGENT HAS NO COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT.

LA AGENT HAS ONE RING CHIEF INSPECTOR WHO CAN HANDLE INTERNAL

SECURITY MATTER WHICH MAY USE SUB-COMMITTEE. IT IS ESTIMATE

THIS SUB-COMMITTEE IS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE DIRECTOR OF INTERNAL SECURITY.

INTERNAL SECURITY DIRECTOR.

LA AGENT LINE POLICIAL OFFICES WHO ARE COOPERATIVE WITH

INTERNAL SECURITY DIRECTOR. IT IS ESTIMATE THAT TWO OR THREE

DEPARTMENTS ARE COOPERATIVE WITH INTERNAL SECURITY DIRECTOR.

ONE DEPARTMENT IS NOT COOPERATIVE WITH INTERNAL SECURITY

DIRECTOR. ONE DEPARTMENT IS COOPERATIVE WITH INTERNAL SECURITY.

TEL 011 MARCH 26 CIR

62-116395-56

28

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR 004 LR PLAIN

3:09 PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 GM

TO DIRECTOR
FROM LITTLE ROCK (66-1880)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

*Cudahy/Rc +
3/26/75*

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
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Admin.	_____
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Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING SET FORTH IN RESPONSE TO REFERENCED

TELETYPE:

TWO AGENTS IN LITTLE ROCK DIVISION ASSIGNED PART-TIME
ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS WITH
BREAKDOWN OF TIME SPENT AS FOLLOWS:

ONE AGENT SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 45 PERCENT OF TIME
ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 5 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
MATTERS. SECOND AGENT SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 65 PERCENT
OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 10 PERCENT ON COUNTER-
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONE SUPERVISOR SPENDS APPROXIMATELY
8 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 2 PERCENT
ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/HG
#MDR/6

3/07

REF ID: A65474

3:30 PM WEDNESDAY APRIL 26, 1950 ON
10 MILE CIOB

(881-88-188)

• 1. LITTLE RIVER COUNTY, ARKANSAS.

• 2. SECRET COMMITTEE OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

• 3. BURGESS KELLY TO ALL 5-24-2, WICH 34, 1950.

• 4. OFFICIAL SET DOWN IN REPORT IN CHARGE:

• 5. APPROXIMATELY 1000 NEW MEMBERS IN THE
• 6. SECRET AND COMMUNIST DIFFERENCE TAKEN WITH
• 7. APPROXIMATELY 1000 MEMBERS IN THE FOLLOWING:
• 8. 1. COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP AS LISTED ON COMMUNIST PUBLICATIONS
• 9. 2. SECRETARIAL AND EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. I.E.
• 10. 3. COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP AS LISTED IN THE
• 11. 4. SECRETARY OF INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950.

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR 009 LA/CODE

12:09 PM URGENT 3-26-75 SMA

TO DIRECTOR

FROM LOS ANGELES

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

S E N A T E S E L E C T C O M M I T T E E O N I N T E L L I G E N C E A C T I V I T I E S

RE BUTEL. MARCH 24 LAST.

LOS ANGELES DIVISION HAS CAREFULLY BROKEN DOWN BY PERCENTAGES THOSE AGENTS WORKING INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE WORK USING THOSE CLASSIFICATIONS PROVIDED BY SUPERVISOR GROOVER. DIVISION HAS A TOTAL OF 91 AGENTS PLUS ONE SAC, FOUR SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, ASSIGNED TO SUCH CLASSIFICATIONS. THIRTY FIVE OF THESE WORK COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND 56 WORK INTERNAL SECURITY.

ADMINISTRATIVE

LOS ANGELES IS SUBMITTING FOR BUREAU'S CONSIDERATION, IF PERTINENT. THREE OF THE ABOVE 56 CLASSIFIED AS SECURITY AGENTS WORK FULL TIME ON BOMBING MATTERS WHICH ARE ALMOST ALL MATTERS WHEREIN WE HAVE NO JURISDICTION EXCEPT FOR DATA KEEPING FOR NATIONAL BOMB DATA CENTER. TWELVE OF THE 56 SECURITY AGENTS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

3/20

PAGE TWO

ARE INVOLVED FULL TIME IN OUR FALSE IDENTITY PROGRAM. THIS
PROGRAM ORIGINATED WITH OUR WEATHFUG ACTIVITIES, HOWEVER,
THE FRAUDULENT USE OF DECEASED INFANT IDENTITY PAPERS HAS
EXPANDED TO SUCH A DEGREE THAT THE VAST MAJORITY INVOLVE
CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN SECURITY WORK. SEVEN OF THE 56
AGENTS ON SECURITY ARE INVOLVED FULL TIME IN FUGITIVE
INVESTIGATIONS WHICH ORIGINATE WITH SOME DEMONSTRATION OR
ACT OF TERROR, ETC, BUT AT THE PRESENT THEY ARE CLEAR CUT
CRIMINAL FUGITIVE INVESTIGATIONS. ONE OF THE 56 IS INVOLVED
FULL TIME IN THE HANDLING OF FOREIGN POLICE COOPERATION
MATTERS WHICH IS TECHNICALLY AN APPLICANT-TYPE INVESTIGATION,
BUT THE 163 CLASSIFICATION WAS INCLUDED IN THE SECURITY
CLASSIFICATIONS. SUMMARIZING THESE EXCEPTIONS WE HAVE A TOTAL
OF 23 AGENTS WHO ARE ASSIGNED TO SECURITY WORK BUT ARE, IN
FACT, NOT INVOLVED IN ANY INTERNAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS,
LEAVING ONLY 33 AGENTS DEVOTING THEIR FULL TIME EFFORTS TO
INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS PLUS, THE ABOVE MENTIONED 35
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AGENTS.

END

JTG FBIHQ CLR

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62-116395-56

30

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR013 LS CODE

9:45 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 HSH

TO DI

RECTOR

FROM LOUISVILLE

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

MAR 25 1975

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TELETYPE

✓ R-6 (PJS)

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Ast. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Int. Cen.	_____
Gov. Inv.	_____
Int.	_____
Int.	_____
Int.	_____
Pla. & Eval.	_____
Sp.	_____
Tr.	_____
Legal Ctr.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

REBUTEL TO ALL SACS, DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

PURSUANT TO REFERENCED COMMUNICATION, FOLLOWING DATA
PERTAINS TO LOUISVILLE DIVISION AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED
INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS:

SUPERVISOR (1) 40 IS, 10 CI; AGENT (1) 85 IS, 10 CI;
AGENT (1) 25 IS, 0 CI; AGENT (1) 50 IS, 25 CI; AGENT (1)
25 IS, 0 CI; AGENT (1) 30 IS, 40 CI; AGENT (1) 40 IS,
10 CI; AGENT (1) 50 IS, 25 CI; AGENT (1) 10 IS, 0 CI.
END.

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DATE 1-17-01 BY SP 282017886

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INTRODUCTION

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EDON FOUNDATION

WITTNER MITTUNGEN DER TEACHERS' UND STUDENTS' ASSOCIATION

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PUBLICATION TO "THE LIBERTY OF CO-MUNICATING". BOSTON, MA, 1850.

REGISTRATION OF FORMULATORS DIVISION REGD. PLATE NUMBER A8510122

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (IS) AND COMMERCIAL INTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS

10 51, 31 22 (D) 10024; 10 31, 31 04 (D) 10025

(D) T18724 & T18725, 21-52 (D) T18724 & T18725, 21-52 (D) T18724 & T18725, 21-52

SI RA (D) T0304 010 2A SI RE (D) T0304 010 2A

• 12 CI; 11 CI (ΨΕΨΑ 12, 25 CI; ΥΕΥΤ 11) Η 12, 6 CI.

TELEGRAMS

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Cmp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Pub. & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
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Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

31
MAR 25 1975

NR 005 ME PLAIN

TELETYPE

9:12 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 JL C

TO DIRECTOR ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
FROM MEMPHIS

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL MARCH 24, 1975.

Budget *✓* *Rebutel* *SEF/H*
MEMPHIS OFFICE USES APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF ONE SUPERVISOR'S TIME IN THE SECURITY FIELD, 20 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 5 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

IN ADDITION, SIX AGENTS ARE UTILIZED, THE FOLLOWING TABLE SHOWING PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TIME SPENT BY THESE AGENTS IN THIS FIELD:

AGENT	TIME ON SECURITY	TIME ON INTERNAL	TIME ON COUNTER-
	CASES	SECURITY	INTELLIGENCE
A	100	100	0
B	75	50	25
C	50	50	0
D	50	25	25
E	25	25	0
F	25	0	25

IN ADDITION TO THE ONE-FOURTH SUPERVISOR TIME, THIS OFFICE USES THE EQUIVALENT OF THREE AND ONE-FOURTH AGENTS IN THE SECURITY

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3/08

PAGE TWO

FIELD; TWO AND ONE-HALF AGENTS ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND THE
EQUIVALENT OF THREE-FOURTHS OF ONE AGENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

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TJT FBI WASH DC

Mar 25 10 AM '75

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

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Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
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Ident.	_____
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Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

MAR 27 1975

TELETYPE

NR002 MM CODE

925AM URGENT MARCH 27, 1975 JWB

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MIAMI 1P

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

✓ Budget + Accounting Section
MARCH 27 1975 JWB

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING ARE MIAMI OFFICE STATISTICS SHOWING PERCENTAGES OF TIME ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS AND INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) MATTERS BY SPECIAL AGENT PERSONNEL:

SACS - 0; ASACS - 0.

SUPERVISORS - CI MATTERS: ONE ASSIGNED 90 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 5 PERCENT. SI MATTERS: ONE ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 5 PERCENT.

SPECIAL AGENTS- CI MATTERS: 15 ASSIGNED FULL TIME; TWO ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 40 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 5 PERCENT. IS MATTERS: TWO ASSIGNED FULL TIME; THREE ASSIGNED 75 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 60 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 30 PERCENT; FIVE ASSIGNED 10 PERCENT.

END.

JDR

FBIHQ CLR

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR 004 MI CODE

7:08PM NITEL 3 / 25 / 75 LSK MAR 25 1975

TO: DIRECTOR

~~2003~~
TELETYPE

FROM: MILWAUKEE (66-NEW)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUNITEL TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

MILWAUKEE HAS 2 SECURITY SUPERVISORS, #5 AND #6, NEITHER OF WHOM IS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO SECURITY WORK. 23 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED TO THESE 2 SECURITY SQUADS, INCLUDING HEADQUARTERS AND RESIDENT AGENTS (RA'S). 4 OF LATTER ARE ENGAGED FULL TIME IN SECURITY WORK. 15 ADDITIONAL RESIDENT AGENTS NOT ASSIGNED TO EITHER SECURITY SQUAD ALSO HANDLE SOME SECURITY WORK IN THEIR VARIOUS AREAS. PERCENTAGE BREAKDOWN IS AS FOLLOWS:

	INTERNAL SECURITY	COINTEL	OTHER
#5 SUPERVISOR	70	5	25
#6 SUPERVISOR	30	55	15
#5 SQUAD 12 agents *	59	8	33
#6 SQUAD 11 agents *	44	44	12
RA'S 15 agents *	2.5	4.5	93

END

ACJ FOR FOUR \$\$\$

* Re place off 4⁵⁵pm, 3/27/75 with George Whoptie,
Supervisor of #6 squad in Milwaukee.

#M0816
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-FAIR/PATG

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Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
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Comap. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
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Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

Budget & Account
3/27/75

60% DIRECTOR

60% MILWAUKEE (CC-MEA)

ATTENTION: EUGENE AND VERA HALLIE ACTION

STATE SERVICE COMMITTEE OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REPUTABLE, LEGAL SOURCE, MARCH 19, 1938.

MILWAUKEE HAS A SECURITY SUPPLY COMPANY, AS AND WE DIRECTIVE OF
WHICH IS ASSIGNED FOR TIME TO SECURITY WORK. SEPARATE ARE
ASSIGNMENT TO THESE 3 COMPANIES, INCLUDING INDIVIDUALS, WHO
IN PAST YEARS (1932) HAVE BEEN USED FULL TIME IN
SECURITY WORK. ACCORDING TO SOURCE GOT ACCESSORY TO
RIGHT SECURITY WORK IN TRADE ALSO HANDLE SOME SECURITY WORK IN THIS
MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT, RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE FOLLOWING:

OTHER	INTERVIEWED	COTTON	60%	60%
es	c.	es	es	es
es	ee	es	es	es
es	s	es	es	es
es	pp	es	es	es
es	es	es	es	es

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

60-116395-56

34

REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975 11:16

11:16 AM

NR001 MP COD ED

7:13 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 DSC

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MINNEAPOLIS (100-NEW)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUTEL TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

MINNEAPOLIS HAS ONE SUPERVISOR WHO SPENDS 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. A SECOND SUPERVISOR SPENDS 40 PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY. THERE ARE FIVE AND ONE HALF AGENTS WORKING COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND 14 WORKING INTERNAL SECURITY.

END

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
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Admin.	_____
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Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

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602-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 27 1975

35
TELETYPE

NR005 MOBILE PLAIN

11-12 PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 VFP

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM MOBILE (66-1145)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUTEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

THE MOBILE DIVISION HAS ONE SUPERVISOR SPENDING FIFTY PERCENT OF TIME SUPERVISING INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS; ONE AGENT WHO SPENDS TWENTYFIVE PERCENT OF TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS; ONE AGENT WHO SPENDS ONE HUNDRED PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. THERE ARE NINE AGENTS WHO SPEND AN AVERAGE OF FORTY FIVE PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.

END

TMA ACK FOR TWO FBIHQ CLR

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
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62-116395-56

36

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR 007 NK CODE

6:06PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 JCG

TO DIRECTOR

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
FROM NEWARK

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

Budget Dept
CDR JFH

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUNITEL TO SAC'S MARCH 24, 1975.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS SET FORTH IN RE NITEL
NEWARK SUBMIT S FOLLOWING BREAKDOWN OF AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED
TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND
PER CENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY PERSONNEL IN THE TWO SEPARATE
CATEGORIES:

INTERNAL SECURITY:

1 ASAC - 15 PER CENT

1 SUPERVISOR - 50 PER CENT

7 SA'S - 100 PER CENT

7 SA'S - 70 PER CENT

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DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ZBT m 12/16

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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

1 ASAC - 35 PER CENT

1 SUPERVICSOR - 50 PER CENT

1 SUPERVISOR - 100 PER CENT

23 SA 'S - 100 PER CENT

6 SA'S - 50 PER CENT

3 SA'S - 10 PER CENT

END

MAR 26 6 04 PM '75

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37

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR002 NH CODE

MAR 25 1975

1038PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 LM

Do
TELETYPE

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: NEW HAVEN (105-13579) (RUC) 1P

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspec. & Inv.	_____
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Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE 6028

REBUTEL MARCH 24, 1975.

ONE SUPERVISORY AGENT DEVOTES ONE-THIRD OF HIS TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND ONE THIRD TO INTERNAL SECURITY.

SEVENTEEN AGENTS ARE REGULARLY ASSIGNED EITHER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OR INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS IN ADDITION TO OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS. OF THESE 17 AGENTS THE EQUIVALENT OF FIVE AGENTS WORK COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS FULL TIME AND FIVE AND ONE THIRD AGENTS WORK INTERNAL SECURITY.

END

FBIHQ FLC FR TWO TELS CLR TKS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-27ADM/JTG

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

38

MAR 26 1975

NR001 NO CODE

TELETYPE

2:49PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 DCB

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, NEW ORLEANS (66-2832)

ATTENTION: BUGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU NTEL MARCH 24, 1975.

NUMBER OF SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) MATTERS, ONE; NUMBER OF AGENTS ASSIGNED TO IS MATTERS, TWELVE; PERCENTAGE OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS, 60 PERCENT; PERCENTAGE OF SUPERVISORY TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS, 60 PERCENT; COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END MESSAGE...

MAH FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE

WA CLR

Assoc Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A D-Inv.	_____
Asst Dir:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comm Syst.	_____
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Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-12-01 BY SP2 ALM/JES

Note: Security supervisor contacted 5²⁰ 3/27/75 re counterintelligence matters. He will check & act on the obvious error corrected, either through call back or corrected Ntel. PD

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2023-2024

10172-2 3 (1910) 4-12 2001 00010010

ANSWER: The first two digits of the answer are 10.

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¹⁴ See, e.g., *U.S. v. Babbitt*, 100 F.3d 1250, 1254 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he [FWS] has authority to regulate the importation of species that are not listed under the Convention.”).

DISCUSSIONS, REACTIONS, AND CONVERSATIONS WITH THE STAFF

1993-03-06 00:00:00 1993-03-06 00:00:00 1993-03-06 00:00:00 1993-03-06 00:00:00 1993-03-06 00:00:00

LEADER OF THE FREE WORLD

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MAR 26 3 47 PM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

38 Revised

MAR 27 1975

TELETYPE

NR015 NO CODE

7:15PM URGENT MARCH 27, 1975 JMF

TO DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM SAC, NEW ORLEANS (66-2832)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL MARCH 24, 1975; NEW ORLEANS TELETYPE

MARCH 26, 1975; BUTEL CALL MARCH 27, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING ARE CORRECTIONS TO REFERENCED NEW ORLEANS TELETYPE. NUMBER OF SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, ONE; NUMBER OF AGENTS ASSIGNED TO IS MATTERS, TWELVE, OF WHICH SEVEN ARE ALSO ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. PERCENTAGE OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS, 25 PERCENT AND PERCENTAGE OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS 35 PERCENT. PERCENTAGE OF SUPERVISORY TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS 25 PERCENT, AND 35 PERCENT SPENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END MESSAGE.

DBS FBIHQ CLR

44

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	_____
Cor. p. Syst.	_____
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Director Sec'y	_____

✓ Budget 1/2 +
✓ 2/26 JF-H

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DATE 11/7/01 BY SP2 ALW/HB

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Director Sec'y	_____

NR003 NY CODE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NITEL 3/25/75 SENT 9:25 AM 3/26/75 GMD

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

✓ TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, NEW YORK
ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE, MARCH 24, 1975.

NEW YORK HAS ONE SAC ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS (DIVISION III) AND ONE SAC ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS (DIVISION IV). THERE ARE NO ASACS IN NEW YORK OFFICE.

SAC, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIVISION (III) SPENDS FULL-TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

SAC, INTERNAL SECURITY DIVISION (IV) SPENDS 40 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND 60 PERCENT IS SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.

SIX SUPERVISORS HANDLE INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND 14 SUPERVISORS HANDLE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

114 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND 331 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END.

JTG FBIHQ CLR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
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B/A

AMERICAN AIRLINES
COMMERCIAL AIRLINES

AMERICAN AIRLINES

3947343

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MAR 26 9:30 AM '75

AMERICAN AIRLINES COMMERCIAL AIRLINES

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR 002 NF PLAIN

40
MAR 26 1975

444PM NITEL 3-26-75 SNB

DCA
TELETYPE

TO DIRECTOR

FROM NORFOLK (66-981)

ATTENTION BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUTEL TO ALL OFFICES MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING IS INFORMATION REQUESTED IN RETEL:

POSITION	INTERNAL SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
ONE SUPERVISOR	50 PER CENT OF TIME	10 PER CENT OF TIME
THREE SAs	50 PER CENT OF TIME	20 PER CENT OF TIME
TWO SAs	75 PER CENT OF TIME	0
THREE SAs	50 PER CENT OF TIME	0

TOTAL AGENT PERSONNEL OF NORFOLK OFFICE ASSIGNED IS ONE SUPERVISOR AND EIGHT AGENTS FOR PERCENTAGES INDICATED ABOVE.

END

DBS FBIHQ CLR

Assoc. Dir.
'Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Adm'n.
Com. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
File & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inform.
Int'l.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Tr. Inv.
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

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GOVERNMENT OF CANADA - DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE

DEFENCE INFORMATION COMMISSION - TELETYPE SECTION

NR008 OC PLAIN

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

9:30PM MARCH 25, 1975 NITEL DSM MAR 25 1975

TO DIRECTOR

FROM OKLAHOMA CITY (105-2398)

Dew
TELETYPE

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUTEL MARCH 24, 1975.

THE SAC AND THE ASAC OF THE OKLAHOMA CITY OFFICE ARE NOT ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY OR COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. THE OKLAHOMA CITY OFFICE HAS NO SUPERVISOR OR SPECIAL AGENT ASIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND / OR COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN IN PERCENTAGES OF SUPERVISOR AND AGENT'S TIME SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS:

	NUMBER	INTERNAL SECURITY	COUNTER INTELLIGENCE
SUPERVISOR	1	75	5
SA'S	31	615	65

OF THE THIRTY-ONE SPECIAL AGENTS, IT IS NOTED THAT 8 ARE ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT OR MORE OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS BUT ACCOUNT FOR 55% PERCENT OF THE 615 PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY TIME AND 62 PERCENT OF THE 65 PERCENT OF COUNTER INTELLIGENCE TIME.

END PAGE 1

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
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3/10

PAGE 2

OC 105-2398

IN SUMMARY, THERE IS .75 AND .05 SUPERVISORY EQUIVALENT TIME SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, RESPECTIVELY. THERE ARE 6.15 AND .65 AGENT EQUIVALENT TIME SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, RESPECTIVELY.

END

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10:37 AM 10/25/95

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602-116395-56
NW 55118 DocId:32989628 Page 368

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

10/25
TELETYPE

NR 004 OM CODE

4:38 PM NITEL 3/25/75 BJP

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: OMAHA

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL OFFICES MARCH 24, 1975.

OMAHA CURRENTLY HAS SEVEN AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, WITH TWO AGENTS SPENDING 60 PER CENT AND TWO AGENTS SPENDING 25 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME ON IS MATTERS. ONE SUPERVISOR SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON IS MATTERS.

TWO AGENTS AND ONE SUPERVISOR SPEND APPROXIMATELY 10 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

MSE FBIHQ

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Secy	_____

✓ Budget & Acctg. Unit
602 JEH

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DATE 11/7/01 BY SP/2007/26

3/25/75

MAR 25

TELETYPE UNIT

5 43 PM 3/25

NW 55118 DocId:32989628 Page 370 62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR 002 PH CODE

245 PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 DMS

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: /PHILADELPHIA (66-NEW) (P)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

PHILA. DIVISION UTILIZES FOLLOWING PERSONNEL ON INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) INCLUDING EXTREMISTS, AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS:

	IS	CI
1 SAC	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>
1 ASAC	<u>50</u>	
1 SUPERVISOR	<u>100</u>	
1 SUPERVISOR		<u>100</u>
13 SAs AT HEADQUARTERS	100	
1 SA AT HEADQUARTERS	50	
9 SAs AT HEADQUARTERS		100
1 SA AT HEADQUARTERS		75
1 SA AT HEADQUARTERS		85

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/00 BY SP-2 NM/166

3/10/01

43

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Analyst	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
File & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Int. Rel.	_____
Intell.	_____
Interview	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

PH 66-NEW PAGE TWO

THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS SAS IN RAS:

	IS	CI
1 SA	5	
1 SA	45	45
1 SA	2	2
1 SA	50	25
1 SA	30	10
1 SA	75	20
1 SA	5	70
1 SA	2	5
1 SA	70	30
1 SA		10
1 SA	5	10
1 SA	55	15
1 SA	5	1
1 SA	1	5
1 SA	35	50
1 SA	5	3

IN SUMMARY, 16 RAS AVERAGED 24 IS, AND 19 CI.

END

KAC FBIHQ CLR

MAR 26 2 58 PM '75

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

44
MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR 003 PX PCODE

12:35 AM MARCH 26, 1975 NITEL JRL

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECT)

FROM PHOENIX (100-8529) (1P)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUNITEL MARCH 24, 1975.

PHOENIX DIVISION HAS FOLLOWING AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED

INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS:

A. INTERNAL SECURITY

ONE SUPERVISOR - 40 PER CENT

TWO AGENTS - 100 PER CENT

TWO AGENTS - 75 PER CENT

THREE AGENTS - 50 PER CENT

B. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. DOMESTIC - NONE

2. FOREIGN-

ONE SUPERVISOR - 30 PER CENT

ONE AGENT - 100 PER CENT

TWO AGENTS- 25 PER CENT

END

MPM FBIHQ CLR

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comput. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Extr. & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Int'l	_____
Leadership	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Tr. & Trng.	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Serv'y	_____

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CHIEF, COMM. C. I. A. S. T.

GOV. INVESTIGATIVE UNIT

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DISC. - 10 APR 1975

62-116395-56

45

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR 09 PG PLAIN

7:35 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 RGM

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: PITTSBURGH (62-NEW)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Int'l.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

REBUNTEL MARCH 24, 1975.

THERE ARE 110 SPECIAL AGENTS ASSIGNED TO THE PITTSBURGH OFFICE (75 HEADQUARTERS CITY AGENTS, 35 RESIDENTS AGENTS (RAS)).

ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) FULL TIME.
ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) FULL TIME.

11 HEADQUARTERS AGENTS ASSIGNED CI FULL TIME AND 7 HEADQUARTERS AGENTS ASSIGNED IS FULL TIME.

RESIDENT AGENT ASSIGNMENTS AS FOLLOWS:

6 RAS 2 PERCENT CI	5 RAS 2 PERCENT IS
3 RAS 3 PERCENT CI	2 RAS 3 PERCENT IS
3 RAS 5 PERCENT CI	1 RA 4 PERCENT IS
2 RAS 6 PERCENT CI	2 RAS 5 PERCENT IS
3 RAS 7 PERCENT CI	1 RA 7 PERCENT IS
2 RAS 8 PERCENT CI	2 RAS 11 PERCENT IS
1 RA 25 PERCENT CI	1 RA 12 PERCENT IS

END PAGE ONE

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DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/JES

3/DA

PAGE TWO, PG 62-NEW

1 RA 16 PERCENT IS

1 RA 24 PERCENT IS

1 RA 28 PERCENT IS

THE ABOVE PERCENTAGE ESTIMATES WERE ARRIVED AT BY COMPARING
THE NUMBER OF CI AND IS CASES WITH THE TOTAL CASE LOAD OF EACH RA.
END

DBS FBIHQ CLR -

AGE 100, PG CS-100

1 50 1G PERCENTAGE

1 50 2G PERCENTAGE

1 50 3G PERCENTAGE

THE ABOVE PERCENTAGE ESTIMATES ARE DETERMINED BY COMPUTATION

THE NUMBER OF CI AND IS COINCIDES WITH THE TOTAL COUNT FOR EACH STATE

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR 007 PD CODE

46
MAR 26 1975

8:57 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 LLD

TELETYPE

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: PORTLAND

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

PORLAND HAS TWO SUPERVISORY DESKS HANDLING SECURITY MATTERS. ONE DESK HANDLES ALL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) AND ACCOUNTING MATTERS. BOTH DESKS HANDLE INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND SOME CRIMINAL MATTERS. BECAUSE OF OFFICE SIZE, PERSONNEL OF BOTH DESKS NECESSARILY PARTICIAPTE IN BANK ROBBERY AND OTHER MAJOR CRIMINAL MATTERS.

ALTHOUGH NOT SPECIFICALLY ASSIGNED SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS, SAC EXPENDS TIME IN DIRECTIONAL AND OVERSIGHT CAPACITY ON CI AND IS MATTERS.

ESTIMATED SUPERVISORY TIME SPENT ON SECURITY MATTERS EXPRESSED AS PERCENTAGE:

SAC (ONE), 5 PERCENT CI, 5 PERCENT IS.

ASAC (ONE), NONE.

SUPERVISORS (TWO), 45 PERCENT CI, 85 PERCENT IS.

AGENTS AND PERCENTAGE OF TIME ON SECURITY MATTERS:

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.: Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
File & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Instruction	_____
Intell.	_____
Law Serv.	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

#MDR/6
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/KTS

3/10/88

PAGE TWO

CI: 90 PERCENT - TWO

80 PERCENT - TWO

70 PERCENT - TWO

IS: 90 PERCENT - FOUR

80 PERCENT - SIX

50 PERCENT - TWO

40 PERCENT - TWO

20 PERCENT - ONE

10 PERCENT - FOUR.

LOWER PERCENTAGES ATTEMPT TO ACCOUNT FOR TIME SPENT
BY RESIDENT AGENTS IN COVERING LEADS IN THESE FIELDS AND TO
DISCOUNT TIME SPENT ON OTHER MATTERS BY HEADQUARTERS AGENTS.
END.

TJT FBI WASH DCC LR

• 1. 5 - 12 30 AUGUST 01 PRACTICE DRILLING THE CLOUD
OF DUST AND THE DUST IS SO DENSE YOU CAN'T SEE THE DUST
• 1. 6 - 12 30 AUGUST 01 10.0 TONS OF DUST

J. S. R. J. T. P.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

47

NR004 RH PLAIN

MAR 25 1975
~~221-1175~~
C. F. M. P. D.

3:50 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 EJM

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SEC.
FROM RICHMOND 1P

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL TO ALL SACS MAR 24, 1975.

RICHMOND HAS ONE AGENT ASSIGNED APPROXIMATELY 30 PERCENT
OF HIS TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND NO AGENTS ASSIGNED TO
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONE SUPERVISOR DEVOTES LESS
THAN 5 PERCENT OF HIS TIME TO SUCH CASES.

END

DBS FBIHQ CLR

Asst. Dir.
Dep. A.D. _____
Dep. A.D.-Int. _____
Asst. Dir. _____
Ad. In. _____
Couns. Secy. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Fin. & Com. _____
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Laboratory _____
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Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

Budget Accounting
Room 6A-876

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DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 AM/196

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JAN 25 5 10 PM '75

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 27 1975

NR002 SC PLAIN

9:23 AM URGENT 3/27/75 VLS

TO DIRECTOR
FROM SACRAMENTO (66-511)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

IN HEADQUARTERS, SACRAMENTO HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. 7 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS; 3 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS; 1 AGENT EXPENDS 75 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND 25 PERCENT TO INTERNAL SECURITY.

IN RESIDENT AGENCIES, 1 AGENT WITH 90 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 10 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; 1 AGENT WITH 50 PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY AND 50 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. 7 RAS HANDLE VARIETY OF CLASSIFICATIONS AND ALSO HANDLE INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. THESE 7 AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS (20 PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY, 5 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE).

END

FBIHQ CLR SMD

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Int. Action	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

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62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 27 1975

49
~~TELETYPE~~

*✓ Budget & Accounting
Section
RNI aged JEH*

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
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Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

NR001 SL PLAIN

8:30AM URGENT 3/27/75 TJO

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM ST. LOUIS (94-297) RUC

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUNTEL TO ALL SACS MARCH 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL
ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS
IN THE ST. LOUIS DIVISION AS REQUESTED BY RE COMMUNICATION.

NEITHER THE SAC OR THE ASAC ARE ASSIGNED TO
INTERNAL SECURITY OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONLY ONE
SUPERVISOR IS ASSIGNED TO SUCH MATTERS, HE SPENDS APPROXIMATELY
55 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND TWO PERCENT ON
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

SIX AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 75 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME
ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND ONE PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
MATTERS.

THE REMAINING AGENTS SPEND NO TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
MATTERS BUT SPEND THE LISTED PERCENTAGE OF TIME ON INTERNAL
SECURITY: THREE AGENTS, 50 PERCENT; THREE AGENTS, 25 PERCENT;
ONE AGENT, 10 PERCENT; TWO AGENTS, 5 PERCENT, TWO AGENTS, 2
PERCENT.

TMOB
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DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/JOB

3/27/75

PAGE TWO S. 94-297

ABOVE FIGURES REFLECT BOTH HEADQUARTERS CITY AND
RESIDENT AGENTS IN THIS DIVISION.

END

JDR

FBIHQ CLR

TESTED
TELETYPE UNIT

MAR 27 9 34 AM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR006 SU PLAIN

8:46 AM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 VLD

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
(ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)
FROM: SALT LAKE CITY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ASIM/TB

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

✓ Budget Dept.
602-547-5411

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TELETYPE MARCH 24, 1975.

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS IN SALT LAKE CITY DIVISION AS FOLLOWS:

SAC: NONE.

ASAC: TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT IS, 10 PERCENT CI).

SUPERVISORS: NONE.

SPECIAL AGENTS: ONE FULL TIME (70 PERCENT IS, 30 PERCENT CI).
ONE FULL TIME (70 PERCENT CI, 30 PERCENT IS). ONE TWENTY PERCENT
(15 PERCENT IS, 5 PERCENT CI). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT IS,
10 PERCENT CI). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT CI, 10 PERCENT IS).
TWO TEN PERCENT EACH ON IS.
END. M

3/27/87

MAIL ROOM NUMBER 1331
P-112, 3331-3332

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MAR 26 10:51 AM '75

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62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR006 SU PLAIN

MAR 26 1975

Re
TELETYPE

846 AM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 VLD
TO: DPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
FROM: SALT LAKE CITY

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
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Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

✓ Budget Affairs
602 & Tech

RE BUREAU TELETYPE MARCH 24, 1975.

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS IN SALT LAKE CITY DIVISION AS FOLLOWS:

SAC: NONE.

ASAC: TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT IS, 10 PERCENT CI).

SUPERVISORS: NONE.

SPECIAL AGENTS: ONE FULL TIME (70 PERCENT IS, 30 PERCENT CI).

ONE FULL TIME (70 PERCENT CI, 30 PERCENT IS). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (15 PERCENT IS, 5 PERCENT CI). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT IS, 10 PERCENT CI). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT CI, 10 PERCENT IS). TWO TEN PERCENT EACH ON IS.

END.

JTG FBIHQ CLR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/01 BY SP-2/EM/16 #MOB16

3/1/11

REF ID: A79414
2022 RELEASE UNDER E.O. 14176

TELETYPE

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS - APRIL 1975

MAR 26 10 57 AM '75

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602-116395-56

MR005 SA CODE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

6:55PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975

MAR 25 1975
LPP/SCW

TO DIRECTOR

TELETYPE

FROM SAN ANTONIO

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

✓ R-6028

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Compt. Sect	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
File & C.m.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
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Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

REBUTEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

SAC ONLY SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL HANDLING SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN SAN ANTONIO OFFICE. ASAC AND SUPERVISORS HAVE NO SUPERVISION OF THESE MATTERS. SAC SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 20 PER CENT OF TIME ON SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND TEN PER CENT OF TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

THREE AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND 4TH AGENT DEDICATES APPROXIMATELY 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME TO THESE MATTERS.

FIVE AGENTS ASSIGNED EXCLUSIVELY TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, THIS BEING A MATTER BEING HANDLED AS A SPECIAL.

E N D.....

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/16/2016 BY SP2 ALM/215

3/6/7

CLASSIFIED AS CODE

TOP

CASE 11 MARCH 25, 1975

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SAN ANTONIO

TOP

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL SECURITY OR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
ATT: SUPERVISOR AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

PRESIDENT, MARCH 25, 1975.

SAC OFFICE SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL HANDLING SUBMISSION

OF INTERNAL SECURITY AND COMMUNICABLE DISEASE MATTERS TO SAN
ANTONIO OFFICE. ASV AND SUPERVISORS HAVE NO PUPILIZATION OF
THESE MATTERS. SAC OFFICES APPROXIMATELY 20 PER CENT OF TIME ON
SUBMISSION OF INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND TEN PER CENT OF TIME
ON COMMUNICABLE DISEASE MATTERS.

THREE PERCENT ASSIGNS FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTER
AT A TIME APPROXIMATELY 20 PER CENT OF THE TIME
THESE MATTERS.

THIS PERCENT ASSIGNS EXCLUSIVELY TO COMMUNICABLE DISEASE
WHICH IS TREATED AS A SPECIAL.

***** C N G *****

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MAR 25 7 15 PM '75
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62-116395-56

NR 02 SD CODED

12:11AM MARCH 26, 1975 NTEL GDF

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAN DIEGO (66-NEW)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS SUPERVISORY AND AGENT TIME DEVOTED
TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN THE SAN
DIEGO DIVISION:

SAC - SIX PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND EXTREMIST
MATTERS; TWO PERCENT ON COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ASAC - SIX PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND EXTREMIST MATTERS;
TWO PERCENT ON COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ONE SUPERVISOR - 40 PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS;
40 PERCENT ON COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ONE SUPERVISOR - 20 PERCENT OF TIME ON EXTREMIST MATTERS.

SEVEN AGENTS - EACH 100 PERCENT ON COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

TEN AGENTS - EACH 100 PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY
MATTERS.

FOUR AGENTS - EACH 100 PERCENT OF TIME ON EXTREMIST MATTERS.

END

THAT IS ALL

SSSSSSS

MPM FBIHQ CLR

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
C. & Sys.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Mike C. Comm.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
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Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Staff	_____

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Ext. Affairs
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Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 004 SF CODE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

12:28 PM URGENT 3/26/75 MCC

MAR 26 1975

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SAN FRANCISCO

ATTN BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

TELETYPE

RE BUNITEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING BREAKDOWN EXCLUDES ON A PERCENTAGE BASIS
MAN DAYS SPENT ON CRIMINAL MATTERS BY AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL
SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CASES.

SAN FRANCISCO HAS 70 AGENTS AND 5 SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED
FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY. IT HAS 73 AGENTS AND 3 SUPERVISORS
FULL TIME AND ONE ADDITIONAL SUPERVISOR 25 PER CENT TIME ASSIGNED
TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. ONE SAC AND ONE ASAC 25 PER CENT EACH
ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

END

IEWTZ

JTG FBIHQ

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/jmg

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MAR 26

3:26 PM '75

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62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975
~~TELETYPE~~

NR003 SJ CODE

10:06 PM NITEL 3-25-75 JXC

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
FROM SAN JUAN

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REFERENCE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE
DATED MARCH 24, 1975, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.

THE FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF SUPERVISOR AND AGENT
PERSONNEL IN THE SAN JUAN DIVISION ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY
MATTERS:

ONE SUPERVISOR - FULL TIME; ONE SUPERVISOR - TWENTY PER
CENT OF THE TIME; FOURTEEN SPECIAL AGENTS - FULL TIME; THREE
SPECIAL AGENTS - FIFTY PER CENT OF THE TIME.

AT THIS TIME, THE SAN JUAN DIVISION HAS NO COUNTERINTELLI-
GENCE MATTERS IN A PENDING STATUS; THEREFORE, NO AGENT PERSONNEL
ARE ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

END.

DBS FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE GA

Asst. Dir.	_____
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Dep. A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. By	_____
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Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

Budget Reporting
60-874

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2/MW/HK

3/1/11

MRSG 27 CO2E

11:15 AM MDT 5-22-56 TAC

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: DIRECTOR AND ACCORDING SECTION

FROM MR. KENNETH R. MCNAUL

REMARKS: COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REMARKS: DRUGS, TEL. WIRE TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN COUNTRY

REMARKS: CALLING FOR A LINE.

THE CALLING IS A COMMUNICATION OF DISCUSSION FOR AN AGENT
MEMBER IN THE SAME DIVISION WHICH IS IN THE SAME SECURITY

ATTACH:

ONE SUPERVISOR - UNIT TIME; ONE SUPERVISOR - TRUSTY PER

ONE OF THE TIME; FOURTEEN SPECIAL AGENTS - UNIT TIME; ONE

SPECIAL AGENTS - IRITY FOR CERT OF THE TIME.

AT THIS TIME, THE STAFF DIVISION HAS NO COMMUNICATIONS

MEMBERS IN A POSITION STATE THEREFORE, IT APPEARS SOME

ONE ASSOCIATED WITH COMMUNICATIONS.

ONE AGENT

55

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
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Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

NR002 SV CODE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

715 PM NITEL 3/25/75 PNR

MAR 25 1975
VCA

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SAVANNAH

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

✓ REK/HB

REBUNITEL ALL SACS MARCH 24, 1975.

IN RESPONSE TO RENITEL, THE FOLLOWING BREAKDOWN IN PERSONNEL ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IS BEING SET FORTH:

INTERNAL SECURITY		COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
1 SAC	0	0
1 ASAC	0	0
1 SUPERVISOR	40 PERCENT	10 PERCENT
1 AGENT	90 "	0
1 AGENT	50 "	10 PERCENT
1 AGENT	10 "	0
1 AGENT	0	30 PERCENT

ALL OTHER AGENTS' ACCUMULATIVE TOTAL OF TIME WOULD EQUAL 10 PERCENT FOR INTERNAL SECURITY AND 0 FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FOR ONE AGENT.

END

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

56

NR002 SE CODED

3:59 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 CSC

TO DIRECTOR
FROM SEATTLE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

SEATTLE DIVISION HAS THE FOLLOWING ASSIGNMENTS TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS:

ONE SUPERVISOR- FULLTIME; FIVE AGENTS - FULLTIME; THREE AGENTS - 85PERCENT OF THEIR TIME.

SEATTLE DIVISION HAS THE FOLLOWING ASSIGNMENTS TO COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE MATTERS:

ONE SUPERVISOR: 80 PER CENT OF TIME; SEVEN AGENTS - FULLTIME.

END

HOLD FOR ONE MORE

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ert. Affairs	_____
Fil. & Com.	_____
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Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

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DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 AMW/WG

3/P/J

EDD AND THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, WHICH WAS ENACTED
BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON JULY 2, 1964, AND BY THE SENATE
ON JULY 24, 1964, AND WHICH WAS SIGNED INTO LAW BY PRESIDENT LYNDON
B. JOHNSON ON AUGUST 29, 1964, IS A LANDMARK
LAW WHICH PROHIBITS DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RACE, COLOR,
NATIONAL ORIGIN, RELIGION, AND SEX IN VARIOUS FIELDS OF
LIFE, INCLUDING EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION, AND HOUSING.

THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 IS A MAJOR PART OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION WHICH HAS BEEN PASSED SINCE THE
END OF WORLD WAR II, AND IT IS A MAJOR STEP FORWARD IN THE
FIGHT AGAINST DISCRIMINATION AND IN THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY AND
FAIRNESS FOR ALL AMERICANS.

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MAY 25 1969 PM 75

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR 013 SI CODE

MAR 26 1975

10:22 PM NITEL 3-26-75 DJK

~~TO DIRECTOR~~

TELETYPE

(ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM SPRINGFIELD (66) 3

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL SAC'S MARCH 24, 1975.

AN ESTIMATE OF THE TIME SPENT BY AGENTS OF THE SPRINGFIELD DIVISION ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IS AS FOLLOWS:

THIRTY-SIX AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 17 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. ONE OF THE ABOVE SAs SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, AND ONE OTHER SA SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 17 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONE SUPERVISOR SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND APPROXIMATELY 5 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WHILE ANOTHER SUPERVISOR SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 15 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SURITY MATTERS.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/HGS

SI 66-

PAGE TWO

THE SPRINGFIELD DIVISION DOES NOT HAVE ANY SQUADS OF AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO THESE MATTERS AND THE ABOVE ESTIMATE HAS BEEN DETERMINED FROM THE UTILIZATION OF TIMES SPENT DURING A TWO-WEEK PERIOD ON MATTERS BY AGENTS OF THE SPRINGFIELD DIVISION.

E N D

DBS FBIHQ CLR

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

58

MAR 26 1970

TELETYPE

NR010 TP CODE

6-10PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 JFD

TO DIRECTOR

FROM TAMPA (105-0)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUNITEL MARCH 24, 1975, REQUESTING THAT EACH SAC SUTEL THE NUMBER OF AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

TAMPA HAS ONE SQUAD WHICH HANDLES INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AS WELL AS OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS, SUCH AS APPLICANT, SELECTIVE SERVICE, DESERTERS, AND EXTREMISTS.

NONE OF THE AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF 1 AGENT WHO IS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

THE PERCENTAGE OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IS AN ACCUMULATION OF THE TIME SPENT BY EACH AGENT WORKING SUCH MATTERS.

INTERNAL SECURITY - SUPERVISOR, 20 PERCENT; AGENTS, 3.5
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE - SUPERVISOR, 15 PERCENT; AGENTS, 1.5.

END

moe 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/JAS

Assoc Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp Svst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Intell.	_____
Lab. Analy.	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Dir. Sec'y	_____

3/16

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR004 WF CODED

59
MAR 26 1975

2:57PM URGENT 3-26-75 KLS

TELETYPE

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, WFO

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
A.D. Asst.	_____
C. D. Syst.	_____
Int'l. Affairs	_____
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Int'l. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
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Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

ATTENTION BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

✓ Budget & Objects
6028 JEM

REGARDING BUREAU NTEL DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE (WFO) HAS ONE ASAC DEVOTING
12 PERCENT OF TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND 78 PERCENT
TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CD MATTERS, THE REMAINING 10
PERCENT BEING ADMINISTRATIVE, POLICE AND LIAISON DUTIES.

IN ADDITION, WFO HAS 162 SPECIAL AGENTS AND 6
SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO CI, AND 21 SPECIAL
AGENTS AND 1 SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO IS MATTERS.
ONE ADDITIONAL SUPERVISOR DEVOTES 75 PERCENT OF HIS TIME
TO CI MATTERS AND 25 PERCENT TO IS MATTERS.

END.

JRM FBIHQ

CLR

moe/b
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DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

3/11

MAR 26 3 02 PM '75

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62-116395-56

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES;
RODERICK HILLS, ASSOCIATE
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

DATE: 4/4/75

DOWNGRADED TO ~~SECRET~~
~~(60324 UC BAW/SAB/mL)~~
1/12/2011

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

AM0816 1-17-01
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Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD, Adm. _____
Dir. AD-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
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Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

Memorandum captioned as above, 3/27/75, from Legal Counsel to you, noted that you and Wannall were to meet with Mr. Hills and Mr. Phillip Buchen, Counsel to the President, on 3/28/75. Your addendum to the memorandum pointed out the results of this meeting and the various matters discussed.

As a follow-up to this meeting, you, Legal Counsel Mintz and Wannall met on 4/4/75 with Mr. James Wilderotter, who is presently working under Mr. Buchen in coordinating intelligence community matters relating to the inquiries underway by the Senate Select Committee. Mr. Wilderotter was given a briefing similar to that which had been afforded to Buchen and Hills. In addition, the discussion covered matters of a sensitive nature relating to the ORCHID and similar programs, electronic surveillances, specialized handling of informants, and Bureau Source 4 (access to social security records). Many of these matters discussed covered topics with which Mr. Wilderotter had become familiar when he was assigned to the Department as an Assistant to former Deputy Attorney General Silberman. (S)

Wilderotter said it was the feeling at The White House that while raw FBI files should not be made available to the Committee, it might be necessary to permit the Committee to review a few such files in order that the integrity of the FBI could be established with the Committee. It was pointed out to him that we did not agree to this; that we could furnish summaries of material from the files. Wilderotter said he did not feel that

WRW:dsh

(5) *[Signature]*

REC-11 62-116395-55

CONTINUED - OVER

8 APR 11 1975

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified by 12 *[initials]*
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

5/15/75

24 APR 16 1975

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~TOP SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES;
~~RODERICK HILLS ASSOCIATE~~
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

furnishing reports and letterhead memoranda which had been prepared for dissemination would satisfy the Committee's needs. He was advised by both you and Mr. Mintz that it was our feeling that we should not furnish the raw material but summaries could be prepared for the Committee's purposes and if necessary, Bureau officials could be placed under oath and attest to the correctness of the summaries. Wilderotter said that this was a matter which he would afford further consideration.

As during the conference with Buchen and Hills, it was obvious as the result of our meeting with Wilderotter that The White House was most anxious that it not be caught by surprise by revelations of activities which in any way might be considered questionable. The White House is making every effort possible to become cognizant of any such situation prior to the Committee hearings.

Classified "Top Secret" to protect highly sensitive investigative techniques and matters relating to foreign relations.

ACTION:

For information. Further contacts with Wilderotter or other White House Staff Members will be duly reported.

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

DATE: 4/4/75

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
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Ext. Affairs _____
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Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

This will confirm that on 4/4/75 Mr. James Wilderotter of the White House orally approved the Bureau's dissemination to the Senate Select Committee the following two memoranda: confidential memorandum of J. Edgar Hoover dated 8/24/36, confidential memorandum from John Edgar Hoover dated 8/25/36, both dealing with conversations Mr. Hoover had with the President.

ACTION:

For record purposes.

WOC:aso (3)

1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. L. Lacey

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/HG

REC-53 62-116395-54

APR 8 1975

54 APR 1 1975

SWB

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 8, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a response to a request set forth in referenced letter. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records. Processing of the additional requests is continuing on an expeditious basis and further responses will be forthcoming.

Enclosures - 2


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EX-110 REC-38
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Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

57 APR 16 1975

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr.Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 8, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

One of the requests contained in referenced letter was for a list of names and titles of all Intelligence Division personnel at FBI Headquarters down to and including unit chiefs, together with a number of personnel below the level of unit chief categorized by unit. At a meeting on April 1, 1975, Inspector John B. Hotis and Special Agent Paul V. Daly discussed this request with Mr. William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee. It was agreed that the request as stated would be modified and that the FBI would prepare a list of personnel in the Intelligence Division down to the level of unit chief, with names included, which would be made available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the committee staff at FBI Headquarters.

This is to advise that the list has been prepared and is available for review under the above conditions.

1 - The Attorney General

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

EWL:jvl
(7)

AMDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 11/7/01 BY SP2 ALM/HG

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

GPO 954-545

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/04 BY SP-2 ALM/ZTG

#moe/16

Access only

check 7/28

#MPC16
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DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

62-111375-53
ENCLOSURE

AMCRLB 1-17-61
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/FIG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X/6

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DATE 8/24/09 BY SP-2 ALM/FIG

JK

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

W. Raymond Wannall
Assistant Director

Thomas W. Leavitt
Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director
Counterintelligence Branch

Hunter E. Helgeson
Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director
Internal Security Branch

4:00 p.m. to midnight Supervisor
F. Anthony Tansey

Midnight to 8:00 a.m. Supervisor
Harry E. Morris, Jr.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH

Section CI-1

William A. Branigan

Section Chief

Eugene C. Peterson

Number 1 Man

Special Cases Unit

Unit Chief

James P. Lee

Five Special Agents

New York Unit

Unit Chief

Alfred E. Smith

Five Special Agents

Washington Unit Chief

Unit Chief

Wilfred R. Schlarman

Four Special Agents

One Special Agent on special assignment at National War College.

Section CI-2

William O. Cregar

Section Chief

James W. Redfield

Number 1 Man

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

(S)
Chinese Unit
Herbert J. Morgan
Five Special Agents

Unit Chief

Satellite Unit
Howard H. Wallace
Three Special Agents

Unit Chief

Coordination Unit
John P. Thomas
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

Section CI-3

Forrest S. Putman, Jr. Section Chief

Sebastian S. Mignosa Number 1 Man

Bombing-Antiriot Laws Unit
Richard J. Daily Unit Chief
Four Special Agents

Middle East Unit
(S) Carl F. Freeman
Three Special Agents

Unit Chief

Far East Unit
(S) William W. Hamilton
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

Cuban Unit
(S) Charles H. McCarthy
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

Nationality Unit
Vinicio Henry Nasca
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

Section CI-4

Homer A. Boynton, Jr. Section Chief

H. C. Flemister, Jr. Number 1 Man

Liaison Supervisors
Six

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Foreign Liaison Unit
Robert A. Birmingham
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH

IS-1 Section

Joseph G. Deegan Section Chief

William H. Atkinson Number 1 Man

Black Nationalist and White
Hate - Central Unit
William D. Neumann
Two Special Agents Unit Chief

Black Nationalist and White
Hate - East Unit
Paul E. Nugent
Two Special Agents Unit Chief

Black Nationalist and White
Hate - West Unit
Garnett T. Tunstall
Three Special Agents Unit Chief

Black Nationalist - South,
Klan and Informant Unit
Homer A. Newman, Jr.
Two Special Agents Unit Chief

Civil Disorders Reporting Unit
Seymor F. Phillips
Two Special Agents Unit Chief

IS-2 Section

Robert L. Shackelford Section Chief
Conrad W. Thompson Number 1 Man

Trotskyist Unit	
George J. Lex, Jr.	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Communist Party Unit	
Louis J. Brune, Jr.	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Security Informant Unit	
Edward P. Grigalus	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Extremist-West Unit	
William N. Preusse	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Extremist-East Unit	
Thomas J. McNiff	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	

Section IS-3

Arthur B. Fulton	Section Chief
Fred J. Cassidy	Number 1 Man
Training Unit	
Elmer W. Larson, Jr.	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Central Research Unit	
Robert P. Finzel	Unit Chief
Four Special Agents	
Special Records and Related Research Unit	
Russell H. Horner	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Analytical Research Unit	
David Ryan	Unit Chief
Seven Special Agents	

#M0216 1-17-61
CLASSIFIED BY SP2 AM 1/25/66
DECLASSIFY ON: 25K6

~~SECRET~~

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

W. Raymond Wannall
Assistant Director

Thomas W. Leavitt
Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director
Counterintelligence Branch

Hunter E. Helgeson
Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director
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4:00 p.m. to midnight Supervisor
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(S)

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Three Special Agents

Unit Chief

(S)

Far East Unit

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Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

(S)

Cuban Unit

Charles H. McCarthy
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

Nationality Unit

Vinicio Henry Nasca
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

Section CI-4

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H. C. Flemister, Jr. Number 1 Man

Liaison Supervisors

Six

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IS-2 Section

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Conrad W. Thompson	Number 1 Man

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Communist Party Unit	
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Section 1S-3

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Robert P. Finzel	Unit Chief
Four Special Agents	
Special Records and Related	
Research Unit	
Russell H. Horner	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Analytical Research Unit	
David Ryan	Unit Chief
Seven Special Agents	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/3/75

THE NUMBER OF FBI FIELD OFFICE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO
INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Based on a survey of all FBI field offices, it has been determined that matters relating to internal security and counterintelligence require the following commitment of manpower in FBI field offices, stated in terms of equivalent full-year employees:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Total Equivalent Full- Year Agent Employees
Internal Security	2.80	1.75	47.06	671.07	722.68
Counterintelligence	2.34	2.16	46.18	904.29	954.97

These equivalent full-year employees represent the following percentages of total field office agent personnel assigned as of 2/28/75:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Percent of Total Agent Personnel
Internal Security	4.2%	2.9%	11.9%	9.5%	9.5%
Counterintelligence	3.5%	3.6%	11.7%	12.8%	12.6%

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/LZG
ON 1-17-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by _____
Exempt from CDS, Category 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/3/75

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#MOR16
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ON 1-17-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9
Classified by _____
Exempt from SDS, Category 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/2/75

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ON 1-17-01

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Exempt from ADS, Category 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/3/75

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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ON 1-17-01

9
Classified by _____
Exempt from EDS, Category 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3-21-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: JOHN T. ELLIFF
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF POLITICS
BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY
WALTHAM, MASSACHUSETTS

#MOP 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 1123101 BY SP-2 ATM

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir. _____
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

On 3-18-75 Professor John T. Elliff advised Inspector John B. Hotis that he had been contacted by William Miller, Staff Director for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, and was asked to serve as Director of the Committee's Task Force on Domestic Intelligence. This is one of four Task Forces being formed by the Select Committee and it will focus primarily on the activities of the FBI. The other Task Forces are on Foreign Intelligence, Military and Technological Intelligence, and Command and Control.

Elliff said he had not decided whether to accept the offer and believed that others were also being considered for the position. He said he was reluctant to do anything that would interfere with the excellent working arrangements he had developed with the Bureau. He feels that his initial obligation is to the Director, and the purpose of going to the Police Foundation was to get formal support for a project that would be of primary benefit to the Bureau and only secondarily to the Attorney General and Congress. He said he would be guided by our judgment in this matter and not want to break any commitments that he might have made with the Bureau.

If he accepts the appointment Elliff said he would, of course, suspend work on his research project until he had terminated his employment with the Committee. He said he would also agree not to use any classified material that he acquired in his capacity as Task Force Director. Elliff has discussed this matter with John Heaphy, Assistant Director of the Police Foundation. Heaphy said the Foundation had no objections whatsoever for his accepting the position with the Senate Select Committee, and he would be free to resume his project after the Committee work was done.

REC-10 62-116395-52

NOT RECORDED
02 APR 10 1975

REC MAR 28 1975

1 - Mr. Adams

1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. Mintz

1 - Mr. Reed

1 - Mr. Farrington

1 - Mr. Hotis 4 APR 1 1975

JBH:dkg (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

Legal Counsel to Adams Memo
RE: JOHN T. ELLIFF

DC.
It should be noted that the Select Committee considered offering the position to Larry Baskir, Counsel to the President's Clemency Board. Mr. Baskir formerly served as Chief Counsel to Senator Ervin's Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, and we had numerous contacts with him in that capacity. Our purpose was to reach some common agreement on privacy legislation that Senator Ervin planned to introduce in the 93rd Session of Congress. There were numerous meetings with Baskir on the same subject in the Deputy Attorney General's office. These efforts proved unsuccessful and after several months we discontinued the discussions. In our opinion, Mr. Baskir was unwilling to work out any reasonable compromise and seemed unsympathetic to the ^{Committee} legislation concerns of law enforcement.

It is clear that this is a matter for Professor Elliff to determine and the Bureau should not express an official opinion. Although we have not always agreed with his views on intelligence matters, we have had no occasion to question his objectivity or his integrity as a scholar. Mr. Miller knows that Professor Elliff enjoys our confidence and it is our understanding that he offered Elliff the position in order to avoid an adversary relationship between the Bureau and the Committee.

Professor Elliff said he would make no commitments to the Senate Committee until he hears from us.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Professor Elliff be advised that it would be inappropriate for us to express an opinion on whether he should accept the appointment offered by the Senate Select Committee.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall *W.R.W.*

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams

DATE: 3/31/75

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Counsel _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community (hereafter referred to as the Group), held at CIA Headquarters on the afternoon of 3/25/75. *[Signature]*

This meeting was chaired by Mr. Colby in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence. In attendance were Mr. Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President; the then Deputy AG Laurence Silberman, Associate Deputy AG James Wilderotter; Mr. John Clarke, as well as officials from Defense, Treasury, National Security Council, Office of Management and Budget, and the Energy Research and Development Administration. *[Signature]*

The following items of interest were discussed:

Mr. William G. Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee (SSC), and the Committee's Counsel, Mr. F.A.O. Schwarz, III, visited CIA Headquarters to discuss SSC business. Mr. Miller suggested that a tactic the SSC was considering is the identification of several key issues that the Committee could look into in-depth. For example, the SSC might propose to identify two or three covert actions engaged in by CIA and examine them in-depth rather than try to cover each and every covert action CIA might identify. Colby advised that this appeared to be an encouraging development and possibly each agency of the Intelligence Community might be asked to provide a series of key issues from which the Select Committee could select one or two for an in-depth study.

EX 104 REC-10 62-116395-51
The question of the SSC staff signing a Secrecy Agreement is still not settled. The Staff Director raised some constitutional questions regarding the Secrecy Agreement. Mr. Schwarz admitted, however, that some type of arrangement would have to be made to insure that the Intelligence Community had some protection against unauthorized disclosures by staff members of the SSC.

Enclosures

WOC:ebc

(7) *dr*

CONTINUED - OVER

11348
ENCLOSURE
APR 14 1975

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75

Both Miller and Schwarz accepted the Third Agency Rule and agreed to abide by it. For the record, the SSC's interpretation of the Third Agency Rule (which is consistent with the Intelligence Community) is as follows: Classified information or material originating in one department shall not be disseminated outside any other department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating department.

The Security Committee of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) will meet to develop some ground rules and standardization for sanitizing documents to be furnished to the Select Committees.

The question of Intelligence Community personnel being represented by counsel was discussed. The position of the White House on this issue has been fully reported in a memorandum from the Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams, dated 3/27/75, entitled "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, Rodney Hills Associate Counsel to the President."

It was also agreed at the meeting of 3/25/75 that the President's Counsel would attempt to negotiate with the SSC to insure that all interviews of Intelligence Community personnel would be conducted on the premises of the bureau, agency or department employing the persons to be interviewed.

Attached also for the record are the following:

A letter dated 3/20/75 from Staff Director William G. Miller to Mr. John Clarke advising that Mr. Ben Marshall has been designated as the Security Officer of the SSC;

A letter dated 3/17/75 from Mr. Miller to Mr. Clarke listing employees of the SSC who have been cleared by the Committee for certification by CIA for access to classified information up to and including "Top Secret";

A letter from Mr. Miller to Mr. Clarke dated 3/20/75 advising that Mr. Ben Marshall was cleared for access to classified information up to and including "Top Secret";

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75

A memorandum from the Chairman of the USIB Security Committee advising that arrangements had been perfected for the delivery of classified documents to the SSC and describing how such documents should be delivered.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

WPA/TWk

PLM

grm

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER
CHARLES MCC. MAUL, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 20, 1975

Mr. John Clarke
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear John:

Mr. Ben Marshall, Security Officer of the Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, has been designated Compartmentation Officer.

Sincerely,

William Green Miller

William G. Miller

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/01 BY SP2 ALM/jcs
#m0816

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-51

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
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(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 17, 1975

Mr. John Clarke
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20505

#MOP16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JMC

Dear John:

Thank you for your letter of March 13, outlining a procedure for clearance for the Select Committee staff. The procedure you have suggested has been adopted and attached to this letter is the Select Committee's first listing of staff who have been cleared by the Committee. This listing is the result of the investigation undertaken by the FBI and a consideration of the FBI reports on individuals by the Chairman. As further investigations by the FBI are received, we will send additional persons to be granted clearances.

As to access to compartmentalized information, those members of the staff who will be designated will be indicated to you in subsequent communications.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

William G. Miller

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-51

ATTACHMENT

The following staff officials of the Senate Select Committee as identified below by date and place of birth and social security number have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are hereby certified as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH</u>	<u>SOCIAL SECURITY NO.</u>
Charity Benz	7-23-46 N.Y.	[REDACTED]
Michael Taylor Epstein	3-10-37 Mass.	[REDACTED]
Mark Henry Gitenstein	3-7-46 Ala.	JFK Act 6 (3)
Audrey Helen Hatry	6-10-23 Md.	[REDACTED]
Lawrence Kieves	1-4-48 N.Y.	068-38-6464
Michael James Madigan	4-18-43 D.C.	[REDACTED]
Elliot Everett Maxwell	7-24-46 N.Y.	JFK Act 6 (3)
Martha Evans Mecham	2-11-40 Cal.	528-48-6848
James Daniel O'Flaherty	11-4-42 Ill.	[REDACTED]
Jan Orloff	11-14-47 Cal.	[REDACTED]
John F. Peterson	6-15-41 Cal.	JFK Act 6 (3)
Lewis Brittle Snider	1-12-45 N.C.	[REDACTED]
Burton Victor Wides	6-14-41 N.J.	[REDACTED]

As the FBI completes its investigative work, other names will be sent to you.

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MORRIS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWAB, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

Ad Hoc Staff

75-181

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 20, 1975

Mr. John Clarke
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear John:

The following staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities as identified below by date and place of birth and social security number has received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and is hereby certified as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

Benjamin Marshall, May 4, 1919, Walnut (now Verdigre)
Nebraska, soc sec no 485-28-4530

Sincerely,

William G. Miller

William G. Miller

AMOR 16
SEARCHED
INDEXED
SERIALIZED
FILED
1-17-75
SP-2 ALM/ZTG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-51

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECURITY COMMITTEE

SECOM-D-49
21 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of USIB on
Congressional Review

SUBJECT : Security - Arrangements for Receipt of Classified
Material by Senate Select Committee

1. On 19 March 1975 I telephonically inquired of Mr. Benjamin C. Marshall, Security Officer of the Senate Select Committee, whether he was in a position to begin receiving classified documents. He advised that arrangements had been perfected and that effective 20 March 1975 such documents could be delivered as follows:

The courier should enter the 1st and C Street entrance of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, inquire of the guard as to the location of Room G308, go to the front door of G308, advise the guard there that material is being delivered and have him call Mr. Marshall or Charity Benz, both of whom are authorized to receive classified documents up to and including TOP SECRET*.

2. Mr. Marshall requested that prior to delivery he or someone in his office be telephonically advised (224-1700) of the impending delivery and the estimated time of arrival so that he or someone from his office can be available. He also stated that if delivery was desired to a specific staff member, Mr. Marshall would try and have such person available, but stated he was authorized to accept documents for members of the Committee and staff.

3. The Committee has not yet advised as to compartmented clearances but Mr. Marshall has been designated Compartmentation

*Mr. Patrick Shea is expected to be added as a person to receive documents but the certification for this access to classified material has not as yet been received by your office.

ENCLOSURE

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Officer and has advised that the same delivery arrangements will be in effect for compartmented material. When necessary clearance arrangements have been perfected so that delivery of compartmented material can begin, you will be advised.

Donald E. Moore
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Chairman